Confessional statement is the best evidence –Mbaba JCA

The appellant was, however, convicted and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on each count under a lesser offence pursuant to section 218 of the Criminal Procedure code, and section 225 of the Penal Code, which says:“Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any act not amounting to culpable homicide but done with the […]

The appellant was, however, convicted and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on each count under a lesser offence pursuant to section 218 of the Criminal Procedure code, and section 225 of the Penal Code, which says:
“Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any act not amounting to culpable homicide but done with the intention of causing hurt or grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years or with fine or with both.”
The sentences were to run concurrently.
Appellant had pleaded not guilty to the charge on being arraigned. She was arraigned for trial de novo on 10/2/2010, having been first arraigned before Umar Maigari J, where two witnesses testified. On the demise of his lordship, the trial had to commence, de novo, before Ahmad Isah Gumel J. At the de novo trial the prosecution called four witnesses and tendered three exhibits, while the appellant testified as DW1.
The facts of the case at the lower court showed that the accused (the 2nd wife) of PW1, had given what they called fura to her co-wife and when the three children, two of whom were of her co-wife drank what was prepared from the fura, they (children) died, one at the spot and the other in the hospital, on admission. PW1 was the father of two of the children; PW2 was the mother of the two children and PW3 the mother of the last girl and neighbour of the PWs 1 & 2 and of the accused. Pw2 said the accused gave her the fura, through her child, to be kept in her room; that on 6/2/2009, she gave the fura to the children and the moment they took it, they started vomiting and stooling and when the fura was checked poison was found in it. The children died of the poisonous substance called “shayin bera” found in the fura. Exhibit P1 was the medical report on the deceased and Exhibits P2 and P2A the statements of the accused. The trial judge relied heavily on the evidence of PW2 and PW3 and on the confessional statement of the appellant in convicting her.
Appellant’s counsel had concluded that the prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Appellant, caused the death of the deceased, by poisoning them.
Counsel argued that to succeed in establishing the alleged murder, the prosecution had a duty to establish all the ingredients of offence of murder.
The charge against the appellant had three counts, each for culpable homicide punishable with death contrary to Section 223 of the Penal Code, Cap 107 Laws of Jigawa State, 1998 and punishable under Section 221 (b) of the Penal Code. One of the Counts (and they were all the same, except for the different particulars of the deceased), states:
“That you Amina Musa (f) on or about the 6th day of February, 2009 at about 0700 hours at Tsakani Fulani settlement Area of Roni Local Government Area within the Jigawa Judicial Division committed culpable homicide punishable with death by causing the death of one Yusuf Musa 7 years old by poisoning him and thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 223 of the Penal code, cap 107 Laws of Jigawa State, 1998 and punishable under Section 221(b) of the Penal code, cap 107, laws of Jigawa State 1998.”
The 2nd and 3rd counts concerned causing the death of Nana Dausiya Musa (f) 3 years old and Hafsatu Ya’u (f) 7 months old, respectively, by the same process of poisoning.
Of course, the fact of the death of the three young children was not in doubt. The remaining task of the prosecution was that of establishing that the death of each of the children (or any of them) was caused by the Appellant, by poisoning them.
I think the evidence relating to the drinking of the fura, and the source of the fura, the vomiting and stooling after the drink and the death of the children as a result of drinking the fura, were clear and direct evidence, without any ambiguity. It is however true that the way the trial judge recorded some part of the evidence of the PW3 left much to be desired, as he was mixing up her name with that of PW2 and confusing direct speeches with reported speeches; But that did not blur or confuse the facts she accounted for, namely what the children drank, what happened to them, who supplied the fura and the death.
I therefore hold that there were no material contradictions or discrepancy in the evidence of the PW3 or PW2, and in between them, to cast doubt on their testimonies on how the 3 children died, after drinking the fura.
The allegation was that the fura was poisoned, and that the accused person was the person who put the poisonous substance in the fura, which she gave to the PW2, her co-wife (whom accused person confessed was a rival and they were not friendly).  Of course, the medical report (Exhibit PI), issued on one of deceased children (Hafsatu), opined the cause of death to be “food poisoning, with ‘2’ Acute respiratory distress.”
It was the Appellant that rather supplied the evidence on how the ‘fura’ had the poisonous substance. She did that in her additional confessional statement (Exhibit P2A), when she said:
‘’… One year ago, my husband Musa Yahaya (m) bought a poison in order to kill rats. I took a poison and put into or inside fura with the intention to kill my rival, one Maryam Musa (f) of the same address. I didn’t have mind to kill her children. We are not living in peace with her, always fight with her because of that, nothing children do me, is God that brought it, I am pleaded you to forgive my offence that I committed.”
Counsel for the appellant had argued, strongly, that the confessional statements by the appellant offended the law; that the DPO’s directive that appellant should tell the truth induced the statement and so it was made on the prompting of the DPO, contrary to the words of caution administered to the appellant and against the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Thus, the confessional statement was not voluntary.
But, the appellant never contested the voluntariness of the confessional statement at the trial and so was raising this issue, on appeal, for the first time, as the trial court never considered it or contemplated the denial in its judgment.
The defence counsel was “blowing hot and cold” at the same time, approbating and reprobating. And it is obvious she allowed the confessional statements to go in unscratched. Her allegation that the accused person did not make any statement to the police could not be true!
Thus, the documents were admitted without objection and so the confessional statements were not contested, denied or retracted by the accused person at the trial. Appellant cannot, therefore, canvass argument, on appeal, to dissociate herself with the confessional statements, on appeal, or reject the same.
A confessional statement is the best evidence, as it comes from the accused person to establish the truth of the case against him. It also implies a self-entanglement in the web of the offence.
The reason is obvious. By a confession, entrenched in Section 27(1) of the Evidence Act 2004 (now 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011), an accused person himself admits and concedes to committing the offence in question. Thus, the accused person gives himself up to the law and becomes his own accuser and witness.
With the exhibits P2 and P2A, wherein the appellant confessed to the crime, and stated that the target of her mischief was the PW2 (her co-wife) not the little children that died after drinking the poisoned fura, the offence was established by the appellant herself.
I think appellant should rather be grateful to the trial court, which, after finding her guilty, as charged of culpable homicide punishable with death, strangely opted to punish her under Section 225 of the penal code, on the allegation of proof of lesser offence, thereby reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for 10 years. Since there is no appeal against this, I shall not comment any further on it.
I therefore resolve the issues against the appellant, as I see no merit in the appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Parties to bear their costs.