Fiscal reality beyond academic abstractions: A response to Tanimu Yakubu

The article by Tanimu Yakubu attempts to wrap Nigeria’s present economic distress in sophisticated macroeconomic language, portraying critics of the current administration as economically illiterate opponents of modern fiscal theory. Yet beneath the heavy invocation of Keynes, Krugman, Samuelson and state intervention lies a troubling attempt to intellectualise hardship while avoiding the central question confronting […]

The article by Tanimu Yakubu attempts to wrap Nigeria’s present economic distress in sophisticated macroeconomic language, portraying critics of the current administration as economically illiterate opponents of modern fiscal theory. Yet beneath the heavy invocation of Keynes, Krugman, Samuelson and state intervention lies a troubling attempt to intellectualise hardship while avoiding the central question confronting Nigerians: where are the measurable outcomes of the borrowing, deficits and fiscal expansion being defended?

No serious observer disputes that governments may borrow, spend counter-cyclically or intervene during structural crises. That debate was settled decades ago. What Nigerians are questioning is not whether deficits can be useful, but whether this particular deficit trajectory is productive, accountable, sustainable and translating into tangible economic improvement for ordinary citizens.

The argument presented by Yakubu commits a common error among technocrats: equating criticism of policy outcomes with ignorance of economic theory. But economic management is not judged merely by theoretical citations. It is judged by outcomes, efficiency, credibility and public welfare.

Nigeria today faces historic inflationary pressure, collapsing purchasing power, rising food insecurity, escalating unemployment, weakening industrial productivity and an unprecedented cost-of-living crisis. These are not ideological inventions. They are lived realities across homes, markets and businesses.

A government cannot continuously invoke “transitional pain” without clearly defining the destination, timeline and measurable indicators of recovery.

Yakubu correctly states that deficits are not inherently immoral. True. The United States, Japan, China and European economies have all used deficit financing. But the comparison becomes intellectually weak when detached from institutional quality, productive capacity and governance standards.

Advanced economies borrow largely in support of productive systems with strong industrial bases, export capacity, technological competitiveness and relatively efficient public institutions. Nigeria’s situation is fundamentally different.

Nigeria borrows heavily while:

* electricity generation remains chronically weak,

* manufacturing continues to shrink,

* insecurity undermines agriculture,

* the naira remains fragile,

* and public confidence in state institutions continues to erode.

The issue, therefore, is not simply debt-to-GDP ratio. It is debt productivity. A country with low revenue, weak exports, import dependency and poor institutional efficiency cannot endlessly comfort itself with comparisons to Japan or the United States. Japan borrows largely in its own currency with massive industrial depth and high domestic savings. Nigeria borrows under structurally vulnerable conditions with limited productive buffers.

To compare both contexts without emphasising those differences risks misleading the public.

Yakubu downplays Nigeria’s debt challenge by citing debt-to-GDP figures. Yet many economists have repeatedly warned that Nigeria’s true vulnerability lies in debt-service-to-revenue ratios, not merely aggregate debt stock.

When a substantial portion of government revenue goes into servicing debt, fiscal flexibility shrinks dramatically. Essential sectors like education, healthcare, security and infrastructure become constrained. Citizens then experience austerity indirectly through declining public services and rising living costs.

The question Nigerians are asking is simple: If borrowing is expanding growth capacity, where is the broad-based productivity growth?

Where are the industrial parks operating at scale?

Where is the stable electricity?

Where is the agricultural transformation sufficient to moderate food inflation?

Where are the export gains matching the scale of fiscal sacrifice?

Economic theory without corresponding developmental evidence becomes elite abstraction.

Another recurring theme in Yakubu’s argument is inheritance: that today’s distortions accumulated over decades. That is correct. But governments are elected precisely to improve inherited conditions, not merely describe them.

Every administration in Nigeria inherited problems.

Olusegun Obasanjo inherited debt and institutional decay after military rule.

Umaru Musa Yar’Adua inherited infrastructure deficits.

Goodluck Jonathan inherited Niger Delta instability.

Muhammadu Buhari inherited falling oil prices and insecurity.

 Inheritance explains challenges; it does not automatically justify outcomes.

At some point, citizens evaluate the current managers by current realities.

One of the most politically dangerous aspects of Yakubu’s essay is the tendency to reduce public frustration to ignorance, propaganda or manipulation by vested interests. This is a serious misreading of public sentiment.

The market woman facing soaring food prices is not engaging in “market romanticism.”  The small manufacturer shutting down because of energy costs is not practicing “colonial mimicry.”  The young graduate without employment is not reciting ideological slogans.

Economic legitimacy depends not only on macroeconomic models but also on whether citizens experience improvement in their daily lives.

Technocrats must be careful not to become insulated from social realities by the language of fiscal sophistication.

Yakubu defends state intervention by citing China, South Korea and the United States. Again, this is only partially correct because successful State intervention depends heavily on institutional discipline, meritocracy, long-term planning and accountability.

South Korea’s developmental State disciplined industry.

China’s State-driven model maintained rigorous production expansion.

Singapore coupled State intervention with bureaucratic efficiency and anti-corruption discipline.

State intervention without institutional accountability can easily degenerate into elite rent recycling rather than national transformation.

Yakubu also argues that allegations should not become convictions before investigations conclude. On this narrow legal point, he is correct. Due process matters.  However, democratic accountability also requires rigorous public scrutiny of fiscal management, procurement processes, subsidy savings, exchange-rate policies and debt accumulation.

Citizens are not required to suspend criticism until every institutional process concludes, especially in a country where investigations themselves are often delayed, politicised or inconclusive.

Reform must be accompanied by credibility

The hardest truth facing the current administration is this: reform credibility depends on visible sacrifice at the top.

Citizens are more willing to endure painful reforms when government demonstrates:

 

* fiscal discipline,

* reduction in wasteful spending,

* transparency,

* elite sacrifice,

* and measurable anti-corruption seriousness.

When political officeholders continue extravagant lifestyles, buying yachts, planes, and extensive travels etc, while citizens absorb inflation shocks, public trust deteriorates rapidly. No amount of macroeconomic vocabulary can substitute for credibility.

Nigeria indeed requires structural reform. Few serious analysts deny that fuel subsidies, exchange-rate distortions and weak revenue systems were unsustainable. But acknowledging the necessity of reform does not require silence about its execution, sequencing or consequences.

Criticism of economic policy is not automatically economic illiteracy.  In fact, one of the dangers facing modern governance is technocratic arrogance, the assumption that citizens suffering economic pain simply “do not understand economics.” Democracies collapse into instability when policymakers dismiss legitimate hardship as ignorance.

The true test of economic policy is not how elegantly it is defended in essays by appointees, but whether it produces:

* rising productivity,

* stable prices,

* stronger institutions,

* improved living standards,

* expanding employment,

* and restored public confidence.

These are the metrics history ultimately remembers.

Hamidu resides in Yola