Identification parade unnecessary where witness knew suspect (Continued from last week)

The appellant also challenged the applicability of the rules of procedure applicable in Imo State in Criminal cases to the offences created under the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act No. 47 of 1970. The appeal was dismissed. On a further appeal to the Supreme Court it was held –1. That by virtue of the […]

The appellant also challenged the applicability of the rules of procedure applicable in Imo State in Criminal cases to the offences created under the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act No. 47 of 1970. The appeal was dismissed. On a further appeal to the Supreme Court it was held –
1. That by virtue of the provisions of Section 274(4)(b) of the 1979 Constitution, the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act No. 47 of 1970 became an existing law of the State and “Robbery” per se is a residual matter, while the Act as amended was deemed to have been made by the State House of Assembly and in view of this offences under the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act No. 47 of 1970 (as amended) are not federal but state offences.
2. That by virtue of Section 191 of the 3 979 Constitution, the power to institute the prosecution of criminal cases is vested in the State Attorney-General and because the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act No. 47 of 1970 operated as a State Law in so far as Armed Robbery is concerned, the State Attorney – General for Imo State had the locus standi as at the 14th day of May, 1982 and the question of delegation of authority does not arise.
The facts and issues contained in Emelogu’s case supra apply mutatis mutandis to the present appeal.
It is provided in Sections 9(3) and 12(5) of the Robber and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act 1990 as follows:-
“9(3) Prosecutions in respect of any person caught committing an offence under section 1(2) of this Act shall be instituted within seven days after the receipt by the Attorney – General of the State concerned or, where there is no Attorney – General, by the Solicitor General of the State, as the case may be of the file containing the completed police investigation in respect of the offence.
12(5) Police investigation into cases relating to any person caught committing an offence under section 1(2) of this Act shall be concluded not later than seven days after the arrest of the offender and the file containing particulars of such investigation shall be sent to the Attorney – General of the State concerned or, where there is no Attorney – General, to the Solicitor General of the State not later than seven days after the conclusion of investigation “.
These provisions were deleted by the Tribunals (Certain Consequential Amendment etc) Decree No. 62 of 1999 Constitution. Section 1 states:-
 “1. The enactments specified in the first column of Parts 1 & II of the schedule to this Decree are amended to the extent set out in the second column of those Parts of that schedule”.
 The sections which were deleted are sections 9, 10. 11, 12 and 14 of the Act. These sections were deleted before the appellant was arraigned and so he cannot claim any benefit from the repealed sections of the Act which in the eyes of the law never existed. In the proceedings of 15th May 2002 when the 6 count charge was read and explained to the appellant he pleaded not guilty. Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Ogun State provides that –
 “215 The person to be tried upon any charge or information shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise to order, and the charge or information shall be read over and explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court by the registrar or other officer of the Court, and such person shall be called upon to plead instantly thereto, unless where the person is entitled to service of a copy of the information he objects to the want of such service and the Court finds that he has not been duly served therewith.”
 The charge was read and explained to the appellant. He pleaded not guilty I cannot fathom how it can be argued that the appellant who pleaded not guilty to the charge will complain of lack of fair hearing. The appellant was represented by learned counsel who could have taken objection to any unorthodox handling of the case by the prosecution. This complaint is without a basis and it is discountenanced. Issues 1, 2 and 3 are resolved against the appellant.
 ISSUES 4 & 5
These issues deal with identification and alibi Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the court below was in error when it agreed with the trial court that identification parade was not necessary, or a prerequisite to the investigation against the appellant. He argued that the appellant was never arrested at the scene of crime nor did any of the witnesses who testified against him state that they knew him before the commission of the crime. He submitted that identification of an accused must be properly ascertained in all instances except where the accused is caught at the scene and in the process of committing the offence or where the accused confesses to committing the crime.
Learned counsel submitted on the plea of alibi that the Justices of the court below came to a wrong conclusion when they held that the appellant had failed to discharge his duty of providing sufficient material on his defence of alibi when he stated that he was coming from a naming ceremony from his sister’s place when he was attacked and beaten up and then taken to the police station. He said this fact was made known to the Police at the earliest possible time and it was left for the Police to find out if there was a naming ceremony which the appellant claimed he attended and whether he was with his sister.
An identification parade is useful and indeed essential whenever there is a doubt about the power of a witness to recognise an accused person or when the identity of the accused person is in dispute. It is not necessary where the witness knew or was familiar with the accused or suspect well before the alleged crime was committed. In Orok vs The State (2009) 13 NWLR (Part 1052) 633 the Court of Appeal enumerated the circumstances under which an identification parade is necessary. They are:-
“(1) The accused was not arrested at the scene and he denies taking part in the crime; or
 (2) The victim did not know the accused before the offence; or
 (3) The victim was confronted by the accused for a very short time; and/or
 (4)          The victim due to time and circumstances must not have had full opportunity of observing the feature of the accused”.
The appellant confessed to the commission of the crime and not only that he was arrested shortly after the commission of the offence and the stolen goods were found with him. It was therefore unnecessary to conduct an identification parade and also investigate the alibi set up by the appellant. The trial court properly invoked the doctrine of recent possession to fix the appellant with the commission of the offence. The appellant had an explanation to give as to how he came into possession of the stolen items so soon after the robber)- was committed. The lower court was right to conclude that –
“if the object of identification is to test the ability of a witness to pick out from a group the person, given the circumstance of this case, this Court agrees with the submission of the respondent on issue 1 that identification parade was not necessary, or a prerequisite to the investigation of the allegation against the appellant”.
The plea of alibi though timeously raised was rightly rejected because the appellant was found in the vicinity of the crime shortly after the robbery and not only that he was found in possession of the stolen items.
Having been found in possession of the stolen goods, the learned trial Judge was right to invoke section 167(a) Evidence Act to presume that the appellant was either the robber or knew that the goods were stolen when he came into possession. The section stipulates as follows:
“167 The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case and in particular the Court may presume (a)that a man who is in possession of stolen goods after the theft is the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession.”
The prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt to warrant the conviction of the appellant. His conviction was rightly affirmed by the lower court.
All the issues raised in the appeal are resolved against the appellant I find that there is no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. The substituted sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the lower court on the appellant in place of the death sentence pronounced by the trial Judge is also affirmed.

Concluded.