Lagos Governorship tribunal: APC, Labour Party in panic mode as parties adopt final written addresses

Lagos Governorship tribunal: APC,Labour Party in panic mode as parties adopt final written addresses. Abimbola Olatunji who dissected all parties final written addresses, opined that PDP is on the verge of winning Lagos. Parties at the Governorship election petition tribunal in Lagos Sate are All progressives Congress, APC, Labour Party and the People’s Democratic Party, […]

Lagos Governorship tribunal: APC,Labour Party in panic mode as parties adopt final written addresses.

Abimbola Olatunji who dissected all parties final written addresses, opined that PDP is on the verge of winning Lagos.

Parties at the Governorship election petition tribunal in Lagos Sate are All progressives Congress, APC, Labour Party and the People’s Democratic Party, the (PDP).

Labour Party on one hand is challenging the victory of Governor Sanwoolu of APC over Non-Compliance of the electoral act, and also seeking the disqualification of APC deputy Governorship candidate over allegation bothering on pledging alllegiance to another country.

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PDP on the other hand is seeking disqualification of both APC and Labour Party candidates on the grounds that their Sponsorships are invalid and contradicted the provision of Section 177 (c) and 182(1)(j) of the 1999 constitution of Federal republic of Nigeria as amended. PDP posited in their final written address that election are conducted under certain rules provided by the 1999 constitution of Nigeria as amended, and the electoral act 2022.

Part of this rules are that whoever want to contest for any election must be a member of a political party, who must sponsor him/her for the said election, and Sponsorship include holding a valid primary election and submission of un-falsify information/document to INEC.

APC and Labour Party in raising preliminary objection to PDP petitions, said it’s a pre-election matter and that the tribunal has no jusrisdiction to try same. They also objected to the admissibility of some CTC documents tendered by the PDP.

Their arguments as seen in their final written addresses was that some CTC documents were tendered without receipt using to procure the CTC from INEC.

Counsel to the PDP Clement Onwunenor SAN, while asking the court to discountenance their objections said INEC who certified the document is a party in the instant case, and never objected to the admissibility of documents certified by its, and that there’s no similar documents before the tribunal challenging the authenticity of the said documents.

He also pointed out the hypocrisy on the part of APC and Labour Party, both of whom also front-loaded and listed same documents they are objecting to in their response to PDP petition.

PDP counsels also cited several authorities to support his stance on admissibility of those documents.

He wrote “The 2nd and 3rd Respondents( Sanwoolu and Hamzat) also raised objections to Exhibits P1, P5-P15, P16 – P27 and P28-P38 tendered by the Petitioners on the ground that the public documents which were certified true copies were tendered without receipts of payment for certification.

To demonstrate the time-wasting nature of the objection which deliberately did not consider time honoured criteria for admissibility of documents, the Petitioners commend a relevant decision of the Supreme Court to this Tribunal”.

In Fedrick v. Ibekwe (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 467a t 480paragraphs F-G, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“I will re-state that the trite principle of evidence law on admissibility of a piece of document is basically its relevance to the facts in issue. The three criteria that govern admissibility in evidence of a document from a number of cases, are:
(i) whether the document is pleaded;
(ii) whether the document is relevant to the issues being tried or
in dispute between the parties, and
(it) whether it is admissible in law”

In the instant Petition, the Petitioners pleaded Exhibits P5-P15 in paragraph 45 of the Petition and listed it as document No. 5 in their List of
Documents, attached to the Petition and frontloaded. Exhibits P16-P27, on
the other hand, are pleaded in paragraph 41 of the Petition and listed as document No. 8 in the Petitioners List of Documents and frontloaded.

The 2nd and 3rd Respondents( Sanwoolu and Hamzat) pleaded certified copies of Exhibits P5-P15 and uncertified copies of Exhibits P16-P27 in paragraphs 13(vi) and 14(vi) of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents response to PDP petition, and listed them as number 2 in their list of documents. To demonstrate that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents have no defence, they neither tendered Form EC9 of the 2nd Respondent it pleaded (Exhibit P5-P15) nor the 3rd Respondent’s Form EC9 it also pleaded (Exhibit P16-P27).
Rather than pray against the damaging legal effect of pleading and listing
documents but refusing to tender them at the trial, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents are fixated that the Petitioners did not tender the receipts issued by the 1st Respondent (who is a party in this proceeding and did not object to the admissibility of those documents, or deny receiving payments from the Petitioners) prior to the certification of the above documents.

The 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ argument that the Petitioners must tender receipt of payment issued by the 1st Respondent is an ingenious but unfruitful attempt to expand the provision of Section 104 of the Evidence Act, 2011 which provides as follows: Every public officer having the custody of a public document which any person has a right to inspect shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees prescribed in that respect, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part of it as the case may be.
The certificate mentioned in subsection (1) of this section shall be dated and subscribed by such officer
with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use
of a seal, and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies”.

The above provision does not say that receipt of payment for Certified True Copy issued to a party in a suit must be tendered. What is it to prove?

The 4th Respondent who unlawfully sponsored the 2nd and 3rd Respondents also
cited the case of Jimoh v. Min. of FCT (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt.
1664) 45 in its Final Address to further support the objection. Jandor/PDP Counsel said the above case arose from an interlocutory application for leave to appeal at the Supreme Court and no receipt of payment for certification was tendered in that case was cited by APC out of context. It was an interlocutory application and no document was tendered. He posited that It is very clear in that case that once payment is made to a Public Officer, what the Public Officer is to endorse as a certificate does not mention or include receipt of payment.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY must be dated and signed by the officer responsible for certification with his name and official title.
In the instant case, according to counsel to PDP, Exhibits P5-P15 and P16-P27 showed that they were certified by the 1st Respondent’s Headquarters in Abuja, dated 3/4/2023, issued by Amina U. Miango with her official title as PLO and duly signed by her.

In the above case of Jimoh v. Min. of FCT, the Supreme Court
dismissing the “over-kill” argument on certification held at pages 65 – 66, paragraphs H-A as follows:
“The insistence of Mr. Anachebe, SAN for certification is just nothing but an appeal to acnetechnicality. The Courts these days lean towards doing substantial justice”

PDP counsel in his final written address to their Lordship to similarly dismiss the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ objection as “acne technicality”.

He reteirated further, asking The 2nd and 3rd Respondents to stop raising weak objections.

He said the Supreme Court case of Tabik Investment Ltd v. GTB PIc. (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1276) 240 cited by the Respondents also flies in the face of their objection. The issue decided in that case was whether Government Agencies can pay fees for certification of public documents and the Supreme Court held that both private and Government Agencies must pay fees for certification. However, the Supreme Court held that non-payment of fees was no reason for rejecting documents.

Rhodes-Vivour, JSC at page 262 paragraphs C-C, held as follows:
“The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the trial court because Exhibits A, BI, B2 and B3, Public documents were-not paid
for. This is correct, but rejecting the document is rather harsh. The learned trial Judge ought to have ordered counsel to ensure that the said documents are paid for, and after payment the trial continues ”

In the instant case, the 1st Respondent who certified the documents did not obiect to the admissibility of the documents secured from its custody or deny receiving payments from the Petitioners.

He said the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ simply have no case.
Non-tendering of payment receipt is not a condition for admissibility of a document. He posited

Meanwhile the document being objected to by APC are already before the court as they were also front-loaded and pleaded by the same APC, which according to PDP counsel, speaks to double standard on their parts.

Unfortunately for APC’s Sanwo-Olu as seen in the tribunal record of proceedings, other documents such as P129 that indicted APC on failure to adhere strictly section 82(1) and (84)(5)(b)(i) which was the provisions of the Law a political party must fulfil in compliance to sponsorship of its candidate, was brought in by INEC through subpoena and the admissibility of this can’t be challenged and it was not challenged.

Also, the Certified true copy of Labour Party Membership register tendered with receipt of payment by PDP, which did not contain the name of Gbadebo Rhodes Vivour, despite being updated in April 2023 via a covering letter sent to INEC by Labour Party, was not also challenged by either APC or Labour Party itself.

Meanwhile the only two documents objected by GRV/Labour party as tendered by Jandor/PDP are the Letter of Application written by Gbadebo Rhodes Vivour to be Jandor/PDP deputy Governorship candidate, dated 19th June, 2022, four days after same Gbadebo Rhodes Vivour claimed he joined Labour Party under oath.

The second document Labour Party objected to, was the affidavit same Gbadebo Rhodes Vivour swore to that he joined Labour Party on the 15th of June 2022.

GRV/Labour party argument in objecting to the application letter was that it’s a computer generated copy and that the CTC affidavit wasn’t tendered with receipt.

Jandor/PDP in their argument asking the tribunal to discountenance GRV/Labour objection said the 5th Respondent(GRV) had challenged the admissibility of Exhibits P115 – P128 on the ground that it was a photocopy and that evidentiary foundation
was not laid as the document is a computer-generated document.

The said Exhibits P 115 – P128, a photocopy of a Letter dated 19/06/22 with attachments written by the 5th Respondent to the 1st Petitioner where he
applied for the position of Deputy Governorship candidate of Lagos State.

“To demonstrate the time-wasting nature of the objection which deliberately did not consider time honoured criteria for admissibility of documents, the Petitioners commend a relevant decision of the Supreme Court to this
Tribunal.
In Fedrick v. Ibekwe (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 467 at 480 paragraphs F-G, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“I will re-state that the trite principle of evidence law on admissibility
of a piece of document is basically its relevance ot the facts in issue. The three criteria that govern admissibility in evidence of a document
from a number of cases, are:
(1) whether the document is pleaded;
(2) whether the document is relevant to the issues being tried or in dispute between the parties, and
(3) whether it is admissible in law” (iti)
In the instant case, PW1 laid foundation for the tendering of secondary evidence of Exhibits P 115 – P128 which were pleaded by the Petitioners at paragraph 10 of the Petitioners’ Reply to the 5ht Respondent’s Reply and relevant to the Petitioners’ case. Also, under cross-examination of RW4, he confirmed that Exhibits P115 – P128 dated 19/6/22 was authored by the 5th
Respondent. It is submitted that the 5th Respondent’s objection to the admissibility of the secondary evidence of Exhibits P115 – P128 is misconceived and has no basis in law.
We submit that Exhibits P115 – P128 are not computer- generated documents, but photocopies of the documents submitted to the 1st Petitioner
by the 5th Respondent on 19/6/2023. The 1st Petitioner in evidence in-chief testified that he lost the original copy of the said documents, hence the
tendering of the photocopies. PW1 never gave evidence that the copy with attachments he tendered were obtained from the 5th Respondent’s phone to
qualify as computer generated documents which requires compliance with Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011 before tendering same.
The law is settled that for a secondary evidence of a private document to be admitted in evidence, proper foundation must be laid. Consequently, once proper foundation is laid, the photocopy becomes admissible without much
ado. We commend My Noble Lords to the Supreme court’s decision in the case ofMIKA V. QUEEN (1963)LPELR-25410 (SC) wherein it was held that:
‘Section 96 (1)(c) of the Evidence Ordinance states that: – “Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases: – (c) when the original has been destroyed or lost and in the latter case all possible search has been made for it’
The Court of Appeal in the case of ODIGIE V. OBASEKI (2022) LPELR- 57134 followed the old age decision of the Supreme in MIKA V. QUEEN (supra) on the admissibility of secondary evidence of a document wherein the Court of Appeal held that:
“Exhibit “B” is the photocopy of Oba’s approval. By Section 87(b) of the Evidence Act 2011, it is a secondary evidence. Section 89 of the Evidence Act, 2011 stipulates circumstances in which secondary evidence can be allowed to be given. Section 89(c) ofthe Evidence
Act, 2011 for instance, provides as follows: “89. Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contexts of a document when – The original has been destroyed or lost and in the latter case, all possible search has been made for it…” See the cases of
Tamkeyar v. Bussa & Ors (2017) LPELR- 42987 (CA) PP. 20 – 22
para E, Mika v. Queen (1963) LPELR- 25410 (SC), pp. 3- 4, paras
F – A., Okoye v. Dumebi (2014) LPELR – 24155 (CA), PP. 63 – 64, paraF u
It is submitted that if My Noble Lords take a calm look at Exhibits P 115 –
P128, My Noble Lords will come to the conclusion that they are indeed photocopies of original documents and that there is nothing on the face of the documents suggesting that are electronically generated documents.
We urge My Noble Lords to overrule the objection of the 5th Respondent.

Jandor/PDP counsel also raised argument asking the tribunal to discountenance Labour Party objection on the admissibility of the second document Labour objected to.

He said the 5th Respondent’s profuse argument that the Petitioners must tender receipt of payment issued by the Federal High Court before EXHIBITS P111 – P114 can be admitted in evidence is an ingenious but unfruitful
attempt to expand the provision of Section 104 of the Evidence Act, 2011 which provides as follows “(1)Every public officer having the custody of a public document which any person has a right to inspect shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees prescribed in that respect,
together with a certificate written at the foot ofsuch
copy that it is a true copy of such document or part of it as the case may be.
(2) The certificate mentioned in subsection (1) of this section shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name
and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal, and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies”.

The above provision does not say that receipt of payment for Certified True Copy issued to a party in a suit must be tendered. What is it to prove? The Respondent cited the case of the Supreme Court case of TABIK INVESTMENT LTD V. GTB PLC. (2011) 17 NWLR (PT. 1276)
The issue decided in that case was whether Government Agencies can pay fees for certification of public documents and the Supreme Court held that both private and Government Agencies must pay fees for certification. However, the Supreme Court held that non-payment of fees was no reason for rejecting documents. Rhodes-Vivour, JSC at page 262 paragraphs C- C, held as follows:

“The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the trial court
because Exhibits A, BI, B2 and B3, Public documentswere not paid for. This is correct, but rejecting the document is rather harsh. The
learned trial Judge ought to have ordered counsel to ensure that the saiddocuments arepaidfor, and after payment thetrialcontinues”

Non-tendering of payment receipt is not a condition for admissibility of a public document duly certified but may affect the probative value Court may attach to such document where its source or authenticity is challenged.

In the instant case, EXHIBITS P111 – P114 showed that it was certified by the Federal High Court, Lagos, dated 29/12/2022, issued by F. A. Agbana Anibaba (Esq) with her official title as Principal Registrar II, and duly signed by her for the Chief Registrar.

“It is sad that the 5th Respondent raised this objection. In the above case of
JIMOH V. MIN. OF FCT (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1664) 45, the Supreme Court in dismissing the “over-kill” argument on certification held at pages 65 – 66, paragraphs H-A as follows:
“The insistence ofMr. Anachebe, SAN for certification is just nothing but an appeal to acne technicality. The Courts these days lean towards doing substantial justice”
My Noble Lords should similarly dismiss the S’ Respondent’s objection as “acne technicality”.

. In DAGGASH V. BULAMA (2004) 14 NWLR (PT. 892) 144 AT 187 paragraph E., the same Court held as follows:
“Payment of legal fee on application for a certified true copy is not part of the condition to make a document so certified, a certified true copy. It is only a condition which must be fulfilled before the officer certifies a document”

Again, in the more recent case of ADEDAYO V. CHRISTINE (2021) 9
NWLR (PT. 1780) 148 AT 183 PARAGRAPHS AB, the Court held that Section 104 of Evidence Act, 2011 does not require that payment of certification fees must be stated on the face of the document itself.

In fact, the 5th Respondent did dispute deposing to EXHIBIT P111 – P114.This objection is baseless and should be discountenanced.

“We urge My Noble Lords to discountenance the objection of the 5th Respondent and give probative value to the documents tendered particularly when the 5th Respondent deny deposing to the document.

Meanwhile GRV/Labour in their final written address raised no objections to the tendered PDP deputy Governoship candidates screening reports held on the 22nd of June and attended by same GRV one week after he claimed he joined the Labour Party.

No objection was also raised to the Labour Party Membership registered that doesn’t have Gbadebo Rhodes Vivour name, like wise his form EC9 sworn to long before he was purportedly elected candidate of Labour Party as against the provision of section 29(2) of the electoral act 2022.
The argument of APC and Labour Party in their final address that the PDP petition is a pre-election matter and that the tribunal has no jurisdiction had also hit a brick wall with the Judgement of the National Assembly election tribunal sitting in Asaba in the case between Ndidi Elumelu and Okolie Ngozi and others, where the tribunal held as follows: “On the issue that the notice of the primaries to INEC can only be raised by INEC and an aspirant in the affected political party as pre- election matter, it
is the considered view of the Tribunal that having failed to conduct a primary election to produce and sponsor the 3rd Respondent which is based on the notice given to INEC , the cumulative effect is that it contravened section 65 of the Constitution and is therefore a post-election matter. Section 65(1) (b) of the 1999 Constitution as amended provides that Subject to the provisions of section 66 of this Constitution, a person shall be qualified for election as a member of the House of Representatives if he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that party. Having come to the conclusion that there was no valid primary to elect the 3rd Respondent, he cannot be said to have been sponsored by the 2nd Respondent which is clearly in contravention of the above provision of the Constitution and it’s a post election matter. The effect of failure of political party to comply with the provisions of the Electoral Act in the conduct of primary election is that its candidate for election shall not be included in the election for the particular position in issue. See Section 84(13) of the Electoral Act, 2022 and the case of Kente v. Bwacha supra. Implicit in the provision is that such a primary election cannot produce a valid candidate for the election and is therefore a nullity. See the case of Yerima v. Balami (2023) 6NWLR(Pt. 3) 487. See also Ibrahim v. Lawal (2015) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1489) 490.
Furthermore, it is settled law that in this country no one can contest an election without first and foremost being a member of a registered political party and, secondly, being sponsored by that party as a candidate for the election. See the cases of Gwede v. INEC and Ors (2014) LPELR – 23763S C pp 49 paras C, and Wambai v. Donatus and Ors (2014) LPELR-23303 SC pp 26-28 paras F. We are therefore in agreement with the submission of learned senior
counsel for the Petitioners and decided cases that the qualification of a candidate is both pre and post- election matter that can be challenged either in the Federal or State High Court or the Tribunal. See the case of Fayemi v. Oni and Ors (2019)”.

Also worthy of mentioning is another judgment delivered in Kano which nullified the election of Hon. Umar Muktar Yerima for submitting a primary school certificate which has two names to INEC, while other document of his, also submitted to INEC had three names.

This Kano Judgement vindicated Paragraph 1.54 of PDP final address which reads as follows: “However, Exhibits P149-P151 tendered by Mr. Adeshile Olaolu Adekanmbi vindicates the Petitioners that the 2nd Respondent(Sanwoolu) lied on oath. The names in Exhibit P149-P151 and Exhibit P36 are not the same. The
names in Exhibit P36 are two but the ones in Exhibits P149-P151 are three.

The Master List produced by WAEC has a completely different name from
the statement of WAEC result issued by Ijebu Ife Community Grammar School with the same examination numbers, same year and same exam
diet. No further credentials of the 2nd Respondent is in harmony with Exhibit P36 which activated the issue of lying on oath against the 2nd Respondent in this proceeding. Exhibits P34, P35 and P37 which were first
and second degrees of the 2nd Respondent and his NYSC Discharge Certificate are clearly unhelpful. The surname of the 2nd Respondent,
Sanwo-Olu in those documents is hyphenated, but the one in Exhibits P36 and P149-P151, is not. The arrangements of the 2nd Respondent’s first
name, Babajide, in his credentials presented to INEC, Exhibits P34, P35, P37and P36, differs from Exhibits P149-P151 brought in by WAEC which
shows his first name as”Olusola”. Worst for the 2″ Respondent, Exhibit P149-P151 is a stand-alone document as the names there do not correspond with any other credentials of-the 2nd Respondent. The 2nd Respondent neither testified in this proceeding to defend himself nor tendered any Deed
Poll to indicate adoption of additional name, change in first name, and or any alteration/amendment to his surname, from Sanwoolu to Sanwo-olu
(as hyphenated in his credentials, Exhibit P34, P35 and P37). This is the albatross of the 2nd Respondent and my Lords have no jurisdiction to
speculate or make any assumption than to find against the 2nd Respondent. Counsel to PDP reiterated.

PDP counsel Clement Onwunenor cited several authorities to drive home his arguments, and they as follows:

In Esenowo .v Ukpong (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 608) 61 at 617 paragraphs E-G, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“There is a world of difference between “J. E Esenowo” and “E.J. Esenowo” for the purpose of registering a name in a professional register sanctioned by law. It allows for crooks and quacks alike to infiltrate into the profession. if at random, a person can rearrange his initials or order in which his names are written. ExhibitH written
by the first respondent queried the medical bills brought by PW6 as
exhibit E at page 92 (i.e. register of medical and dental practitioners for 1980) contained a n entry thus:
“Esenowo, Johnson Esenowo”
The surname is Esenowo, the first and middle names being “Johnson” and “Esenowo” respectively. This will be rendered into
“Dr.J.E. Esenowo” not “Dr. E.J. Esenowo” that-the appellant in his pleading andevidence clearly claimed to be the correct name”
Per Achike, J.S.C at page 621, paras B-D, held as follows:
“As would be recalled, the gravamen of-this appeal was that the plaintiffsigned Exhibit P and PI as ‘Dr. E.J. Esenowo’whereas the
name listed in the 1980 Nigerian Medical Register read ‘Dr. J.E. Esenowo’. Ordinarily, there is world of difference in the arrangement of the initial listed in Exhibit E and those stated in Exhibit PandPI by the Plaintiff. It may well be that the plaintiff was used to arranging the initials interchangeably for which he needed
to so plead and lead credible evidence in respect thereof or it may well be, on the other hand, that the initials ‘E.J.’ were exclusively used by him and perhaps that the initials ‘J.E.’ were alien to him.

Clearly; there was need ot furnish some lucid explanation otherwise it would be unacceptable to accede, by the judgment of the trial Judge, that it will be too simplistic to hold that the name ‘Dr E.J Esenowo’is the same as D’ r: JE. . Esenowo”

Again, in Titilayo Plastic Indu. Ltd v. Fagbola (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1691) 8 at page 124 paragraphs E-F, the Supreme Court decidedly held
as follows:
“In the absence of any averment or documentary evidence
explaining the discrepancy between the two names, the court was
right to hold that the discrepancy is a fundamental defect and not a mere misnomer: For instance, where a father and son bear the same
names and/or initials, the only means of differentiating between them is by an additional name or a middle name or by affixing
“Jnr:”, meaning Junior after the names. It is not for the court to speculate, without evidence, that Simeon Fadeyibi a n d Simeon
Ololade Fadeyibi are one and the same person.”

In PDP v. Degi-Eremienyo (2021) 9 NWLR (Pt.1781) 274 at 292 paragraphs D-F, the Supreme Court held as follows:

“In his Form CF001 the Is Respondent, on oath, vouches in
paragraph F thereof-
Thereby declare that all the answers, facts and particulars I have
given in this Form are true and correct and I have to the best ofmy knowledge fulfilled all the requirements for qualification for the office I am seeking to be elected’
This clearly is a certificate of the truth of the facts and particulars given by the I Respondent in the said Form CF001.
If any fact vouched to be true turns out to be false, particularly deliberatelyfalse, then in my view the Is Respondent has presented
to INEC aforgedorfalse certificate: Didi v. Seleketimbi (supra)”
2.43 At page 293 paragraphs B-C, the Apex Court further held as follows:
“The sum total is that the joint ticket of the IS and 2nd Respondents sponsored by the 3rd Respondent was vitiated by the disqualification of the IS Respondent. Both candidates disqualified are deemed not to be candidates at the Governorship election conducted in Bayelsa
State”

Section 182(1)(j) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended provides as follows:
“(1) No person shall be qualifted for election to the office of Governor of a State if –
he has presented a forged certificate ot the Independent National Electoral Commission”

APC which happened to be the beneficiary of the Kano Judgement on discrepancy of names on Documents submitted to INEC, may likely suffer the same fate in Lagos as evidences before the tribunal clearly show discrepancies in Governor Sanwoolu’s names as appeared on his credentials submitted to INEC.

The sponsorship of the
2nd and 5th Respondents( Sanwoolu and GRV) by the 4th and 6th Respondents(APC and LBaour party) violates the provision of Section 177 (c) and 182(1)(j)of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) because at the time of the disputed election, they were not qualified to run for that election, Jandor/PDP posited in their final address.

Throughout the trial and in theirfinal addresses, all Respondents to Jandor/PDP petition tendered no document to controvert any of the documentary evidence submitted by PDP, rather they stick to their preliminary objections that the tribunal has no jurisdiction.

Jandor/PDP in concluding their final written address say their reliefs to be declared winner is supported by section 136(2) of the electoral act which says: Where an election tribunal or court nullifies an election on the ground that the person who obtained the highest votes at the election was not qualified to contest the election, the election tribunal or court shall declare the person with the second highest number of valid votes cast at the election who satisfies the requirements of
the Constitution and this Act as duly elected:

Provided that the person with the second highest number of valid votes cast at the election remains a member of the political party on which platform he contested the election otherwise, the candidate with the next highest number of votes in the election and who satisfies the same conditions shall be declared the winner of the
election.