A caliphate takes uncertain roots in Iraq

These include parts of Syria. They have also named the reclusive Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph, and asked all Muslims to pledge allegiance to him. This clearly is a move to redraw the map of the region to replace the boundaries demarcated by the British and French following the collapse of the last known caliphate, […]

These include parts of Syria. They have also named the reclusive Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph, and asked all Muslims to pledge allegiance to him. This clearly is a move to redraw the map of the region to replace the boundaries demarcated by the British and French following the collapse of the last known caliphate, the Ottoman Empire, in 1924. The Saudi-funded Al Arabiya channel reported that the group has begun issuing ‘caliphate passports’.  El Baghdadi, who has a bounty placed on his head by the U.S. and is probably the most wanted man in the Middle East, made a rare appearance at the Grand Mosque in Mosul in Iraq last Friday, rallying support for the IS, whose website posted a video of him, introducing him to the congregation as ‘Your new Caliph Ibrahim”.
The Sunni uprising in Iraq has considerable following and sympathy among the minorities in Iraq who feel marginalised by the policies of Prime Minister Nouri el Maliki, considered by many, including some in his Shiite-dominated government, as a sectarian leader. But the IS move to establish a caliphate has left many of the supporters wondering if they had not been mistaken. Besides, Muslim scholars and movements from across the Sunni Islamic spectrum have rejected the caliphate, with the IS receiving scathing criticism from both mainstream religious leaders, and those associated with their former allies, Al-Qaida.
Assem Barqawi, also known as Abu Mohamed al-Maqdesi, who was released from a Jordanian prison in June after serving a sentence for recruiting volunteers to fight in Afghanistan, called IS and al-Baghdadi “deviant”.
Given the group’s trajectory, particularly in its postings of graphic images of executions, beheadings and destruction of ancient religious sites revered by Shiites, its campaign poses a serious threat, not only to the region, but to the outside world as well. It exposes it as intolerant of other sects.  The proclamation of a caliphate is bound to deepen the centuries-old sectarian conflict between the Sunni and the Shiites which started as a feud over the succession to the Holy Prophet Muhammad.
The monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, some of which have been associated with some form of support for the group on religious and political differences, should now be reassessing their position. Demanding allegiance from the rest of the world, even if from the Sunnis alone, would include the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Nouri al Maliki is not helping matters either. Rejecting calls for him to step down and pave way for the formation of a unity government to bridge sectarian divides and confront the Sunni insurgency, he has instead said he would seek a third term in office, an announcement that has infuriated many of his compatriots and angered the U.S. which installed him. U.S. officials continue to live in denial when they reject suggestions that the instability that now plagues Iraq and much of the Middle East is a direct consequence of the U.S. invasion of the country in 2003.
 With little prospects of a regime change, the likelihood of a cohesive Iraqi government halting the IS advance on Baghdad, even with the deployment of about 600 U.S. service personnel, is further diminished. And with every passing day, the IS continues to consolidate its grip on the positions it holds and preparing for further territorial gains, establishing facts on the ground that may be difficult to erase.  And for Iraq, that’s not the only problem. The Kurds have seized the chaotic environment to strengthen their hold on Kurdistan, including Kirkuk, a major oil producing area; there are talks now of independence from the rest of Iraq.  An independent Kurdistan has implications, not only in Iraq, but for Kurdish minorities in Turkey, Iran and Syria.
The declaration of an Islamic state has implications for the wider international Muslim community beyond the Middle East too. If the IS succeeds on the battlefield in expanding the territory under its control, it would also increase its street credibility among some Muslims. And that’s a dangerous recruiting potential to radicalism, the less of which we should be striving for in the quest for inter–and intra-faith harmony.