Changing the Nigerian railways for delivery and sustainability

The railway bill finally made its debut for second reading on the floor of the Federal House of Representatives on 22 October 2015, sponsored by Gideon Gwani. Its path to the NASS had been tortuous and chequered, taking as much as 14 years for successive governments, since Obasanjo to put an executive railway bill before […]

The railway bill finally made its debut for second reading on the floor of the Federal House of Representatives on 22 October 2015, sponsored by Gideon Gwani. Its path to the NASS had been tortuous and chequered, taking as much as 14 years for successive governments, since Obasanjo to put an executive railway bill before the National Assembly. The bill was eventually sent to the 7th National Assembly by President Goodluck Jonathan in March 2015, in the twilight of his government.
Unsurprisingly, after much focus groups and interministerial committees, after much toing and froing within the executive arm, with the bill being tossed from one reviewer group to the other, then languishing  over 14 years, it is no surprise that the outcome is that we have simply gone full circle and and arrived at where we are coming from. All the bad things that had been taken out in the earlier drafts of the bill have found their way back in.
What are the positives and features of the new bill? (I) there is an executive railway bill at the National Assembly for better or worse.  (II) the problem has changed name (PHCN). It is now known as the Nigerian Railway Authority (NRA). It is the successor in title to the assets and liabilities of the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC). It is owned by government, it owns railway infrastructure, can build railway infrastructure, can operate railway services, can grant concessions to private operators to provide railway services, it will regulate technical standards and safety on all railways, including railways of states and local governments. It will enforce compliance with the Act. Indeed, no one in Nigeria can carry out the construction, ownership or operation of railways in Nigeria except with the express authorisation of the Nigerian Railway Authority. The NRA should not licence or regulate state and local government owned railways. Neither should it operate and regulate nor provide infrastructure and regulate safety at the same time. All are littered with potential conflicts.
The board is better professionalized with the infusion of three executive directors though the six parttime directors should of necessity have railway experience and commitment as should the chairman. There are other stakeholders that should be represented perhaps through the auspices of the six part time director provision. The organised private sector should be represented on the board as should labour and railway users.
The role of the minister is clarified. He is responsible for the formulation of policy for the railway sector, facilitation of international protocols and agreements with foreign entities, review of the records and performance of the NRA etc. Nowhere does it say that the minister can award contracts for railway construction or the purchase of railway equipment. That role is reserved for the implementing agency, i.e. the NRA and private operators. Nowhere does it suggest that the minister needs a parallel bureaucracy to carry out the functions of the NRA or its board.
There is a need to also clarify the role of the NRA board as Section 4 provides for a board who “shall be responsible for policy formulation for the Authority”. Given the scale and scope of powers of the authority and its dominance of the railway industry, it is understandable to consider the NRA and the railway sector as one and the same thus potentially causing conflict between the minister and the board’s.
A Railway Accident Investigation Unit is situated in the Ministry under the bill. Ideally, this should be a unit under the NTC but with Chinese walls between it and any other branches. There is also a need to define what constitutes a railway accident and who should be investigating what. Better phraseology and legislative drafting is required in the conflict of interest provision as regards Accident Inspectors.
There are lots of bill housekeeping issues that disappoint, especially given that it has taken all of 14 years to produce the bill. From mis-references to contradictions and significant errors for instance, where the authority is referred to as the corporation, or where it claims on the one hand that the Inspector of Railways would be appointed by the authority while on the other claims that the Inspector of Railways would be appointed by the National Transport Commission. In one breath it says the NRA would licence operators, while in another it says the NTC would.
We are now left with an NRA with the same powers and reach as the NRC as an owner, landlord, operator, regulator, enforcer in chief and government.
What may be apparent is that the private sector involvement in the development of this bill has been probably marginal. It is possible that this contribution may have been limited to the consultants at the BPE who produced the first drafts of the bill and perhaps some limited participation in focus groups. Notwithstanding, the civil servants seem to have since whittled away any diminution of their power with serial amendments. But it stands to reason that the organised private sector must be adequately consulted and carried along if the purpose is to attract their interest.
There is no gainsaying that the private sector will not be attracted to an environment in which the dominant player is the government with sweeping powers to potentially undermine their investment, sabotage and take over their business. That is what constituting the NRA as an operator, licensor and regulator portends for the private operator.
The onus is now on the National Assembly to turn the bill into a worthy document that would chart our future railway.
Rowland Ataguba, Managing Director, Bethlehem Rail Infrastructure Limited, London NW7 4RS