Experts identify line between speedy trials and breach of fair hearing

Senior lawyers and criminal justice experts had a brainstorming session in Abuja over the weekend as the contentions in the country’s Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) was once again brought to the fore. The major focus of discussion is the effect of provision of Section 306, 396 (2) of the ACJA as opposed to […]

Senior lawyers and criminal justice experts had a brainstorming session in Abuja over the weekend as the contentions in the country’s Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) was once again brought to the fore.

The major focus of discussion is the effect of provision of Section 306, 396 (2) of the ACJA as opposed to sections 6(6) and 36(4) of the Constitution, 1999, and the place of substantial justice in criminal trials.

The forum, which was organized as the First Criminal Law Review roundtable, was facilitated by former President of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) and chairman of the Law Development Foundation, Joseph Daudu (SAN). Others in attendance are: Prof Akinseye-George; D.C. Denwigwe, Emmanuel Ukala, Dipo Okpeseye, Tawo Eja Tawo, Dr J.O. Olatoke, Solomon Umoh and Akinlolu Kehinde, all Senior Advocates of Nigeria (SAN). There was also former Osun High Court judge, Justice Folahanmi Oloyede, among other law scholars at the forum.

The theme of the seminar, which was: ‘A Review of the Ruling of the Supreme Court in SC/457/2016 Metuh vs Federal Republic of Nigeria and another’, gave the speakers opportunity to discuss the provisions of the of Section 306, 396 (2) of the ACJA as opposed to sections 6(6) and 36(4) of the Constitution, 1999.

While Section 306 reads: “An application for stay of proceedings in respect of criminal matter before the court shall not be entertained,” Section 396 (2) states that: “After the plea has been taken, the defendant may raise any objection to the validity of the charge or the information at any time before judgment provided that any such objection shall only be considered along with the substantive issues and ruling thereon made at the time of delivery of judgment.”

However, Section 36 (4) of the 1999 Constitution states that: “Whenever any person is charged with a criminal offence, he shall, unless the charge is withdrawn, be entitled to a fair hearing in public within a reasonable time by a court or tribunal.”

In his view, Daudu noted that the Supreme Court may in due course be called upon to review its decision in Metuh’s case because not granting stay of proceedings on interlocutory appeals places a fait accompli on a case, especially when at the end of the trial the defendant was found to be innocent. 

“We would have had no problems if instead of hearing the motion for stay of proceedings, it dealt with the substantive appeal and no case submission and sent him back to court if he was overruled,” he said.

“The fact that courts jettisoned their powers willingly, which have been given to them by the constitution to be able to stay proceeding in deserving cases, embolden trial courts to think that they may no longer be corrected by the corrective powers of the appellate courts. 

“And because of the fact that the maturity in trial courts may not be as high as the maturity in the Appeal Court and Supreme Court due to long association with the law, you find that injustice is perpetrated in cases where the people has nothing to do with corruption or other similar issues hence it is not a one size fits all.”

In the same vein, J.O. Olatoke (SAN) called for the amendment of expulsion of the Section 306 of the ACJA because it fetters the discretionary powers to grant a stay of proceeding. He said the blanket application of the section will one way or the other occasion injustice on an appellant’s constitutional right to fair hearing under Section 36 (4) of the 1999 Constitution. 

He added that “the right to interlocutory appeal is a constitutional right under Section 241 (1) of the Constitution.” 

“Also, the provisions of the Criminal Practice Directions should be incorporated into the ACJA and even the Constitution of Nigeria to give it a better force of law,” he added.

Towing the same line, Tawo Eja Tawo (SAN) the constitution cannot take away the inherent powers of the court provided for in Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution, not to talk of mere legislation. 

Said it is not right to hinge an appeal on Section 306 on delay to comply with ‘reasonable time’ as every case is dependent on circumstances. He added that: “Section 306 is not only unconstitutional, it is an aberration.”

But in his submission, Prof Akinseye-George (SAN) stated that the Supreme Court of a panel, which consisted of: Justices Musa Dattijo Muhammad (Presided), Clara Ogunbiyi, Kudirat Kekere-Ekun, Ejembi Eko and Sidi Dauda Bage, in Metuh’s case took the Bull by the Horn and upheld the provisions of Section 306 of the ACJA to address the “rot which had afflicted the Nigerian criminal justice system through the monster called Stay of Proceedings and Interlocutory Appeals.”

He noted that the ACJA has not been able to address the problem of delay in the conclusion of criminal trials as defence lawyers still use the usual strategy to couch the grounds of appeal as jurisdictional in nature with a view to forcing the trial court to give the appeal priority over the substantive matter before the court

He listed other grounds for delay as identified by Justice Suleiman Galadima-led Corruption and Financial Crime Cases Trial Monitoring Committee (COTRIMCO) such as: Poor investigation, weak prosecution, lack of witnesses, poor funding and wrong attitude of defence lawyers, etc. 

The solution in such a case does not lie in tinkering with section 306; but in proactive administrative measures by the heads of court such as special fast track panels to quickly determine interlocutory appeals especially where they border on jurisdictional and constitutional questions. 

He noted that “the right to fair hearing under the constitution does not extend to the right to stay of proceedings after a prima facie case has been made out against a defendant at the trial court and upheld by the Court of Appeal,” adding that in Metuh is in accord with Public Policy which finds expression in section 15(5) of the Constitution and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the locus classicus, AG Ondo State v. AG of the Federation (2002) 27 WRN 1.

However, in his submission Denwigwe (SAN) argued that “every judge of every superior court of record in Nigeria is adequately equipped to render sound exercise of discretion. There is absolutely no need for any legislative gag which flies in the face of the supremacy of the constitution.”