Dangers of altering the impeachment procedure

Two clear objectives can be distilled from the foregoing. One is to remove perceived ambiguities in the impeachment provision, on grounds of gross misconduct, and the other is to make the process transparent and democratic.In respect of the former, the amendment bill fails to change the offence that leads to impeachment. The offence, as the […]

Two clear objectives can be distilled from the foregoing. One is to remove perceived ambiguities in the impeachment provision, on grounds of gross misconduct, and the other is to make the process transparent and democratic.
In respect of the former, the amendment bill fails to change the offence that leads to impeachment. The offence, as the bill prescribes is still “gross misconduct”. Section 143(11) of the 1999 Constitution describes ‘gross misconduct’ as “a grave violation or breach of this Constitution or a misconduct of such nature as amounts in the opinion of the National Assembly to gross misconduct.”
No Constitution sets out specifics as they relate to impeachable offences. The U. S, Constitution, for instance, defines impeachment at the federal level and limits it to “The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States” who may be impeached and removed only for “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanours”.
Several commentators have suggested that Congress alone may decide for itself what constitutes a “high crime or misdemeanour” especially since Nixon v. United States stated that the Supreme Court did not have the authority to determine whether the Senate properly “tried” a defendant.  
With Section 143(11) as it currently is, wide latitude still exists for the exploitation of legislators’ intent on reigning President. This indeed is an omnibus monster which plays to the whims of adversarial lawmakers, and therefore cannot be any worse than it is. It can only be ‘improved on’ to the advantage of the President.
Honourable Dogara, in an interview, reeled out specific issues of infringement on the Appropriation Act by the President, perceived lopsidedness on the interpretation of the Bureau of Public Procurement Act, sundry issues on removal of subsidy on petroleum products, and concluded that they are all impeachable offences. Even if they are, which is still subject to proof, they cannot be part of the Constitution in specific terms and can only be subsumed under an umbrella phrase. In effect, the content of the bill contradicts its mission statement.
This brings us to the second arm of the bill, which is to make the process of impeachment “transparent and democratic”. The amendment bill ousts the Judiciary from the impeachment process and gives the Senate the power to prosecute the President or the Vice President upon impeachment by the House. The Chief Justice of the Federation, is however to preside over the proceeding with the Senators voting.
In the same interview cited above, Dogara continued “…When the National Assembly, a body of 469 members by 2/3 majority has passed a resolution to say that an office holder has committed an impeachable offense, the CJN is called upon to constitute the panel, at the end of the day, whatever they say, the courts cannot query it, the National Assembly cannot debate it. So, if I were the President, I will just give the CJN the seven names, because he is my appointee. After that houses or mansions will be bought for them, they will be bribed and the story goes on. In fact, they won’t even put people of unquestionable integrity.”
This is an undeservedly grave indictment of the Judiciary.  
This doctrine of separation of powers has worked fairly well in Nigeria; hence there is no need to seek greater powers for one arm. The proponents of the amendment bill are flustered over their claim that the opinion of 469 members of the National Assembly could be subordinated to the whims of just seven Justices of the Supreme Court, who are after all the appointees of the President and necessarily must do his bidding.
The concept of separation of powers is not a by-product of numbers. In the imagination of the law, the three arms are equal. The power of the National Assembly over the Judiciary is evidenced by the confirmatory role of the Senate over its leadership.  
The assumption of control by the Executive over the Judiciary is uncharitable and without substance. The current Chief Justice of the Federation, for instance was among the three Justices of the Supreme Court in whose view, late President Musa Yar’adua and then Vice President Goodluck Jonathan were not properly elected in 2007. But even with that fact glaring Jonathan on the face, he still proceeded to nominate her for the position of Chief Justice of Nigeria.  
Another reason advanced for this proposed amendment is to simplify the process of impeaching the president. No democracy makes the process of deconstructing its leadership infrastructure simple.
Liberalising the process of impeachment is akin to removing the immunity clause. In an environment with fledging institutions, such an act will constitute a needless distraction to the President, who may spend more time fending off impeachment than in governance. This will in turn lead to recurring activation of the impeachment process thereby destabilising the process of governance.
The impeachment pattern modelled after the American system will scarcely sit easy in our clime because the states are not running bicameral legislature.  
If the sponsors of this bill were driven by altruism and not a pre-meditated intention to whittle down the President’s capacity to function, they should have prescribed the federal model for the states too.

  Lawal wrote from Kaduna