Boko Haram’s deadly return

The hope of millions of distressed people, especially in Borno State, that they would start the year, 2025, on a clean slate devoid of bloodbath, was punctured by terrorists from Boko Haram and the Islamic State, West Africa Province (ISWAP). The terrorists had used the last quarter of 2024 to re-launch their onslaught after reported […]

The hope of millions of distressed people, especially in Borno State, that they would start the year, 2025, on a clean slate devoid of bloodbath, was punctured by terrorists from Boko Haram and the Islamic State, West Africa Province (ISWAP).

The terrorists had used the last quarter of 2024 to re-launch their onslaught after reported gains by military and civilian authorities of decimating them.

Since the beginning of this year, attacks by the insurgents have continued unabated.  On January 4, 2025, the terrorists, using drones for surveillance, attacked the Forward Operating Base of the military in Sabon Gari, Damboa Local Government Area of Borno State. On January 9, they attacked the Gajiram Divisional Police Station in Nganzai Local Government Area. On January 12, they wreaked havoc on Bazir village of Chibok Local Government Area and Dumba village of Kukawa Local Government. The terrorists went back to Chibok on January 14 and descended on Shakarkir community.

Before then, they had launched seven assaults between October 1 and November 24, 2024 in Gwoza, Marte, Konduga, Kukawa and Gubio local government areas of Borno State. The terrorists also attacked Sabon Fegi community of Buni Yadi area of Gujba Local Government in Yobe State.

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The Boko Haram insurgency, now in its 16th year, remains an enduring scar on Nigeria’s security architecture, particularly in the northeastern states of Borno and Yobe.

Despite trillions of naira allocated to counterterrorism efforts by successive administrations, the persistence of violent attacks and the deepening humanitarian crisis in this region expose the glaring shortcomings in the war against terror.

The renewed assaults by Boko Haram and its offshoot, ISWAP, have left communities devastated. Lives of military operatives, the police and civilians have been wasted.  Villages have been razed and thousands have been displaced yet again. These developments contradict repeated claims by government officials that Boko Haram has been “technically defeated.”

Borno and Yobe states have been at the epicentre of Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operations. While some gains have been recorded, such as the liberation of previously held territories, these successes have proven unsustainable. Boko Haram continues to adapt, employing guerrilla tactics, and of recent, deploying drones, which the military high command brushed away as “toys.”

The terrorists are also leveraging local grievances and exploiting weak governance structures to maintain their grip. They have diversified their operations, targeting both rural areas and key highways, making travels perilous and disrupting economic activities.

The situation is compounded by the dire humanitarian crisis the conflict has triggered as hunger, malnutrition and limited access to education and health care, which are becoming increasingly difficult to manage.

One of the most troubling aspects of Nigeria’s counterinsurgency efforts is the colossal financial outlay without corresponding results. Over the years, trillions of naira has been funnelled into defence and security, yet the country remains vulnerable.

Allegations of corruption and mismanagement in military procurements have repeatedly surfaced, with reports of poorly equipped soldiers and delayed allowances demoralising the troops on the frontlines.

The House of Representatives Committee on Defence recently said it would increase the N50 billion budgeted for the Ministry of Defence in 2025.

Earlier, the minister had lamented the inadequacy of the funds provided for the ministry in the 2025 budget proposal.

He had said, “We have a shortfall of N18 billion in last year’s budget and people expect the ministry to do wonders. In fact, the Ministry of Defence is supposed to provide some equipment for some of the zones, but we cannot. Out of what we have in 2024, we were able to provide just 20 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs). What can 20 APCs do?”

We recall that in the N49.7 trillion 2025 appropriation currently before the National Assembly, the security sector got N4.91 trillion, which is the highest.

The same sector got N840 billion in the 2021 budget; N2.4 trillion in the 2022 budget; N2.74 trillion in the 2023 budget and N3. 25 trillion in the 2024 budget. These are besides other interventions not known to the public.

Evidently, there is something fundamentally wrong with the overall approach to the Boko Haram crisis, and by extension, other security challenges; and it is time to get another methodology. Fighting terrorism should not be a war of attrition.   

Moreover, the strategy to combat the insurgency has often been reactive rather than proactive. Military operations, while crucial, have largely focused on immediate threats, neglecting the underlying socio-economic conditions that fuel extremism.

Efforts at deradicalisation and reintegration of former fighters have also been met with mixed reactions, as many communities remain distrustful of the rehabilitated insurgents.

To address this protracted crisis, we believe a multi-faceted and transparent approach is essential. First, there must be a thorough audit of counter-terrorism expenditures to ensure that funds are judiciously utilised. Alleged corruption within the defence sector must be tackled decisively, with offenders held accountable regardless of rank or status.

Second, the military’s operational strategy must evolve to prioritise intelligence gathering and community engagement. Building trust with local communities through inclusive governance and protection mechanisms can yield critical intelligence and foster resilience against Boko Haram’s recruitment strategies.

Third, the federal and state governments must intensify efforts to address the root causes of the insurgency. Poverty, unemployment and lack of education create fertile ground for extremist ideologies to take root.

Additionally, regional cooperation is critical. Boko Haram fighters are exploiting porous boundaries to regroup and launch attacks. Nigeria must strengthen collaboration with neighbouring countries under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and seek broader international support to combat the insurgency more effectively.