Finally, a qualified Minister of Defence but….

That message obviously did not get through. Instead, we ended up with the two  persons that were appointed as ministers of defence. The results spoke for themselves. It took nearly two years for the system to finally acknowledge that such an arrangement would not work. I congratulate President Tinubu for finally admitting he was wrong in appointing ministers of defence.  I congratulate the new Minister of Defence and wish him luck.

Now, at least, the first part of the problem is being fixed.

The President has replaced the former minister with a far more capable hand: a retired General and former Chief of Defence Staff. This solves the problem of individual capacity. Here is someone who understands doctrine, joint operations, service rivalries, procurement cycles, and the culture of the Armed Forces.

But let us be honest: Anybody conversant with Nigerian military set up knows that Nigeria’s defence problem has never been the competence of individual ministers alone. There is also the institutional weakness of the office itself. From the days of military regime two offices in the defence architecture were designed to be weak ab initio: the CDS office and the Minister of Defence office….for obvious reasons: military heads of state emerged from military coups and consequently they fear military coups…The solution was to appoint a powerless CDS and powerless Minister of Defence and deal directly with the service chiefs. That has been the unspoken formula which continued in democracy.

The truth is uncomfortable but must be said:

1. The Nigeria’s Ministry of Defence is structurally powerless.

Under the Armed Forces Act and current administrative practice, the Minister of Defence has almost no real statutory authority over the military. The office manages policy memos and international engagements but is not in the operational chain of command. The incumbent only attends Passing out Parades, does not control budgets, or procurement and wear military uniforms to masquerade like real general. Defence Headquarters, Service Chiefs, and theatre commanders routinely take instructions directly from the President.

2. The Minister of Defence is often bypassed — turning the office into a ceremonial posting

For decades, it has been normal for Service Chiefs to go straight to Aso Rock, bypassing the minister entirely. This practice:

a. Undermines civilian oversight

b. Weakens institutional accountability

c. Turns the minister into a spectator

d. Concentrates too much power in the service chiefs leaving them almost on auto pilot

Creates a “military-first” rather than “defence-first” system

The result? An office that looks important but has very little real power — a virtual sinecure.

3. Changing the person does not change the system. Yes, appointing a retired General solves the competency gap. But it does not fix the structural dysfunction.

Just as the U.S. Secretary of Defence’s authority is clearly defined in law (Title 10), Nigeria must confront the reality that:

No matter who you appoint, the Minister of Defence will remain weak until the law and day-to-day governmental practice are reformed.

4. The new Minister’s past performance shows his capacity — but also exposes the institutional weakness

Based on his recent performance as CDS — another problematic office with no real defined statutory powers — the new Minister succeeded not because the office empowered him, but because he personally thought outside the box, identified blind spots, and operated in “ungoverned spaces” not contested by the too-powerful Service Chiefs.

One recalls his forays into defence diplomacy, which allowed him to avoid clashes with the Service Chiefs — a problem that confronted many of his predecessors.

But that “survive by innovation” model will be much harder to repeat as Minister of Defence. Why?

Because of the unorthodox practice — begun under late President Muhammadu Buhari and continued by President Tinubu — whereby Service Chiefs maintain direct access to the President behind the Minister’s back.

If this continues, even the most capable minister will be reduced to a ceremonial figure.

Therefore:

The new Minister must be institutionally empowered — not left to succeed by personal ingenuity.

This is global best practice. This is how defence ministries function in almost all democracies.

No more the situation where the tail (Service Chiefs) wags the dog (Minister of Defence).

If the Minister is to succeed, the President must allow him to function as the real civilian boss of the military.

5. What must change for Nigeria to see real results:

(a) Amend the Armed Forces Act

– Define clear powers for the Minister

– Make Service Chiefs report through the Minister

– Place procurement, doctrine, oversight, and strategy under MOD authority

(b) Reform command and reporting practices

– End the tradition of Service Chiefs bypassing the Minister

– Reinforce the chain: President → Minister of Defence → CDS → Service Chiefs

– Institutionalise respect for civilian control (Gen Gwabin is a civilian now he should answer mister )

(c) Rebuild MOD as a real Defence Headquarters

– Staff it with professionals, strategists, planners, and analysts

– Make it the centre of defence policy, not an appendage of Service HQ. Bottom Line :

A strong minister helps. A strong ministry wins wars.

Nigeria has now fixed the capacity problem by appointing a qualified minister.

The President must now fix the institutional problem by empowering that minister to truly lead the Armed Forces.

Only then can we stop the tradition of Minister of Defence functioning as ornamental placeholder in a system dominated by Service Chiefs — and move toward global best practice in military governance.

Goup Capt. Shehu, a retired Air Force officer sent this piece from Abuja