Legal concerns over inconsistencies in lawmaking process in Nigeria

A close look at recent legislative developments, including the proposed Nigeria Tax Act 2025, signed into law on June 26, 2025 but became effective on January 1 2026 reveals more than isolated drafting errors.  It points to a deeper and more troubling issue, a fragile lawmaking process under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic […]

A close look at recent legislative developments, including the proposed Nigeria Tax Act 2025, signed into law on June 26, 2025 but became effective on January 1 2026 reveals more than isolated drafting errors. 

It points to a deeper and more troubling issue, a fragile lawmaking process under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. These concerns are no longer speculative. They are supported by court decisions, constitutional disputes, and observable legislative practices that raise serious questions about transparency, accountability, and institutional integrity.

Take, for instance, the case of Olisa Agbakoba v. National Assembly in 2010 where a Federal High Court held that constitutional amendments made without presidential assent were incomplete and invalid. This decision exposed uncertainty about whether due process had been properly followed.

Similarly, disputes surrounding the National Assembly Pensions Board Act revealed concerns that some laws may have been enacted in conflict with existing statutes and without strict adherence to constitutional procedure.

These are not minor technicalities they strike at the validity of the laws themselves. In 2018, former President Muhammadu Buhari refused assent to several constitutional amendment bills, citing drafting inconsistencies and structural defects. That decision was significant. 

It highlighted a critical risk that the version of a bill presented for assent may differ in clarity or intent from what lawmakers originally debated and passed. At the heart of the problem lies ambiguity within the Constitution itself, particularly in the relationship between Sections 58 and 9 of the 1999 Constitution.

Questions about when presidential assent is required, and when it can be overridden, remain unsettled. Courts have offered differing interpretations, leaving room for manipulation and uncertainty. Even where no clear alteration is proven, the pattern is troubling. 

Many laws require immediate amendment after enactment or rely on judicial interpretation to resolve avoidable ambiguities. This suggests a failure of scrutiny before laws are passed, not just disagreements over policy.

One major weak point is the harmonization stage, where bills passed by both chambers of the National Assembly of Nigeria are reconciled. This process lacks transparency and is rarely subjected to public scrutiny. It creates an opportunity, real or perceived for substantive changes to be introduced without full legislative oversight. Compounding this is the absence of a reliable system for tracking legislative versions. 

There is no comprehensive public record that clearly distinguishes between what was passed and what was eventually signed into law. This creates a dangerous verification gap.

Executive influence also plays a role. Legislative drafting is often shaped by ministries and government agencies, while the legislature itself struggles with limited technical capacity. The result is laws that may already contain internal inconsistencies before they are even enacted. Time pressure further worsens the situation. Many bills, especially those relating to finance, are rushed through the process under political urgency. In such conditions, scrutiny is weakened, and errors or worse, deliberate insertions can go unnoticed.

The problem, therefore, is not merely procedural; it is institutional. Oversight mechanisms are weak, transparency is limited, and violations rarely attract consequences. Over time, this erodes public trust and shifts the burden to the courts, forcing judges to resolve issues that should never have arisen. If Nigeria is serious about strengthening its democracy, incremental fixes will not suffice. What is needed is structural reform. Every bill should be digitally tracked from introduction to assent, with each stage publicly accessible. The final version presented for assent must be certified as identical to what was passed, with clear accountability for any discrepancies. Conference committees must operate transparently, with all changes subjected to final legislative approval.

Silent alterations should have no place in a constitutional democracy. There is also a strong case for establishing an independent legislative drafting body, staffed by experts and insulated from executive influence. In addition, a constitutional review panel possibly involving senior jurists and the Nigerian Bar Association could help identify inconsistencies before laws are enacted.

Finally, the constitution itself must be clarified. The ambiguity surrounding presidential assent and legislative override must be resolved to prevent continued uncertainty. The real issue is no longer whether inconsistencies exist. It is whether Nigeria is willing to confront the process that produces them. Without reform, the country risks continuing to produce laws that lack clarity, consistency, and legitimacy. And once legal certainty begins to erode, governance itself becomes unstable.

 

Ahiakwo wrote from Calabar