Boko Haram: Beyond the military response (1)

and as its well-paid spokespersons continue to put forward conflicting and contradictory replies to criticisms, perhaps it is time we move forward. No need wasting any more time in criticisms. It is now buying better equipment, trying to give the troops what other requirements had been denied them before and (despite the rear guard noises […]

and as its well-paid spokespersons continue to put forward conflicting and contradictory replies to criticisms, perhaps it is time we move forward. No need wasting any more time in criticisms. It is now buying better equipment, trying to give the troops what other requirements had been denied them before and (despite the rear guard noises of its apologists) waking up to the fact that we are facing terrorists’ insurgency. These are welcomed, if almost belated, developments. In a democracy, even one as crude as this one, the citizens have to keep up the pressure in other ways and hold political leaders accountable. Yet these rights also entail some obligations.
It is important to continue along two lines. One, we must reject the crude attempt to silence us in the name of a myth that security and military matters are best left to the officer corps and the security contractors. Just as education is too serious to be left to teachers, health is not just for doctors and pharmacists so is war beyond weapons and soldiers alone. In addition, all of us, but especially religious, community and political leaders, have to wake up to our responsibilities.
Wars and insurgencies have been studied throughout human history. Historians and social scientists have a lot to say about war studies and counterinsurgencies.  One such basic observation is that insurgencies often go unnoticed until they have blossomed into real threats. Another observation is that once an insurgency has taken root, it takes time to root it out. Thirdly, time is on the side of the insurgents. Finally, any military response is just a part of the solution; much more important are the ideological, social, political, administrative, legal and (in some instances) diplomatic responses. All these are applicable in the case of responding to Boko Haram (BH).
When, from common knowledge, one Borno State governorship candidate made a deal with a relatively unknown group to help him come to power and subsequently gave the group positions in his government (and, as some alleged, money) hardly anyone paid attention. The arrangement did not last, and the group pulled out of the marriage, became a nuisance and started becoming lawless. Over a small matter of crash helmet for motorcycle riders and a funeral procession for those killed by the police over the new policy things really got out of hand and the late President Umaru Yar’adua had to send the military to deal with the matter. They were dispersed, their leader captured alive by the military only to be killed by the police, under some very murky circumstances, forcing them to go underground.
The group resurfaced in 2009 better trained, better equipped and they went haywire. Their suicide bombings and direct attacks on military, police and prison personnel and facilities were the wake-up call. Yet, even then the government did not fully grasp what was happening, preferring to see everything through the prism of Jonathan for 2015. It was only after they took over more than half of Borno and part of Yobe states that the government declared a “state of emergency”. Burning of schools, killing of teachers and pupils and the kidnapping of young boys and girls all over the North-east were largely ignored. It was the abduction of over 200 girls from Government Secondary School, Chibok, and the decision by some citizens to internationalise the matter, that brought us to the present situation in which the government seems to be finally realizing that the matter is more serious than its blinkers would allow it to see. Admittedly, even now this fresh rededication to fighting BH is murky; the same ex-governor many are blaming for nurturing, if not the creating, these insurgents is now being feted by the government to “capture” Borno State from the opposition, with an airport supposedly shut on security ground opened for him to land and declare for the PDP.
Since then we have heard many deadlines for routing them out. All those “to end on/or before” dates came and passed. The most recent is some instruction from the Council of State demanding an end to Boko Haram by December.  We are a people always praying for a miracle, so let us also pray for this one. If we are lucky we may succeed; but luck often has to find you prepared. However, time, as pointed out earlier, is more often than not, on the side of the insurgents. A government must show clearly that it is winning the war. The insurgents, on the other hand, only need to show they are still around and capable of striking at will, or at least at some opportunistic soft-target; a school here, a hospital there, a market elsewhere. Any crowded place or one that could give it some publicity. A government’s approach to counterinsurgency must give due considerations to national laws and approved terms of engagements. It must observe international laws and conventions governing wars. Torture, targeting of civilians and collective punishment of whole communities, and deliberately blowing up of settlements are not permitted. (These were tried by our military in the beginning and the people started wondering which was worse. Since the change of tactics, civilians were encouraged to come on board and this has clearly helped). The insurgents are not given to such moral or ethical restraints. All they are out to do is to show that the government cannot defend the population and, thus, lacks basic legitimacy in that regard. They want to force people into accepting their rule as an alternative even if only to escape with their lives. These asymmetrical burdens of responsibilities could often give the impression that the government is losing even when it is the insurgent that are being routed.
Incidentally, the security agencies are recently fond of telling us to be circumspect in our utterances. This is well taken but it equally applies to them as well. When one Inspector General of Police bragged about ending their menace by a certain date, they targeted the Force Headquarters with devastating effects. A military top brass, when he was newly appointed chief, gave a time-frame for ending BH’s murderous activities; they quickly devastated his village and razed his family home. The security chiefs should just shut up and leave the noise-making to their political bosses.
It is time to prepare the minds of Nigerians that we are currently facing what is likely to be a bitter, protracted and difficult battle that may not be won as quickly as we all hope for. In this regard it is time we refocus, allow the government to get its acts together, however belated, and ask what we can do on our part. No, I have not established an NGO to canvass support for anybody. I am merely saying we must make sure we are not led up a blind alley and abandoned. Nigeria does not belong to Jonathan, Badeh, or the two Sambos, nor to Buhari or Tinubu, but to all of us. Yes, the government has primary responsibility but we must also do our part.
We should start by appreciating that insurgencies, like all wars, are extensions of politics by other means. Its terrain includes ideology and propaganda, politics, geography and related spheres.