Arms deal: When did the rot begin?

The ongoing investigation of arms procurement by the Federal Government has brought issues of corruption in defence contracts to the front burner in Nigeria. Findings of the panel have come to remind us, yet again, about how weak our procurement and control mechanisms are. The scale of corruption so far found in the procurement of […]

The ongoing investigation of arms procurement by the Federal Government has brought issues of corruption in defence contracts to the front burner in Nigeria. Findings of the panel have come to remind us, yet again, about how weak our procurement and control mechanisms are. The scale of corruption so far found in the procurement of arms in recent years is no doubt a world-beater. Billions were diverted to fund the People’s Democratic Party’s outing in the 2015 general elections and the side effects, of course, have been the geometric rise in insecurity especially in the North-East.
When did the rot start and how did it go unnoticed until the current administration came on board? Generally speaking, almost every facet of public procurement in Nigeria is bedevilled with corruption, at different levels. The extent of corruption depends on who is heading the particular ministry, department or agency among many other factors. The international scene is not much different. While some nations have succeeded in tackling these problems, others are still struggling.
Traditionally, defence procurements in Nigeria have always been the function of Federal Ministry of Defence (MOD). The ministry was responsible for buying weapons and other defence equipment for the Nigerian Army, Navy and Air Force. But on October 4, 2010, retired General Andrew Awoye Azazi, now late, was appointed as NSA by the then-president Jonathan and things began to change. He assumed his new role and quickly became powerful, largely owing to the fact that he was a kinsman of Jonathan. The new NSA, being a former Chief of Army and Defence Staff, started to see himself as the boss of the service chiefs.  He quickly usurped the traditional functions of MOD and began to procure weapons for the three arms of the Nigerian Military without any objection from Jonathan.
The MOD became almost dormant overnight and the ONSA took charge of billions of dollars of spending. The trend went on without any trouble as Azazi continued to have his way with President Jonathan. In October 2012, after two years in office, Azazi was removed as NSA after Jonathan came under severe pressure from several quarters to replace the top aide. Col. Sambo Dasuki, the prince from Sokoto Caliphate, was appointed to succeed Azazi. Dasuki continued from where his predecessor and classmate left things. Defence contracts continued to be done by the ONSA.
The NSA did not change any of Azazi’s structures or plans. In fact, he consolidated the arrangements made by his predecessor by securing the review of the Terrorism Act to ensure that the ONSA was given the legal mandate to “assist” the armed services in weapons procurement and other areas. The armed services therefore switched their “loyalty” completely from MOD to ONSA. This development was responsible for the fracas between the then Chief of Defence Staff Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh and Gen. Aliyu Gusau in 2014. When Gusau resumed as Minister of Defence, following a cabinet reshuffle by Jonathan, Badeh and the other service chiefs refused to defer to him as their supervising minister. Some of the chiefs reportedly shunned meetings called by Gusau. It took the intervention of the President for the matter to be resolved.
Although Azazi’s tenure saw the looting of huge funds under the guise of weapons procurement, the scale at which it occurred at that time was nothing compared to the level that his successor took things. Things astronomically got worse under Dasuki as time went on. The rest is now history.
The Jonathan administration clearly provided the atmosphere for that level of corruption to take place under his watch. Not only did he grant approvals for monies to be illegally released to politicians and other groups of people for all kinds of purposes, he also reportedly ordered heads of other agencies of government to use public money to fund his re-election campaign activities. They did this through dubious contracts and ignored all controls put in place to check illegal use of public money.
There is no doubt that on-going war against corruption is a step in the right direction. President Muhammadu Buhari must however consolidate on this war by strengthening existing institutions that were set up to prevent, minimise or punish graft. These include the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), CBN, Office of the Auditor General of the Federation and many more. He must also continue to support the Presidential Committee investigating defence procurement from 2007-2015.
The president must also push for the amendment of the terrorism Act, National Security Act and all other legislations on security. Clear processes must be set up with appropriate control measures so as to limit the possibility of abuse in the future. The ONSA should revert back to its original function of being the umbrella body and coordinating agency for the three security intelligence bodies in Nigeria namely: DSS, National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). Not doing this will compromise its institutional integrity and that of the MOD.
The Ministry of Defence itself requires some form of restructuring to enable it perform its functions well. This is because during the days that the MOD was fully in charge of arms procurement, things were not the way they should be either. MOD is largely manned by regular civil servants with neither military experience nor expertise in weapons procurement. They simply acquired weapons and equipment for the Army, Navy and Air Force without knowledge or consideration of the specific needs of the services.
To correct these anomalies, we need to adopt international best practices in defence procurement. The MOD needs to be restructured. Alternatively, it could be broken into specialist agencies to be manned by well-trained personnel or competent ex-service men and women to procure weapons for the armed forces. This is what many countries do. The government must also initiate genuine efforts to begin local production of some weapons, especially the less complicated ones.
If findings of the presidential committee have taught us anything, it is that a clique of very few privileged people can easily divert huge portions of our common wealth under the guise of weapons procurement. With millions wallowing in poverty and public infrastructure in a state of complete decadence, Nigeria cannot afford to allow this kind of corruption to endure.
Lawal writes from Wuse, Abuja.