Boko Haram: time for inquest into Chad’s role

Call it realism for a better word; in the quick sand of international politics, the robust understanding of the strategic national objectives or interests of nations makes their concurrent or even impending decisions in their relationships with others more predictable. Put in reverse order, the foreign policy thrusts and aspirations of nations are almost without […]

Call it realism for a better word; in the quick sand of international politics, the robust understanding of the strategic national objectives or interests of nations makes their concurrent or even impending decisions in their relationships with others more predictable. Put in reverse order, the foreign policy thrusts and aspirations of nations are almost without exception predicated on the dictates of its specific national interests.
For more than a century the America’s foreign policy was deeply rooted on the fundamentals of its ‘core national interests’ which included democracy, liberty, freedom, justice and free enterprise. It never mattered that in the pursuit those very objectives, America’s foreign policy behaviour directly, or indirectly, led to the truncation of legitimate, albeit contentious choices of governments by the people of Congo (September 1960), and Chile (September 1973).
For as long as the successive US governments at the time were able to convince the gullible American public that such foreign interventions – which frequently led to the fall of foreign governments and the enthronement of dictators like Mobuto in Congo/Zaire and Pinochet in Chile –  were necessary to check the scourge of communism, they fitted snugly with their strategic national interests. It did not matter that such wilful interventions in pursuit of the American national interests invariable came to grief in so many far-flung locations as it did in disastrous circumstances in Vietnam.  
Before Nigeria’s oil boom rapidly degenerated into the predictable doom many foretold, Africa was the centre-point of our foreign policy. Even the later resolve to define the same policy in three concentric cycles did little to detract from the resolve to allow the interests of Africa to determine the content and structure of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives.  As Nigeria’s first Foreign Minister Hon. Aja Nwa-chukwu put it at the time:  ‘Charity begins at home and therefore any Nigerian foreign policy that does not take into consideration the peculiar position of Africa is unrealistic’. (Emphasis mine).
And so with charity in our minds, and little in terms of a solid Nigerian-centric   ideological basis or framework for our foreign policy, Nigeria got involved deeply in the decolonization struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa. We rejoiced at the honorary appellation a ‘frontline nation’, even though we were geographically far removed from the theatre of the struggles.
Nigeria topped that by taking some drastic economic measures in support of its Africa-focussed foreign policy that ultimately hurt its own local economy. We nationalized companies like British Petroleum (BP) and Barclay’s Bank because their government procrastinated over the need for liberation of the colonized nations in Southern Africa.
We topped that by spending billions of badly needed dollars at home trying to export the democracy we didn’t have at the time to Liberia and Sierra-Leone. The ratio of our human and material contributions to ending the civil wars in both countries against our status as a developing nation was unprecedented in history. And yet, for our role, we merely earned President Clinton’s recognition as the ‘morale superpower’ of the world and unlimited insults from our beneficiaries. Today, only foreign policy neophytes could fail to see that South Africa has always regarded Nigeria as a major threat or rival for supremacy on the African continent. And with there being no permanent friends or interest in international relations, we can hold few grudges for their perceived ingratitude.   
Our charitable foreign policy did not earn us the universal recognition we craved and will not guarantee us the illusive permanent seat on the United Nation’s Security Council when that anachronistic arm of the UN is grudgingly reformed to reflect the contingent realities of our times.
Still, to be fair, successive Nigerian governments, beginning from the 1980s up till 2007, appeared to have shifted the focus of our foreign policy a bit. We heard loose talk about economic diplomacy and reciprocity in the conduct of our foreign affairs for the first time. But even today, with the rampant insurgency in the North East and collective international efforts required to contain it, we appear not to have learnt enough lessons from the past. With this Jonathan administration, one is not even sure what the blueprint for the nation’s foreign policy is.     
Given the way the so-called cease-fire with Boko-Haram brokered by the President of Chad quickly unravelled, and the nauseating revelations in the media on the exact reasons for the farce, one cannot fail but wonder if Nigeria has learnt any lessons from the past at all.
Surely, only government officials who lacked the critical intellectual rigour required for the consummation of such delicate deals could have fallen so cheaply for the lies fed to our government by the complicit government in Ndjamena. Chadian rebels, unless we chose to forget, once violated our territorial integrity in the 1980s.
And Chad, like the other francophone nations in the sub-region is not better than a vassal of France which considers such nation’s to belong to its exclusive sphere of influence. Our recent history will also show that France has always been wary of Nigeria’s clout in Africa especially in the West African sub-region. It was the major reason why France, under Charles de Gaulle, along with Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Gabon, were among the handful of nations to recognize Biafra at the onset of the Nigerian civil war for easily predictable reasons.  
The more Nigeria becomes an attraction to the French-speaking nations in the region, the more the influence of France becomes diminished as a direct consequence. It is for that reason that France has military pacts with most of its former colonies on the continent. It was also for the same reason why it backed Cameroun against Nigeria in the dispute over the Bakassi peninsular not too long ago.  
And while we are on the same subject matter, with Cameroun also at the receiving end of Boko Haram attacks, it has become abundantly obvious that Chad, which has not suffered from any such recorded invasions despite its close proximity with the insurgents, is either considered an ally by the sect, or is in fact the launch pad for its activities. All insurgents groups in history required safe heavens. When Fidel Castro and Che Guevara launched their revolution in the 1950’s, it was from the relative safety of the Sierra Maestra Mountains in south-eastern Cuba. Surely, our intelligence community do not believe the Boko Haram forces are like ghost who can appear and disappear easily into a void!
But there is yet another important factor why an inquest into the role of Chad and by extension France has become a matter of urgent priority. Whether by coincidence or not, most of the areas affected by the insurgency are located on the northern fringes of the Chad basin known to be rich in oil and Gas resources!     
If France stays loyal to its strategic interests on the African continent; if Chad has always been an unreliable neighbour and now serves as a safe heaven and launching pad for Boko Haram; and, if the Chadian President is chummy with the likes of Ali Modu Sherriff, why should the sect be suing for peace anytime soon?
Besides, why must Nigeria bar-gain or negotiate with terrorists or any insurgency group from the position of weakness. When the late Yar’Ádua coerced the militants in the Niger Delta to embrace his peace initiative, he had to demonstrated the folly of their armed struggle in the creeks by seizing the military initiative on the ground. The Nigerian military Task Force was unrelenting in their pursuit.  Today, our soldiers are demoralized and flee like rabbits from the heat of battle. They dread to confront Boko Haram, and the commanders of the terrorist group know it.