How longer presidential terms could improve policy continuity
Nigeria operates a presidential system that allows a maximum of two four-year terms by virtue of Sections 135 and 137 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), a structure inherited from constitutional models that assume political stability, strong institutions, and mature democratic culture. In practice, however, this eight-year window is fragmented by an intense and recurring […]
Nigeria operates a presidential system that allows a maximum of two four-year terms by virtue of Sections 135 and 137 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), a structure inherited from constitutional models that assume political stability, strong institutions, and mature democratic culture. In practice, however, this eight-year window is fragmented by an intense and recurring election cycle that begins almost as soon as the first term starts. From party primaries to nationwide campaigns, pre-election court cases, and post-election disputes, governance in Nigeria is repeatedly interrupted by the demands of electoral politics. What should be a four-year mandate to govern is, in reality, a much shorter period of focused leadership.
The frequency of elections has created a political rhythm where governing and campaigning are inextricably intertwined. The first year is often spent assembling a cabinet and finding policy direction; the second is consumed by political negotiations and positioning; by the third, attention shifts toward re-election strategies; and the fourth is dominated by campaigns and electoral uncertainty. This gyrate leaves little room for long-term planning, policy consistency, or the disciplined execution of reforms that require time to mature. As a result, successive administrations frequently abandon or rebrand projects because the political clock demands constant reinvention.
A clear example is the start of President Muhammadu Buhari’s first term in 2015. Despite taking office in May, his cabinet was not sworn in until November leaving key ministries without political leadership during a critical period. This delay slowed decision-making, stalled policy direction, and reinforced the reality that the early months of a presidential term are often lost to transition politics rather than governance. These experiences highlight a recurring structural problem.
By the time an administration finds its footing, a significant portion of the four-year term has already been consumed by transition and political calculations. This compressed governance window naturally feeds into a system where long-term planning becomes secondary, setting the stage for policy inconsistency and abandoned initiatives.
The consequence of this shortened and disrupted governance window is a persistent pattern of policy inconsistency. Major national programmes are frequently introduced with urgency, only to lose momentum as political priorities shift or administrations change. Infrastructure projects are rebranded, economic reforms are paused or reversed, and long-term sectoral plans rarely survive beyond a single electoral cycle. Notwithstanding the constitutional provision that allows a president to serve two four-year terms, this structure has done little to solve the problem. The first term is often consumed by transition delays and political consolidation, while the second is shaped by legacy management and succession politics rather than bold reforms. As a result, policies remain vulnerable to abandonment or dilution. This stop-start approach undermines investor confidence, weakens institutional memory, and delays the tangible benefits of governance for citizens leaving Nigerians trapped in a cycle of perpetual beginnings rather than sustained progress.
Compounding these challenges is the reality that most Nigerian presidents assume office amid significant public goodwill and political leeway. In the aftermath of elections, citizens, civil society, and even opposition figures often adopt a ‘let’s wait-and-see’ approach, allowing the new administration time to settle, make appointments, and articulate its vision. This period of grace, while understandable, further reduces the effective time available for performance assessment and course correction. Nigerians often are notably patient, dissatisfaction tends to build slowly, only becoming widespread after years of unmet expectations. By the time this goodwill wanes and underperformance becomes broadly acknowledged, the country is often already approaching another election cycle. At that point, the constitutional threat of impeachment designed as a check on executive failure loses much of its practical force, as political actors calculate that electoral change, rather than institutional accountability, is imminent. The result is a system where weak performance is endured rather than corrected.
A recent example is President Bola Tinubu’s signature tax reform initiative, which has only begun to take effect roughly a year before the next election cycle. Such timing leaves little room for Nigerians to fully understand and evaluate its real impact on their day-to-day lives before being asked to judge the administration at the ballot box on this issue.
Beyond governance and accountability, the current four-year electoral cycle carries significant financial implications, particularly for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Conducting nationwide presidential elections every four years requires enormous public expenditure ranging from logistics and technology procurement to personnel deployment and security coordination. These costs recur regardless of broader fiscal pressures, diverting resources that could otherwise be invested in education, healthcare, infrastructure, or institutional strengthening. Frequent elections also limit INEC’s ability to shift from a cycle of emergency preparedness to long-term capacity building, as the commission is perpetually planning for the next general election. A longer presidential term would reduce the frequency of these high-cost exercises, easing the financial burden on the country while allowing INEC to focus more on electoral integrity, voter education, and system improvements rather than constant large-scale mobilisation.
Accordingly, it is worth interrogating whether Nigeria’s development challenges are being worsened by a governance framework that prioritises elections over governance. As the country seeks deeper reforms in key sectors highlighted above, the structure of presidential tenure may itself deserve serious reconsideration. A longer, less disruptive term such as two five-year terms or single six-year term may offer a path toward greater policy continuity, reduced political distraction, and more effective governance.
Concerns that longer presidential terms could encourage executive overreach are understandable, particularly in a political environment where institutions are still evolving. However, the risk of abuse is not inherently tied to the length of tenure, but to the strength of oversight mechanisms. Nigeria’s experience shows that even within the current four-year framework, executive excesses can and do occur. A restructured term whether a single six-year term or two five-year terms need not weaken accountability if accompanied by stronger legislative oversight, an independent judiciary, a free press, and empowered civil society. In fact, removing the pressure of re-election may reduce the incentive to misuse state resources for political survival, allowing presidents to focus more on governance than consolidation of power. When properly safeguarded, a longer term can strengthen leadership effectiveness without compromising democratic control.
A shift from two four-year terms to two five-year terms would provide Nigeria with a balanced approach to both continuity and accountability. It would extend the governance horizon without removing the incentive for performance that comes from the possibility of re-election. In practical terms, an additional year per term would allow presidents to move beyond short-term policy fixes and pursue more sustainable reforms that require time to take root.
First, longer terms create the necessary breathing room for sustained governance and institutional reforms. Many of Nigeria’s most urgent challenges power sector restructuring, judicial reforms, digitalisation of the civil service and security cannot be solved through quick, four-year initiatives. Institutional reform requires planning, implementation, and consolidation. A five-year term gives leaders the space to build systems rather than simply announce them, and to ensure reforms are embedded in the machinery of government.
Further, longer terms improve the ability to evaluate the implications of reforms. A four-year cycle encourages a rush to launch projects before the political clock runs out, often without sufficient monitoring or follow-up. With five years per term, there is more opportunity to measure outcomes, adjust strategies, and correct course before major decisions are made. This is particularly important for reforms that produce benefits only after several years such as education overhaul, tax, infrastructure development, and economic diversification. A five-year window allows leaders to move beyond pilot stages into full implementation with real impact.
Moreover, the prospect of re-election within a longer term still provides a credible check on presidential performance. If a president underperforms, the electorate has time to see results, evaluate outcomes, and respond accordingly at the ballot box. This is especially relevant in Nigeria, where, as highlighted above, public goodwill at the start of a presidency often gives leaders a grace period. With five-year terms, this grace period would still exist, but it would be followed by a meaningful opportunity for citizens to hold leaders accountable based on performance rather than short-term political messaging. A five-year term also gives the electorate space to rethink the trajectory of government whether they believe the country is moving in the right direction and deserve another five years, or whether it is time to cut losses and demand change.
Finally, a two five-year term structure would make re-election more objective and performance-based, rather than dependent on political consolidation. In a four-year term, presidents often spend the latter half of their first term and much of the second term building political alliances and strengthening their power base activities that often distract from governance and prioritise political survival over service. A longer term reduces the need for constant political manoeuvring and allows leaders to focus on delivering results. When re-election becomes a genuine assessment of achievements rather than a contest of political dominance, democracy in Nigeria will be better for it.
Many sceptics argue that extending the presidential term could embolden leaders to become more entrenched, weaken democratic checks, and reduce accountability. However, the risk of authoritarianism is not inherently tied to term length but to institutional weakness. Nigeria already faces challenges of executive overreach within the current four-year system. The country will inevitably require stronger democratic institutions a robust legislature, independent judiciary, transparent electoral systems, and an empowered civil society. Longer terms can actually reduce the incentive for presidents to misuse state resources for re-election, as they would not be constantly campaigning.
Also, some may argue that if a leader is poor or corrupt, a longer term would prolong national hardship before change can occur. While this pessimistic concern is valid, it overlooks two important realities. First, Nigeria’s current system already offers limited corrective mechanisms when facing economic and social hardship; impeachment is rare, difficult, and often politically motivated, and the public typically waits until the next election cycle to demand change. Second, a five-year term does not eliminate accountability of government, it merely changes the timing. A president still faces the threat of electoral rejection after five years. In fact, with more time to demonstrate performance, the electorate can make a more informed judgment rather than reacting to short-term political messaging after first terms often seen in Nigeria. Senegal, Tanzania, Botswana, Sierra Leone, Zambia are examples to show that a two five-year term system is not foreign to Africa. In 2024, former President Mokgweetsi Masisi, lost his re-election bid after his Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) lost by a landslide for the first time in 58 years.
Although less popular around the world, with Mexico being one of the few countries adopting same, A single six-year presidential term offers Nigeria a unique path to strengthen governance without the distortions of electoral politics. Unlike the two-term model, which can encourage a constant cycle of second-term jockeying, a six-year tenure would allow a president to focus on policy implementation and institutional reform without the constant pressure of re-election.
One of the most significant advantages of a single six-year term is the reduction of political distraction. As noted above, in the current system, presidents spend a large portion of their first term establishing their base and the second term securing political survival. The result is a governance model where political strategy often supersedes public service. A single, non-renewable term removes the temptation to prioritise popularity over policy, enabling leaders to pursue bold, sometimes unpopular reforms that are necessary for long-term development.
This structure also creates space for sustained institutional reforms. Many of Nigeria’s most pressing challenges require time to plan, implement, and consolidate. A six-year term provides the continuity needed for reforms to move beyond pilot stages into full implementation, and for institutions to adapt and stabilise. Without the looming threat of re-election, leaders can pursue reforms with greater clarity and resolve, focusing on outcomes rather than optics.
A single six-year term also encourages a purpose-driven leadership model. Leaders would be more likely to set a clear agenda from the outset, as against shifting priorities mid-term to suit political expediency. The absence of re-election pressure would allow presidents to govern with a longer strategic view thus pursuing policies that may not yield immediate political benefits but are sine qua non for national progress.
President Goodluck Jonathan in 2011 proposed the idea of a single long-year term, arguing that it would allow leaders to govern with greater focus and avoid constant electioneering and acrimony of frequent elections. This underscores the fact that this proposal is not merely theoretical but has been considered seriously at the highest levels of Nigerian political leadership at some point.
Critics may argue that without the possibility of re-election, a president may become complacent, knowing they will not face voters again. This could reduce responsiveness and accountability. Notably, accountability in a democratic system is not only tied to re-election. Nigeria’s institutions as mentioned, the National Assembly, the judiciary, independent regulatory bodies, and the media can ideally remain powerful mechanisms for oversight. Moreover, a non-renewable term can reduce the temptation to pursue short-term populist policies for political gain, allowing a leader to prioritise long-term national interest. The president still answers to the electorate through established constitutional checks, and their legacy and reputation remain important political currencies.
Furthermore, the fear is that if a president is underperforming or corrupt, citizens would have to endure six years of ineffective governance before a change can occur does not hold water as a longer term does not mean unaccountable governance. Nigeria already has constitutional mechanisms such as impeachment, judicial review, and parliamentary oversight that can be strengthened and made more effective. It may be the wake-up call the National Assembly needs to properly check the President and ensure effective governance. Additionally, the fear of an extended bad presidency can be mitigated through reforms that empower institutions to act decisively, such as stronger and impartial anti-corruption enforcement, better transparency laws, and effective legislative oversight. A six-year term should be paired with institutional reforms to ensure that failure can be addressed without waiting for the end of the term.
Lastly, some argue that if citizens know a president cannot be re-elected, voter interest and engagement might decline, weakening democratic participation. In actual fact, voter enthusiasm is more strongly influenced by the perceived credibility of elections and the quality of governance rather than by length of term structure alone. A six-year term can increase engagement by allowing citizens to better assess the impact of policies over time. Additionally, civic participation can be strengthened through robust local elections, parliamentary accountability, and increased civic education, ensuring that democracy remains active even without frequent presidential contests.
Nigeria’s current presidential structure has shown itself to be less than ideal for the kind of sustained governance the country urgently needs. Frequent election cycles, political distraction, delayed appointments, and the constant pressure of re-election all combine to limit the effectiveness of leadership and disrupt long-term policy implementation. Whether through the adoption of two five-year terms or a single six-year term, reform is worth considering as both options offer Nigeria a clearer path toward continuity, deeper institutional reforms, and more meaningful accountability.
A two five-year term model preserves democratic choice while giving leaders the time to plan, implement, and consolidate reforms. It provides the electorate with a genuine chance to evaluate performance and decide whether the government’s trajectory is worth continuing. Meanwhile, a single six-year term reduces political distraction, encourages purpose-driven leadership, and allows reform efforts to mature without the constant interruption of re-election politics. Both models strengthen governance in ways the current system has struggled to achieve.
That said, any discussion of constitutional reform in Nigeria must come with a dose of realism. Even the best-designed system depends on the people who operate it those with the vision, discipline, and genuine commitment to national progress. In Nigeria, the truth is that the success of any reform is often less about the number of years and more about the quality of leadership, and the country’s unique dynamics that sometimes seem to defy even the most persuasive arguments.
There is no better time than now for Nigeria to consider reforming its presidential term structure. But whether the country adopts two five-year terms, a single six-year term, or even retains the current system, the real determinant of progress will be the leader at the helm. As Nigerians know all too well, the constitution can set the rules, but it is the person in power who writes the story with discipline, sometimes with courage, and sometimes with the cognisance of the familiar Nigerian twist that makes every policy debate feel like hot potatoes.
Adesunkanmi resides in London and can be reached via [email protected].