Governing the economy and the burden of choice

When Abia Governor, Dr. Alex Otti, stood before his audience recently, in Lagos, to deliver a lecture titled “Governing the Economy: Choices, Trade-offs, and National Priorities,” he did not reach for abstractions. Instead, he offered a blunt diagnosis of Nigeria’s condition: “Several nations of the world are doing better than we are, not because they […]

When Abia Governor, Dr. Alex Otti, stood before his audience recently, in Lagos, to deliver a lecture titled “Governing the Economy: Choices, Trade-offs, and National Priorities,” he did not reach for abstractions. Instead, he offered a blunt diagnosis of Nigeria’s condition: “Several nations of the world are doing better than we are, not because they are better endowed, but for the simple reason that they have consistently made better political and economic choices than we have done.” It is the kind of statement that sounds obvious until one considers how persistently Nigeria has chosen otherwise.

For decades, the country has vacillated between reform and relapse, ambition and retreat. Economic plans are launched with urgency, only to be weakened by political compromise or abandoned altogether. Institutions struggle to sustain continuity. Governance often becomes less about production and national purpose than about access, distribution, and political survival.

The result is the paradox Nigerians know too well: a country rich in human and natural resources, yet persistently unable to translate either into broad prosperity.

This is why economic conversations in Nigeria are rarely just about economics. They are ultimately about political incentives, institutional culture, and the deeper question of what the state exists to do.

To understand how choices shape outcomes, analysts often look beyond Nigeria. Rwanda has become one of the most cited examples. After the 1994 genocide, the country rebuilt around a strong developmental vision under President Paul Kagame. Over time, Rwanda developed a reputation for policy discipline, administrative coordination, and unusually consistent execution.

The results are difficult to ignore. Poverty declined significantly in the 2000s. Life expectancy improved sharply from post-conflict lows. Healthcare access expanded. Infrastructure improved in ways tied more to productivity than symbolism. In Rwanda, the state generally attempts to do what it says it will do.

Yet Rwanda’s experience is also complicated. Its developmental gains are tied to a tightly managed political system where dissent is constrained and central authority is dominant. The same discipline that improves execution also narrows pluralism.

That distinction matters because Nigeria is not Rwanda. Nigeria is larger, more fragmented, more politically competitive, and far more socially diverse. Its democratic structure produces pressures and compromises that make centralized developmental governance far more difficult.

But that is precisely why smaller examples within Nigeria itself are becoming increasingly important. Abia State under Otti may still be an evolving experiment, but it offers an interesting glimpse into what happens when governance begins to shift from patronage toward problem-solving.

Otti’s central argument was that economics cannot be separated from politics. “There is no silver bullet for Nigeria’s economic challenges,” he said. “Economics is about cold, hard facts, not vanities or wishful thinking.”

Beyond the realism is something more foundational: a reassertion of public purpose. Governance, in this view, is not merely about sharing resources or managing political alliances. It is about solving practical problems and improving collective welfare.

That shift is beginning to show in Abia. Urban sanitation has improved. Public spaces in cities like Aba increasingly reflect order rather than neglect. Roads in key commercial corridors are being rehabilitated, reconnecting economic activity in a city long regarded as one of Nigeria’s entrepreneurial centres. Administrative responsiveness has improved, along with public confidence that government may respond to everyday problems.

None of these changes are revolutionary on their own. But collectively they point to something Nigeria has historically struggled with alignment between governance and lived reality.

Development is not simply about announcing projects or unveiling policy documents. It is about whether citizens experience visible improvements in the functionality of everyday life.

Former Central Bank governor and Emir of Kano, Muhammadu Sanusi II, who was chairman of the occasion, reinforced this perspective with characteristic bluntness. Over the years, Sanusi has repeatedly argued that Nigeria’s economic problems are inseparable from its governance failures.

Weak institutions, fiscal indiscipline, poor incentive structures, and the reluctance to make politically difficult decisions continue to undermine sustainable growth. An economy cannot become productive when public resources are consumed without corresponding increases in value creation. His broader point is uncomfortable but difficult to dismiss: economic decline is rarely separate from political incompetence.

This is where the issue of trade-offs becomes unavoidable. Every meaningful reform imposes costs. Fiscal discipline reduces the capacity for patronage. Redirecting spending toward infrastructure and productivity limits immediate political consumption. Strengthening institutions means enforcing rules that may threaten entrenched interests. Transparency disrupts systems that have long benefited from opacity.

These are not merely technical problems. They are political ones. And this may be Nigeria’s deepest challenge. The country’s political incentives often reward short-term distribution more than long-term development. Elections are expensive. Political loyalty is frequently transactional. Public spending often serves immediate political stabilisation rather than strategic national transformation.

Under such conditions, reforms become episodic rather than sustained. The consequences are visible across the economy. Growth remains uneven and insufficiently inclusive. Inflation continues to erode purchasing power. Youth unemployment remains dangerously high. Public debt has expanded faster than productive capacity. Infrastructure gaps persist across transport, energy, healthcare, and education.

In the end, governing the economy is not about discovering perfect solutions. It is about making difficult choices consistently, accepting their trade-offs, and sustaining a clear sense of public purpose long enough for institutions and societies to change.