2011 presidential polls: How the results may stand

Let me state at this juncture that though experiences of past elections can be very instructive to the present course, it should however be borne in mind that each election has its own distinct campaign features that can be totally unrelated to those of others but which determine the elections outcome. Indeed, to a very […]

Let me state at this juncture that though experiences of past elections can be very instructive to the present course, it should however be borne in mind that each election has its own distinct campaign features that can be totally unrelated to those of others but which determine the elections outcome. Indeed, to a very large extent, the 2011 presidential campaign is markedly distinct from previous national campaigns in three fundamental ways.

Firstly, there is an attempt on the part of government to build a national consensus in which members of the majority are being persuaded and convinced to elect a member of a minority as president (in the person of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, GCFR). This has never been the case before. Secondly, in practical terms, this is altogether a complex political scenario for the country with its own peculiar features distinct from any other in the past. For example, three key elements are discernibly involved and form the central political implications and complications for a minority/Goodluck presidency in 2011. These are – compromise on the ingenious zoning formula which arguably is being put forth as the basis of our national unity and stability; Resource Control, Derivation and the National Economy; and, Igbo Presidency. Thirdly, the Obasanjo leadership and the misuse of incumbency to achieve set political/electoral goals is today a poignant national lesson that is defining people’s response to incumbency politics. Indeed, the central fulcrum around which the electoral reforms and the hullabaloo for credible elections revolve is devising the cure for this spreading illness termed as “incumbentitis”. These three issues lie beneath the current presidential campaigns and will be the key determinants of the presidential election results for all candidates.

At independence, the key driver of political consideration was the fear of one ethnic group being dominated by another among the various ethnic groups of the country.  This fear was two-fold – the fear of domination among the three major ethnic groups and regions; i.e. the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yoruba in the West and the Igbos in the East and the fear of the minority ethnic groups being dominated by the majority group in their respective regions.

These fears in effect affected the character of Nigerian federation in two ways.  First, it created a tripartite struggle (and hence conflict) for political supremacy among the three major ethnic nationalities.  This partly derived from, and partly helped to structure, Nigeria’s national politics, which invariably became the politics of the ethnic groups, of their religions and of their regions.  Second, the structure and practice of the national politics became a challenge to the minority ethnic nationalities. To these minorities, it was clear that they were in for an internal imperial domination by their big brothers. This being a threat to their economic and political aspirations, the structure and politics of post independence leadership in Nigeria engendered in the submerged minorities a deep suspicion of, and even dislike for, the majority groups in their respective regions.  This in turn led to the emergence of a fierce resistance from the minority groups at the regional level. These groups therefore always looked out for alliance with major ethnic groups of other regions.

With this in mind, therefore, one can peep through into the coming presidential election with a view to predicting its likely outcome in each of the zones of the federation. Notably, like the previous elections, this election too is not devoid of sectional, religious and ethnic sentiments as key drivers of its campaign. In fact, the major issue in the election campaign is that of zoning – meaning power sharing on the basis of sectional consideration. This issue has irreparably broken the ruling party, the PDP, into two opposing camps, which has now split over to mold national public opinion on sectional lines. Indeed, President Jonathan himself anchored his campaign on this cleavage, creating a sudden alliance between the Niger Delta and the Northern minorities as the first line of his support base. This then put out the President as a minority candidate. Politics being the game of the majority, this perception re-enforced both the push for the ‘revision’ of the zoning arrangement in favour of the North, and emboldened politicians of the majority group to challenge the President head-on. To a large extent, these will influence the voting pattern in the presidential election; minorities voting Jonathan and members of the majority, especially of the North, voting their own – mainly General Mohammadu Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change, CPC.

In the same vein, the eventual jettisoning of the PDP zoning formular as it is generally understood has cast the President out as a usurper and also eroded the integrity of the PDP as a political party. On this score too, the universal democratic principle of “what is morally wrong cannot be politically right” will naturally take its toll at the polls against the president and his party.

The second driving consideration for the presidential election will be the economy. Given that the national economy is oil-based, and given that both the oil and President Jonathan are from the Niger Delta, and given that the major political agitation in the Niger Delta for which its youths are ready to raise armed revolt against the country is on resource control, it will be highly unlikely for any non-oil producing state to be comfortable with a Niger Delta president now, especially when the candidate made no categorical and clear policy statement as to where he stands on the contentious resource control/derivation issue. On this count, therefore, if President Jonathan does not make his position clear to the nation (which so far he did not throughout his campaign lectures), then the votes are most likely to score against him. Another point most Northerners are considering is that the Niger Delta has the wealth and if political power is added to it, what then will the North have?

The third will be Igbo presidency. Clearly, the election of President Goodluck Jonathan, a member of a minority nationality, in 2011 will be at the expense of Igbo presidency in the foreseeable future; certainly not before 2027 – may be even far beyond. Although the PDP presidential primaries has shown that the South-East is supportive of the President, but the primaries are far from being the yardstick to measure public support for the candidacy of the president. At best, the primaries merely indicate the political leaning of the five PDP leaderships of the zone (as of the other zones as well).  In the general elections, however, the issue of Igbo presidency and the interest of the Igbo in this election will come up and play a determining effect. In the likely event of this happening, the election will spring some surprises.

Now let’s look at the electoral strength, pattern and behaviour of the various zones of Nigeria over the years with a view to projecting the presidential election results.

The South-West zone currently has a total number of 14,296,163 registered voters. This figure represents 19.44% of the total number of voters nationwide. In terms of national electoral strength, the zone is number 2. Taking into account the electoral behavior of the South-west since independence, the zone has proven itself, without exception, of incapable of voting anyone other than its own. In the First Republic it voted only Action Group in favour of Awolowo with about 69% voters’ turnout. In the Second Republic, it voted 78.75% of its total votes cast for UPN in favour of Awolowo, with 70% voters’ turnout. In the June 12, 1993, the pattern was repeated more or less the same, except that the total percentage of SDP’s votes in favour of MKO Abiola rose up to 84.5 percent in the zone. In the 1999 presidential election, may be because the only two candidates for the presidency were from the South-west, the zone’s voters’ turnout was abysmally low (48.09%) with about 68% of the votes cast to ANPP in favour of Chief Olu Falaye. The 2003 elections also recorded poor voters’ turnout with 71% of votes cast to Obasanjo’s PDP. With this trend, one can logically assert that, though the South-west has no presidential candidate of their own in 2011, they, however, have a political party in the ACN, and a Vice Presidential candidate. One can therefore confidently conclude that the South-West votes will go to the ACN up to over 65%, albeit with a low voters’ turnout.

Like the South-West, the electoral pattern of the North-West, too, has shown, without exception, that it does not elect anyone other than its own. This trend includes the much celebrated June 12 presidential election where Chief Abiola was given an average votes cast of 42.9% by the zone. Even this score was unusually high, and can be attributed to the personality profile of Chief Abiola, including his faith. For the record, it should be pointed out that the North-West zone always led the nation in terms of number of registered voters. For the 2011 elections, the zone has 19,803,689, representing 26.93% of the national electoral strength, the highest in the country. Although in the 1999 presidential election the voters’ turnout in the zone was a poor 37.45% of its total strength, which can be attributed to the absence of their own in the race, the zone has generally good record of high voters’ turnout. With the present election, it can be projected that there will be as high as 80 – 90% turnout for the presidential polls. With this trend, it can be reasonably concluded that nothing has substantially changed the voting pattern and therefore General Buhari is most likely going to score at least 80% of the total votes cast in the zone notwithstanding the candidacy of Governor Ibrahim Shekarau.

The South-East zone has the lowest electoral strength in the country. For the zone, its electoral beheviour has been undulating. It can go to anyone depending on the issues at stake and the power dynamics on the ground. To this end, in the 2011 presidential election, it is highly likely that the zone will give up to 60% of its total votes cast to the powers that be – i.e. the President; but up to 40% of the votes can also go to the CPC and ACN candidates in the hope of actualizing the Igbo Presidency dream in 2015. However, because the zone has very little at stake in the election (it has no President, Vice President, Senate President, Speaker nor even Party National Chairmanship) to protect, there will expectedly very low voters’ turnout.

The South-South zone has a total of 9,474,427 registered voters; representing 12.89% of the national electoral strength. Like the South-East, the zone has the propensity to elect others; although it never had its own occupying a center stage at the national level. But now it has one in the person of the President. These 50 years of lacking, couple with the fact that the oil that oils the economic wheels of the country comes from the zone, has spurred the zone into grapping the Jonathan presidency as if it is the only and last opportunity for the zone to ever take hold of political power in Nigeria. The zone will therefore massively vote the President. Nevertheless, the various contradictions and conflicts within the communities of the zone, such as distrusts between Ijaws and non-Ijaws, the lack of control of Edo state by the President’s party, conflicts between oil producing and non-oil producing communities, struggle for power amongst some key power blocs in the region, will all severally and collectively invariably affect the electoral fortunes of the President. Taking this into account, therefore, I will expect that the President cannot get more than 80% of the total votes cast in the zone. The remaining 20% will seek their political fortune elsewhere. As the zone is the traditional political allies of the North, one can safely assert that the CPC will be the major beneficiary of the 20%. We can also expect up to 90% voters’ turnout.

With a total of 10,749,059 voters, representing 14.62% of the national voters, the North-East zone is the fourth in terms of electoral strength in the country. Most often it votes its own, but where absent it goes with the North-West. Although ethnically heterogeneous, it largely shares common history, faith and cultural values with the North-West. These may have accounted for the often common political stand between the two zones. On this score, we can confidently assert that the zone will go not less than 60% for CPC. Added to the fact that Buhari was once the governor of the entire zone, there is a sentimental political attachment to the man that somehow remains through the years. If every vote will count, as the nation expects it to count, then Buhari is very much at home in the zone. Also, there will be very high turnout.

The North-Central has 11,627,490 voters representing 15.81% of the total electoral strength of the country. It is the home of about 70% of what is generically term as “Northern Minorities”. But about 50% of the populace is historically and politically affiliated to the ‘Northern Caliphate Establishment’; and over the years this affiliation has translated into electoral votes to the establishment. Barring any other consideration, this factor is also likely to reflect in the present election. Conservatively, therefore, I can give the CPC at least 50% of the votes while the ACN, ANPP and PDP will have the rest. Here, too, there will be high voters’ turnout.

In conclusion, barring rigging, misuse of security agents, the roles of incumbent governors, LGA Chairmen and Legislators, and taking into account all the arguments proffered above, the following projection is made for the likely turnout and results of the Presidential elections for each zone of the federation:-

1.    South-West: Voters’ turnout: 65% = 9,292,506 ACN 65% = 6,040,129 PDP 15% = 1,393,876 CPC 20% = 1,858,501  ANPP 0%

2.    North-West: Voters’ turnout: 80% =  15,842,951 ACN 3% = 475,289 PDP 10% = 1,584,295 CPC  80% = 12,674,361 ANPP 7% = 1,109,007

3.    South-East: Turnout: 60% = 4,546,327 ACN 20% = 909,265 PDP 60% = 2,727,796 CPC 15% = 681,949 ANPP 5% = 227,316

4.    South-South: Voters’ turnout: 90% = 7,579,542 ACN 5% = 378,977 PDP 80% = 6,063,634 CPC 12% = 909,545 ANPP 3% = 227,386

5.    North-East: Turnout: 75% = 8,061,794 ACN 5% = 403,090  PDP 30% = 2,418,538 CPC 60% = 4,837,076 ANPP 5% 403,090

6.    North-Central: Turnout: 75% = 8,720,618 ACN 5% = 436,031  PDP 35% = 3,052,216 CPC 55% = 4,796,340 ANPP 5% 436, 031

TOTAL: ACN 17.17% = 8,642,881; PDP 38.33% = 17,240,355; CPC 40.33% = 25,757, 772; ANPP 4.17 = 2,402,830

We give error margin of +/- 3%.

Although from the above projection, the CPC has the highest number of votes cast, it may not have the mandatory ¼ in 2/3 of the states of the federation. However, if the party can focus to get 70% of its 20% in the South-west in two states, 80% of its 15% in the South-East in two states, and 70% of its 12% in the South-South in one state, then the party will win at the first leg of the election and avoid a run-off.

Ghali wrote this analysis from Abuja, FCT