Beyond the security plans

According to the standard set by the Phase I Land Use plan of the Federal Capital City, the land use budget ubiquitously provided for security installations in all the district and neighbourhood centres. These were purposely to underscore the importance of security in the well-being of the City. In fact, due to the high number […]

According to the standard set by the Phase I Land Use plan of the Federal Capital City, the land use budget ubiquitously provided for security installations in all the district and neighbourhood centres. These were purposely to underscore the importance of security in the well-being of the City. In fact, due to the high number and sizes of the lands earmarked, some were subjected to abuse for different purposes, like residential and commercial uses. Be that as it may, the contemporary challenges of kidnapping and banditry are more concentrated at city outskirts and rural areas. The city will never be safe with its surrounding regions under such siege. 

The projected targeted population for Phase I was 230,000 and four major police installations were provided one each in Garki, Wuse, Asokoro and Maitama districts. This is to be implemented in all the districts of the other phases of the city development, in accordance with their peculiarities. It was assumed that planning should prepare for improved responsiveness and accessibility for traffic control, crime detection and prevention, and public festivals and national event management. 

Local police installations, previously referred to as “charge office”, but presently, police stations with land size of approx. 0.5 Ha, containing small detention facilities were to be provided in each district centre, which location should be central and on arterial access to facilitate public safety coverage. They are expected to serve 30,000 to 60,000 population. While same is provided for town centres in the FCT with a minimum population of 15,000.  

It could be observed that all the provisions for the city security were centred on the police, because, the military installations as security to serve the city were never envisaged in the city’s development plan, but gained significance later as the plan is being implemented. More so that most of those periods were in the military era. Hence, the military barracks were placed across the Outer Northern Expressway hitherto considered outside the limit of the city development. 

The banditry-related crimes, with kidnappings assuming regional and national dimensions, were never envisaged while preparing the FCT development programme from 1976 to 1979. The city is naturally surrounded by mountain ranges, which previously served as assets for planning and aesthetics, but presently it is more of a liability than an opportunity, because of the degeneration of the mountainous areas as a haven for the banditry perpetrators.

Generally, as known, crimes are not respecters of political boundaries. Although the targets could be in the FCT, obviously most originated and were planned from outside, and the criminals retreat into the woods with the victims, mostly outside the FCT borders. 

As a result of problems resulting from the non-coincidence of political boundaries with natural geographic districts as well as the development problems resulting from access and proximity, the Abuja Master Plan recommended that special joint planning areas be established with the states surrounding the FCT. This provision was for planning, and mitigation of environmental consequences, but now being leveraged to also include combating the security challenges. 

Presently, the joint military and police task force for combating crimes across the borders of the FCT with its surrounding settlements contiguous with the FCT, but politically located in the states of Niger, Nasarawa, Kogi and Kaduna are in place. The security outfit must not relent in constantly conducting joint surveillance and operations on the forests and mountainous areas across the boundaries. It must be recognised that some of these settlements, particularly Suleja, Mararaba, Karu, Masaka, Zuba and Madalla developed, and are still developing faster than can be anticipated by any state government to cope with their growth management. 

We made the observation in this column before the commencement of the insurgency and banditry phenomenon, way back in 2007, that these settlements which are rapidly and uncontrollably developing, triggered essentially by the very existence, development and policies of Abuja, were indeed scenes of dangerously developing slums that are capable of threatening the internal peace of the capital city in the future, and that the strengthening of security apparatus of the surrounding settlements of the FCT was very crucial. Regrettably, it is now occurring. 

Areas around Bwari connecting with Kaduna State where bandits are presently, and very regrettably, holding five sisters after killing one in gruesome circumstances, have for long been dangerous spots for banditry operations. Other spots include roads and footpaths connecting Zuba, Gwagwalada and Yaba areas with the surrounding forests in Niger State. These are among the too many to mention. 

Identifying and mapping the forest footpaths used by the bandits, and the use of local security organizations are very crucial. Others are the use of CCTV cameras, other electronic gadgets and military aircraft surveillance. Also, prompt response to intelligence information is very critical, as any slight delay could be termed as very expensive negligence on the part of the enforcing security agencies. All stones must not be left unturned in order to secure the kidnapped victims and punish the perpetrators.