America, accountability and Nigeria: Why threats, sanctions won’t solve complex crisis

Recent public statements by President of the United States, Donald Trump, that he had directed the Pentagon to draw up plans for possible military action against Nigeria – ostensibly to stop what he described as the “genocide of Christians” – have rightly provoked concern among Nigerians and observers of international relations. Equally troubling are reports […]

Recent public statements by President of the United States, Donald Trump, that he had directed the Pentagon to draw up plans for possible military action against Nigeria – ostensibly to stop what he described as the “genocide of Christians” – have rightly provoked concern among Nigerians and observers of international relations. Equally troubling are reports of moves within the U.S. Congress to impose visa and asset restrictions on the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) and Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore, two socioeconomic and cultural associations representing Fulani pastoralists.

Both actions, if pursued, would represent a grave misreading of Nigeria’s internal complexities and a dangerous overreach in U.S. foreign policy. They threaten to distort reality, inflame ethnic sensitivities, and undermine the cooperative framework that has long underpinned Nigeria-U.S. relations.

“Christian Genocide”: True of False?

The claim that a state-backed campaign of genocide against Christians is underway in Nigeria finds no support in credible evidence. Some of our own countrymen and women have attempted to panel-beat the irrational assertion of a genocide by reframing the state-sponsorship angle by pushing a narrative that the government may not have been a sponsor but is aiding and abetting the mayhem by not bringing the “Fulani” herdsmen to book and therefore itself complicit. But first, the question must be asked: is there a coordinated attack on Christians anywhere in Nigeria? There is no such evidence. The largest number of Christian victims of the various unfortunate crises in the country is in Benue and Plateau States. But then, these are the states with perhaps the highest Christian population in Nigeria. By the law of averages, you would expect that most of the victims to be Christians, just as Muslims would be in Zamfara and Katsina. The truth is that our country’s insecurity crisis is, tragically, multifaceted and affects Nigerians of all faiths and ethnicities.

Independent reporting by the International Crisis Group, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), and Nigerian research institutions such as SBM Intelligence and the CLEEN Foundation consistently show that most violence in rural Nigeria arises from competition over land, water, and grazing routes, aggravated by climate change, criminality, and weak governance.

From 2015 to 2023, the Global Terrorism Index ranked Nigeria among the top ten countries most affected by terrorism, citing deaths from Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and banditry in the Northwest. Yet, data disaggregated by incident type show that both Muslim and Christian communities have suffered from these crises, with Muslims victims being the overwhelming majority. The federal government, state authorities, and international agencies – including the U.S. Department of State itself – have not classified the situation as genocide.

The Miyetti Allah question

Miyetti Allah, founded in the 1970s, is a socio-economic and advocacy organisation representing millions of pastoral families across Nigeria. While the group has been embroiled in controversy, including accusations of defending violent herders, it remains a legally registered association and a stakeholder in national livestock policy discussions.

To brand the entire organisation – and by extension, the Fulani ethnic group, including its leaders, governors, former presidents and vice presidents, emirs and the clergy, professionals and academics – as culpable for Nigeria’s insecurity is factually incorrect and politically reckless. Criminal acts committed by individuals must be prosecuted individually. Blanket sanctions on entire associations risk institutionalising ethnic discrimination and could even breach international norms against collective punishment.

Legal and diplomatic implications

Under international law, the United States cannot lawfully take military action against Nigeria absent one of three conditions: (1) a United Nations Security Council authorisation; (2) a legitimate self-defence claim under Article 51 of the UN Charter; or (3) consent by the Nigerian government. None of these conditions presently exists. Any unilateral strike would constitute a violation of Nigeria’s sovereignty and the Charter of the United Nations.

Similarly, proposed visa and financial sanctions targeting whole socio-economic groups would be a policy misstep. While a state has the sovereign right to control its borders, measures that appear ethnically selective undermine America’s own moral authority and risk eroding trust with Africa’s largest democracy and economy. The Fulani are spread across several African countries and hold positions of authority in many.

The true roots of the crisis

Farmer–herder conflicts have existed for generations in Nigeria’s Middle Belt and Northwest regions. Historically, communities resolved disputes through local mediation, grazing reserves, and traditional arbitration. What changed was the combined effect of:

• The shrinking of arable land and pasture due to desertification and population growth;
• Weak enforcement of rural land laws and the encroachment of farms on migration routes;
• Proliferation of small arms and cross-border banditry from the Sahel;
• Corruption and lack of accountability in both federal and subnational governments.

Today, over three million people are internally displaced across Nigeria, according to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), with more than 70 per cent of them in the Northern states. Both Muslim and Christian villages have been attacked. In some states such as Zamfara and Benue, communities are simultaneously victims and perpetrators in cycles of revenge. Simplistic religious framing obscures these realities.

Risks of misguided U.S. intervention

1. Ethnic Polarisation: Targeting Fulani-linked organisations could cement the false perception that Fulani identity itself is synonymous with violence. This would deepen ethnic divisions and potentially radicalise marginalised youth. Already this false narrative is promoted under different guises, including what is clearly a tacit incitement by a university professor Hausa people to reclaim their identity, emirates and freedoms from colonial Fulani, who usurped the kingdoms in a false Jihad. On social media the Fulani are daily dehumanised and collectively characterised Bello Turjis.
2. Delegitimising Nigerian institutions: If Nigerians perceive that Washington will impose external solutions, domestic incentives for reform may diminish. Nigerian leaders must remain primarily accountable to Nigerian citizens, not to foreign coercion.
3. Regional Spillovers: The Sahelian security crisis is transnational, spanning Mali, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Nigeria cannot be stabilised in isolation. External punitive actions that ignore regional dimensions may displace, not diminish, violence.

A better path forward

For the United States:

• Base action on verified evidence. Support independent investigations by neutral bodies such as the United Nations, the African Union, or ECOWAS before determining culpability.
• Engage Nigeria through diplomacy, not threats. Strengthen law enforcement and judicial capacity-building, intelligence sharing, and human rights training.
• Apply sanctions individually, not collectively. If there is credible evidence against specific persons, they should be sanctioned on a case-by-case basis. Broad ethnic or associative bans are indefensible.
• Invest in root-cause mitigation. Support climate adaptation, water resource management, and livelihood diversification projects across the Sahel that reduce migration pressures and conflict.

For Nigeria:

• Strengthen rule of law. Conduct transparent investigations into all acts of communal violence, prosecute offenders regardless of background, and publish findings. It is the absence of this, especially, that fuels the accusations of complicity against both the federal and subnational governments.
• Reform land and pastoral policies. Implement a modern livestock and land management framework that provides designated grazing routes, conflict-resolution mechanisms, and compensation for losses. Kaduna State Government under former Governor Nasir El-

Rufa’i tried to do this but lost the public relations battle to entrenched interests.

• Promote responsible leadership. National and community leaders must avoid inflammatory rhetoric and work collaboratively across ethnic and religious lines. Now more than ever, Nigeria needs to regulate unrestrained religious zealatory masquerading as preaching and evangelism. No one should be allowed to use the pulpit/mumbar to incite the public to violence in the name of preaching.
• Improve communication. Nigeria’s embassies and ministries must actively engage global media and policymakers to correct misinformation and present verifiable data on the situation.

Nigeria’s security challenges are serious, but they are not unique, nor are they evidence of a state-sponsored genocide. What the situation calls for is sober analysis, mutual respect, and cooperative engagement – not the rhetoric of invasion or collective blame.

The United States and Nigeria share deep economic, educational, and security ties. Rather than endanger those bonds through reactionary measures, Washington should work with Abuja to build the institutional capacity needed to protect all Nigerian lives. Facts, not fear, must guide policy.

Nigeria’s sovereignty is non-negotiable; so too is its responsibility to ensure justice and safety for every citizen – Muslim, Christian, or otherwise. The path forward lies in partnership grounded in evidence and mutual accountability, not in coercion built on misconception.

 

Abdulqadir is a banker