Finding the recipe for a people’s ECOWAS
Although this process commenced through open deliberations and suggestions by individuals and representatives of civil society groups, it is still unclear how years of state involvement in developing regional policies will be transformed. This was identified as a major impediment to the realization and implementation of consensus agreements on peaceful solutions to the myriad conflicts […]
Although this process commenced through open deliberations and suggestions by individuals and representatives of civil society groups, it is still unclear how years of state involvement in developing regional policies will be transformed. This was identified as a major impediment to the realization and implementation of consensus agreements on peaceful solutions to the myriad conflicts that plagued the region over the years.
Focusing on the themes of reassessing the negotiating processes, examining the process of crafting and implementing peace agreements and evaluating preconditions for durable peace in post-conflict reconstruction with emphasis on gender equality in peace mediation, the conference involved a week of closed door deliberations and explicit arguments on the failures and errors made in the formulation of the peace agreements arising from civil wars in the region.
President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf stated in her speech at the opening ceremony, that “the root causes of civil conflicts in Africa are bad governance, lack of respect for human rights, socio-economic and political inequity and grinding poverty”. This viewpoint reverberated throughout the conference and exposed the need for a shift in the forces that would dictate the course of transforming the political space in the West African region.
It was clear that the conference was a consequence of the ECOWAS Commission’s encouragement of democratic governance in line with demands by civil society for more inclusive and equitable governments in member states. These demands are not new. They provoked many of the political crises that have plagued the region since the 1990s, and continue to fuel the push for political change in the region today.
The successes and failures of these struggles may not be measured by simple indices such as the instant change in the structures of governance but by the recognition of these struggles as necessary factors in sustaining the integration process. While West African states have experienced a boost in the democratization process and an improved sense of socio-political stability, it should also be recognized that the conditions that fan the embers of political instability continue to exist and can still boil over.
There were comprehensive discussions about the causes, consequences and outcome of the attempts at conflict resolution in Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the fact that these experiences were replicated in Cote D’Ivoire was largely overlooked. The constant friction that has stifled democratic governance in that state exposes a pattern that has only been addressed by member states in words but not through deeds. In Cote D’Ivoire, the civil war that broke out was as a result of government mismanagement and corruption, ethnic distrust and cupidity. Sadly, at the conference, this issue did not feature prominently in discussions about solutions for brewing political tensions in the region. In this, there is a discrepancy; understanding the reasons behind the conflict in Cote D’Ivoire may expose some of the main factors that oil the engines of social collapse in states with presumably strong prior democratic traditions.
In Guinea Bissau, tension boiled over as a consequence of similar political issues that had their roots in bad governance and public distrust for political actors. Once again, the pattern of military intervention in the democratic process has reared its ugly head through the mutiny in that country. These trends have been observed mainly as emanating from grievances over political transparency.
The role of ECOWAS in stemming the rise of violent conflicts, civil wars, and breakdown of political order across the region can be deduced from the visible efforts of its military affiliates ECOMOG and ECOMIL but these have not been exclusive elements of its intervention. Comprehensive mediatory efforts and consistent calls for transparency in governance by the ECOWAS leadership have played an important role in resolving conflicts. This has been manifested not only through deployment of troops to maintain peace, or through efforts at initiating programs of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, as in Cote D’Ivoire, but also, by calling on governments to imbibe strong democratic structures of governance that address the socio-political needs of their people.
One of the main indicators of ECOWAS’ success to drive its demands for responsible governance is the fact that it has pushed this process even with its membership ranks still infiltrated by “sit tight” governments. The determination of its leadership in recent years, has enabled the Commission to push through the ratification of its protocol on democracy and good governance and its ability to participate instructively in the affairs of member states regardless of this impediment.
The involvement of other regional and international bodies, such as the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) in the negotiation and peace keeping processes may suggest that ECOWAS faces limitations in tackling such issues within its member states. There are limitations in the Commission’s efforts at mediation, partly as a result of general suspicion of complicity in local conflicts, whether covert or overt, among member states, but the involvement of other regional bodies is important to build synergy with the international community in order to share experiences that will help provide a wider outlook. The interaction between these regional and international bodies is essential to develop checks and balances in situations where conflicts of interest arise within the West African region.
The situation in Togo exposes this necessity. Following the death of long-time president, Eyadema Gnassingbe, ECOWAS diplomats successfully negotiated a nine-step plan to hold presidential elections and then oversaw its implementation. However, an ECOWAS observation mission was also charged with making an independent assessment of the election process and all its players. For a better sense of transparency, this task could have been executed by other bodies or missions.
A message that ECOWAS has so far succeeded in sending out is that while military interventions in states’ political processes are often based on demands by the public for change, they represent an aberration in political authority. They tend to aggravate political tensions by suppressing public opinion and as long as that remains, it cannot be accepted as a legitimate means of changing government.
At some point, mediation efforts are expected to create a favorable environment for the commencement of a genuine political process. To ensure that such a process is legitimate, it is essential that a program of surveillance is instituted to guarantee transparency. Despite some admirable successes on this issue, ECOWAS has not yet devised an approach to election observation that would be relevant across the region.. Selecting a unified approach would give ECOWAS the means to consistently identify minimum circumstances under which they would agree to observe an election; and the scope of their mission, in terms of length of time in country and focus of observation efforts.
The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance sets out general principles for election observation, but the document lacks a clear criteria and operational guidelines to serve as a checklist for observers. It does not define standard operating procedures that could facilitate the planning for observation missions under challenging security environments. It does not have a code of conduct that binds its observers to common rules and standards and ensures consistency in their work. In this regard, the commission lags behind other African organizations, such as SADC, which have developed methodologies that are viable.
ECOWAS still lacks a long-term approach to observation. If observers intend to make meaningful impact as umpires and judges of elections, they must observe the pre-electoral processes and not just events on Election Day. Also, the findings and assessments of the observers must be sufficiently detailed and plausible. It is also important that the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja incorporate an elections unit in order to improve its capacity to plan, mobilize and manage election observation missions. It must also have a pool of trained and experienced observers from within its member states.
The recipe for an ECOWAS that serves the needs of an increasingly articulate and vigilant civil society requires the expertise of a “chef” who can concoct a “political dish” that will appeal to the taste buds of a democratically demanding population. It must start from harnessing transparency in the election processes of states. Without this, a major ingredient for palatable governance is lost and thus starts a gradual decline to anarchy. This must be recognized as a necessity if the scourge of conflicts is to be stamped out of West Africa’s political history. ECOWAS looks ready to achieve this as it identifies the potential for regional growth inherent in promoting the political aspirations of the West African people. The Monrovia Conference was a step in the direction of accountability and a shared sense of responsibility to encourage stronger regional unity in the interests of the masses rather than to serve rarefied elitist objectives.