How I disarmed Charles Taylor’s soldiers in Liberia – Col. Adokwu

How have you fared after over 20 years of retirement?Retirement is what everybody who does government job looks forward to, but in my own case it came rather early. I returned home 23 years ago. I was 42 on retirement, still young and very energetic, so I plunged myself into farming. It was, however, tough […]

How have you fared after over 20 years of retirement?
Retirement is what everybody who does government job looks forward to, but in my own case it came rather early. I returned home 23 years ago. I was 42 on retirement, still young and very energetic, so I plunged myself into farming. It was, however, tough and hard, but I’m relaxing now, with age setting in.
Farming is a passion. When you go into it you don’t know how to get out. I took after my mother who was a big time farmer. I have a massive piece of land where I farm and my workers also live there. I have massive cashew, manila, jatropha, beniseed and palm tree plantations.

Why the early retirement?
It was forced on me in 1991, and God knows that I committed no offence, neither was I indolent.

You successfully led the first ECOMOG battalion to Liberia in 1991 and returned without a single casualty. How did you achieve such a feat?
My men were not the first that went into Liberia; we were the fourth battalion. My battalion was the 5th infantry battalion of the Nigerian Army. It was a very old battalion formed after the First World War.  It was once commanded by the late Ikemba  Odimegwu Ojukwu before he became military governor of Eastern Nigeria. It was the first battalion that went into Congo in 1960 under the command of Aguiyi Ironsi, a lieutenant colonel then and it performed a lot of heroic activities.
I proudly took over the command of the battalion in January 1989, by which time they had moved a lot around the country. It was in Ibadan in 1960 when the Queen of England visited Nigeria. It was once in Abeokuta and then Kano and it moved to Makurdi on the eve of the civil war and opened the civil war from Orokam in Benue State under the command of the late General Shuwa. The battalion had moved from the war front in Port Harcourt to Yola, where I took over its command under the dissolved 15 Brigade. It was my turn between January and February 1991 to move the battalion to Liberia. I remember vividly that I had a hint, but waited for an official message. When it got to me before it leaked out, I decided to burst it myself, otherwise we could have a case of soldiers running away. I summoned the men on parade ground, called for a war song and reminded them how under my command we had won a lot of laurels in several weapons and sports competitions. We used to call ourselves, “Fighting Five,’’ so I began by telling them how my wish to go for an operation with them had come true. I was full of smiles and they were eager to know why I was so happy. That was the psychology, and I broke the news that I was not willing to end my command (my tenure was ending and I was due for promotion to a colonel) until I go to war with them. And immediately, a corporal who was fond of Bachama songs broke out with a Bachama war song, and they all joined in the chorus. Everybody was happy. It was such a unique occasion that stirred me emotionally as the men sang, danced and prayed to go deal with Charles Taylor.
That was where I started. I boosted their morale, and in the euphoria, they came and lifted me up. The army headquarters used to make provision for so many things once it was an external operation, so they gave me so much latitude. Any weapon I wanted, I carried from anywhere within the army. The army made some money available and I didn’t squander the money. I used it very well.
Every morning I met with my men on the parade ground, where we would boast, talk tough and sing war songs to prepare ourselves from stage to stage. It was necessary because at that early stage of going to Liberia, soldiers were fond of engaging in Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL). However, not a single soldier from my battalion ran away. Towards the end of our departure, it occurred to me to talk to their wives and I got the women assembled in the sergeants’ mess and addressed them. At the tail end of our one hour chat, an inspiration occurred to me to tell the women that anyone of them that misbehaved in the absence of her husband or got herself pregnant would have herself to blame. I told them that I was going with all their men and that no soldier under my command would die, so if any woman got pregnant in the absence of her husband, on return, that woman must have answers to give to her husband, and no one in such case should meet me for intervention. I can’t explain how those words came out of my mouth. I think it was a miracle as it ended well.  It was an act of God that none of us died. It wasn’t my doing. I was the only person who went and came back with all my men. Some battalions lost up to 15, others 20 and so on. Even while I was there, some battalions had their casualties, but I didn’t.

Were you rewarded for that feat?
No. But, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) commander at the time, the late General Kupola appreciated me and my men so much that virtually everything he did while I was still in ECOMOG, he consulted me. Before my return he told me that he was recommending me for the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) award; but it never happened. On return I was due for promotion to the rank of colonel and posted elsewhere. The promotion was through, but I was retired.

What happened along the line?
Before we left for Liberia, our movement date was changed from February 11 to 10, a Sunday; and I was not aware. The army headquarters had moved the date back by one day and communicated the changes through the Jos divisional headquarters, which didn’t inform me. That day, I was in church with my men when one Charlie 130 aircraft landed, accompanied by a major without meeting me at the airport. Usually, when an army headquarters identifies a unit going for operation it deals directly with them, but my GOC, Brigadier Olurin complained about why they should be dealing directly with me. So they started working through him. When the message came to him he didn’t pass it over. As far as the army headquarters was concerned, I got the information but messed up.
However, I did a quick time appreciation and realised that the time it would take to move the soldiers from the barracks to Yola airport, then to Lagos before moving to Monrovia meant landing at night, precisely 9pm. And that wasn’t possible due to the situation of the country. It was therefore advisable not to move. So I had to let the aircraft go, with the understanding that the major would explain to the COAS, but they went and were too afraid to explain to the COAS. They hid the truth and the COAS was angry with me.
The following day, when I learnt of what happened, I went to meet General Bakut who was chief of operations at the time. He assured me that the situation had been cleared the night before and that I had no blame. When we got to Liberia after about a month and half, a query came and I answered it simply and thought the matter was over. It was later I got to understand that the GOC extricated my explanation when he was sending back his query and blamed me.
When the COAS, General Salihu Ibrahim got the report, he didn’t ask for my explanation; rather he nursed a grudge against me and threatened to withdraw me from the battalion, but a few people advised him against it, saying he should let me finish my operation.
I finished my operation and passed through my promotion board, which my GOC didn’t query. But while I was being promoted, he secretly went and submitted a letter for my retirement. General Babangida didn’t like it, but he didn’t want to interfere. He was president and not the COAS. So I was promoted and retired. However, I’m glad that I got that last promotion, from lt. colonel to colonel. It was when I returned home that I wrote a personal letter, explaining everything to the COAS, at least to prick his conscience. Even his military assistant, who was my NDA Course 8 mate, failed to tell him the truth.

Did you suspect any conspiracy in the matter?
I don’t think it was conspiracy; it was inefficiency. When Babangida got to know the truth he felt very bad and sent the then Major Adoga to my house here in Otukpo to bring me. I went, but for some reasons he was unable to see me. He fixed another date, which also coincided with the visit of the prime minister of Niger. So he asked me to leave my phone number behind. He later called, saying he wanted to compensate me, but June 12 crisis sprang up and he stepped aside. Thereafter, everything about me disappeared.

Could you share your experience in Liberia; how were you able to keep your men alive?
There was total anarchy in Liberia – no law, no prison, no police, virtually nothing. Charles Taylor had taken over 12 and two-third of the 13 counties when ECOMOG moved in. The people had no food, no hospitals. They trekked long distances of 400 miles, such as from Maryland, capital of the far eastern state county, Harper to Monrovia, and were at the mercy of God. The people experienced hunger, diseases and everything bad. They had lost hope hence there was a popular Liberian adage, “Thank God for ECOMOG.’’
Our job was humanitarian in nature. The Taylor soldiers had taken positions in all the 12 and half counties. They were untamed and vicious. They could unleash viciousness on the people anyhow, such that the country was under siege. In places where we were eyeball to eyeball with his men, there was a ceasefire, but from time to time they broke the ceasefire. Being a government army, we were more careful not to break the ceasefire. However, on occasions we were tempted to, especially when it was to save lives. And we did break the ceasefire without making too much noise about it. But our jobs were more humanitarian in nature than combat.
I remember performing one of such humanitarian jobs when a mother of a little girl who was isolated in a place called Kle ran to me from Monrovia town and told me of her predicament. Her husband was a Liberian police officer of the rank of police commissioner (powerless commissioner); they even had no food to eat. She gave the address of the place in Kle, which was about 21 miles into Taylor’s territory. I asked her to return the following day. I went into discussion with Taylor’s soldiers across where I had borders with the rebels. I met eyeball to eyeball with their commander to help me secure the release of the girl. The commander asked me to pay a price with petrol so that he could go and bring the child from Kle. I did and he brought the child, who I handed to the mother when she returned the following day and she fainted. The girl’s name is Nafisat. The woman was able to approach me because she used the Hausa language. There was also the instance of my landlord, a native of Trinidad and Tobago, whose only son was marooned in the same Kle with 13 dependants. When he approached me I used a similar method to secure the release of his son and all the 13 dependants.
Again, some refugees were coming all the way from Monrovia and my men were deployed in the eastern coastline. They found my location easier to come into Monrovia. I had vehicles stationed in all my positions, and the refugees would bypass all the other battalions and come in through my locations and I will ferry them into town. I got a truck load of them every morning, so I decided to establish some little markets. Taylor’s rebels would come to the markets with fufu, they would use refugees to come and sell in the markets while the refugees would use that as an excuse to bail out. Initially, I allowed Taylor’s rebel to come into the market without arms. After a while some of them got tempted to come over to Monrovia. Some of them started decamping, but I told them that I would not allow them come in without their weapons. In that way, I took in so many of Taylor’s soldiers and disarmed them. I got 113 of them in my six and half months in Liberia. The next battalion was a Ghanaian battalion. They got seven while I was there; the second Nigerian battalion got four in comparison with what I got. I consider that as a major achievement.
The markets were attractive, so they were coming to buy and sell. I used what we call psychological operations. My officers and men were always telling them that life was sweet, so why waste their time in the bush.

 Would you suggest that this tactics be applied to win the Boko Haram war?
It can be used, but I’m not in Boko Haram operations. I don’t know how the army is operating, or the kind of weapons they are using now. What I can say is that Boko Haram is an insurgency and it is like insurgency anywhere else in the world. Insurgency is not new to military tactics.
Of late, the army started performing well. The story about Boko Haram is a bit strange. All of a sudden, the military became capable in one week. Did they have a reserved energy? One thing that has bothered me is that we have had to ask the Chadians, the Nigeriens and Cameroonians to come into our territory and help us fight our internal insurrection. We should remain a mystery to these clientless states, but we have not been. I would have expected them to secure their boundaries and leave the rest of it for our men to handle.
Our military should be capable of dealing with situations within our borders rather than expose ourselves to weaker nations. From what I read in the newspapers the civilian vigilante takes part in the operation, and they are giving tough time to Boko Haram who are armed to the teeth. Sometimes I wonder how vigilante could chase Boko Haram away and the military cannot.
I wonder whether we still have good military maps that have been updated. Nigeria has developed so much over these years. If we don’t have good military maps, how can the military fight? How do you read your weapons, especially armours and artilleries for close combat? Are Nigeria’s military maps up to date? The military maps I know in this country were produced in 1962 when Nigeria was in its infancy.

What is the implication of the foreign aid to fight Boko Haram?
We own our territory and we should be able to maintain our territorial integrity. Self pride is uppermost in my mind when I said this. We could find more young men in service if we wanted. When our civil war came, we were hardly prepared for it. However, it was just a rightful army who fought the war and won it in two and half years. Boko Haram has been around between five and six years, which is unacceptable.

What is your opinion of the present Nigerian Army and during your time?
Frankly, I don’t know what the army is like now, but when we were in service, professionalism was emphasised. Assessing the army while I’m not in service would be wrong. However, I know that an army marches on its stomach. You must make sure that you provide well for the welfare of the men and give them the equipment and motivation they need. There is an old adage that there are no bad soldiers but bad officers. If in any situation the officers are not good, the men will not be good, but if the officers are good, the men will follow. I don’t know what is happening now, so I can’t say specifically if our army is up to the situation. But professionalism is paramount.
The Nigerian Army, however, has a record of creditable performance in Congo, Yugoslavia and other places.

You also led some soldiers to Lebanon and returned intact. Is there anything the present Nigerian Army can learn from you, especially to fight Boko Haram?
I was in the United Nations Forces in Lebanon (UNFIL) in 1979. In Liberia, I commanded a whole battalion, but in UNFIL I commanded a company of 150 men. I was a staff officer at the divisional headquarters in Kaduna in 1978 when suddenly the call to go to Lebanon came. Lebanon is a mountainous country, and the people are Arabs. I had to deploy my men around the bank of River Litany, an ancient river that was even mentioned in the bible, which runs into the Mediterranean Sea in Sidon. My battalion headquarters was situated at various positions at the bank of the River Litany where you could see through a long distance. It was an open country to another UNFIL position where the United Nations Forces had been operating since 1966.  At Southern Lebanon, the UNFIL was a buffer between Israel and Lebanon. It was a nasty operation because the Palestinians were very wild. They always tried to infiltrate and pass through our positions to Israel to go and cause havoc. The UN wanted us to stop all that. That was what we were doing. Occasionally, they would get angry with us and start shelling our positions and we would all scramble into our bunkers.
We carried small arms, we were not expected to fight back, but occasionally, we were provoked. We call that self defence. It happened once in August 14, 1979. I and my men fought back in self defence when my patrol was moving and some Palestinians infiltrated and my patrol intercepted them. The mandate stipulated that on situations like that we should take them under arrest and send them back to their positions, an impossible mandate. But fortunately, we talked them into it and they accepted, so we took them in our Land Rover and went very far and dropped them where they crossed over on a bridge. The next day, being 14th, they came back with vengeance and waited for my patrol at midnight, ambushed them and opened fire on them. A soldier who happened to be a Tiv boy got a bullet behind which came out through his chest but miraculously, he didn’t die. Others got wounded and we reported the situation. That same night, a helicopter came and lifted him to a hospital in Israel where he was operated upon and his life was saved. I later learnt that the bullet missed his heart by a millimetre.
Of course, another soldier jumped down and went into a gully, with so many soldiers wounded, I wasn’t going to let it go. So I organised the men to fight back, and as we started shooting into the position, the Palestinians that did these slipped in the same gully where one soldier slipped into, but funny enough, they didn’t see my soldier. He narrated later that they were passing very close to him but didn’t see him as they were running for their lives. The soldier kept on going until he got to where the then Captain Markka, a former military administrator in Benue had his own company, and Markka picked him up. Meanwhile, I had assaulted the position, but we didn’t pick up any corpse. I was sleeping at 5am when Markka came knocking on my door, saying he had brought my soldier for me. I saw my soldier shedding tears. I was glad I didn’t lose him. The one who was taken to the hospital in Israel was also saved. We were later informed by Isreali intelligence, MOSSAD, that we killed two of those other people. I didn’t know that because we never saw any corpse. However, the Israeli intelligence was very effective, so we could rely on their report. Again, I didn’t lose any soldier. In both international operations, I didn’t lose any soldier. I attribute it to fate. It was simply the handiwork of God.
What is your take on the recently condemned army mutineers?
Protest from the military is not allowed. It amounts to mutiny. And the reason is simple – the profession is noble, a profession of arms. When they protest, it is as good as carrying arms, and when soldiers carry arms against an establishment that is supposed to be the authority, it amounts to mutiny. Soldiers are guided by both civil and military laws. Under the military law, the punishment for mutiny is condemnation to death. However, the president, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, has the powers to convert that penalty to terms of imprisonment or even pardon.
As a kind and humane person by nature, I will ask Mr. President to exercise his powers of reprieve and grant them pardon. Life is very precious. If you have an act of mercy and consider that every Nigerian who works is a breadwinner to at least 10 people, you would try as much as possible not to always enforce every law. These people (mutineers) have their families and so many other dependants, so one can only appeal for clemency. I believe that life is sacrosanct; do not take life if you can avoid taking it.

Do you have any regret serving in the Nigerian Army?
No. I have no regret whatsoever because my 22 years in the army is an experience that every young man needs to pass through. It exposed me so much that I see Nigeria as my constituency. It took me round the country, right from the Bayelsa creeks as a cadet in 1972, just before we passed out of the Nigeria Defence Academy (NDA). It afforded me the opportunity to have friends all over the states of the federation. The army also took me round the world. I’m now living on my army pension, and with military training, I learnt to endure everything.

How would you react to General Buhari’s certificate allegation?
What are they talking about Buhari’s certificate? In the army we learn much more than what any university can ever teach. I have been speaking in English in the course of this interview; did you discover any flaw in my English? The highest paper qualification I have is A Level and I got it in the army. That’s all I have and I’m proud of it. The NDA certificate of education is fashioned after the old high school certificate along with 25 military subjects. We had three major academic subjects and two minor ones, with all regular courses which must be taken. The papers were set and moderated by the University of Ibadan. If you didn’t pass any of your terminal exams you were in trouble. We had the HSC, which was done only in 24 months, and we did academics in 18 months along with the military subjects, and if you didn’t make it you were thrown out. Buhari has all the qualifications equivalent to master’s. The army is the place where things happen, but people don’t know.