How to end insurgency

The then president Umaru Yar’adua handled the situation with military might. Later the matter took a different dimension with the sporadic killing and maiming of individuals and security operatives, destruction of property and inducing constant fear among the populace. A Joint Task Force (JTF) was formed in 2011 when the security challenges became more intensified. […]

The then president Umaru Yar’adua handled the situation with military might. Later the matter took a different dimension with the sporadic killing and maiming of individuals and security operatives, destruction of property and inducing constant fear among the populace.

A Joint Task Force (JTF) was formed in 2011 when the security challenges became more intensified. In an attempt to stop the carnage, the federal government declared state of emergency in some selected local government areas in Borno, Yobe, Niger and Plateau States. Yet the problem defied solutions because of its intricate nature with various dimensions to it.
There were calls for granting of amnesty to the insurgents from many quarters including the Sultan of Sokoto. A presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges under the chairmanship of the Minister for Special Duties Saminu Tanimu Turaki was set up to deal with the issue.
No sooner had the committee been set up than the insurgents sacked government authorities in Marte, Ngala and Dikwa (indeed most part of northern Borno) and hoisted their flags. This prompted the federal government to declare afresh a state of emergency in three ‘frontline’ states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. A large contingent of the military was deployed to the affected states which assisted in dislodging the insurgents, destroyed their camps and recaptured areas hitherto under their control.
Despite government efforts and huge expenditure on taming the insurgency, citizens continue to lose their parents, relations and friends. Youths in Borno then took up the challenge, organised themselves into vigilante groups and took the fight to the insurgents. The Youth Voluntary Vigilante Group, popularly called ‘Civilian JTF’, made a tremendous breakthrough by arresting and handing over to the JTF suspected members of the insurgent group. However, this did not go without reprisal attacks from the insurgents.
How then can the insurgency be contained? While we ponder on this, let us examine some suggestions earlier offered. These include: prosecution of those accused of killing the leader of the Yusufiyyah sect, Mohammed Yusuf;  reconstruction of ‘Markas’ (the operational base and mosque of the sect); granting of amnesty to the insurgents; ‘the Marshall plan’ advocated by Kashim Shettima; the ‘integrated approach’ or ‘the carrot and stick approach’ of Mr president etc.
It is also pertinent to bring to focus some counter-terrorism measures propounded by experts, such as use of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV), Internet Protocol-based wireless mesh, Intelligence Surveillance Camera, Global Positioning System (GPS), Communication and Tracking System, Explosive Detection System, Aerial Surveillance etc. Though these are so technical and could be expensive, government may consider it as a long-term plan. It is possible that some of these are already in use.
In a discourse of this nature, it may not be out of place to highlight postulations on crime prevention. Notable among these is Jeffery’s Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) which is a multi-disciplinary approach to deterring criminal behaviour through environmental design – a strategy that relies upon the ability to influence offender’s decisions that precede criminal acts. This theory may seem alien and impracticable but may serve as food for thought.
Drawing from the above postulations, personal observation and unfolding events, one may wish to propose the following as alternative to ending this quagmire. Government should consider disbanding the Turaki Committee as it seems to be not the right approach to having a truce, judging from the response of some leaders of the sect to the committee. Dialogue organised by an international body (acceptable to the insurgents) could be a viable option; strengthening the civilian JTF by reorganising it with a possibility of establishing a ‘Federal Vigilante’ which should be community-based; create employment for the youth volunteers who cannot fit into the federal vigilante; identify and eliminate source(s) of arms and ammunitions;  identify their source of funding and stop the flow of finance; and encourage, through the National Orientation Agency/ traditional rulers, the culture of community policing where ‘visitors’ or ‘strangers’ are introduced to the village or ward leader with a view to establishing their identity. Furthermore, insurgents willing to lay down their arms could be granted amnesty and be fully integrated into the society.  With these, the path to reconciliation, reconstruction, compensation, rebuilding and reintegration would be opened. For all we are looking for is PEACE which Islam stands for.

Kale can be reached at: [email protected]