Limitation statute is matter of jurisdiction – CJN

 “(a) A declaration that the plaintiff still (sic) in the service of the defendants and that he  is entitled to his full remunerations and leave allowances since dismissal. (b) A declaration that the letter of his dismissal dated 30th January, 1996 and letter of interdiction dated 22nd August 1995 are null and void and of no […]

 “(a) A declaration that the plaintiff still (sic) in the service of the defendants and that he  is entitled to his full remunerations and leave allowances since dismissal.
 (b) A declaration that the letter of his dismissal dated 30th January, 1996 and letter of interdiction dated 22nd August 1995 are null and void and of no effect.
 (c) A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to all his allowances as an employee of the defendants.
 (d) A declaration that the plaintiff who is an employee of the defendants be with immediate effect re-instated by the defendants.”

On 18/4/2000 learned counsel for the respondents moved a motion for the dismissal of the suit for being statute barred. The learned counsel for the appellant filed a counter affidavit. Both learned counsel addressed the court on the motion, but the learned trial judge rather than rule on it made the following observation:-
“I am of the opinion that the implication of this application will entail my giving a ruling which in effect would have the implication of a final judgment. And because of this I wish to serve my ruling until the end of the trial and make application and the ruling to form part of my judgment.”
Indeed the learned trial after going through the gamut of appraising the evidence before him found as follows in his judgment in the final analysis:-
“At the end of the day I find and hold that this suit was filed outside the 3 months period required by the law and is therefore statute barred.”
Aggrieved by the decision the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal Kaduna Division. The court affirmed the decision of the court of first instance and dismissed the appeal. Again the plaintiff was aggrieved by the dismissal of his appeal, and he has appealed to this court.
 Issues for determination were formulated in the briefs, and I will reproduce those in the appellant’s amended brief of argument here below. They are:-
“1. Whether the lower court was right in saying that the trial court considered all the issues raised by the Appellant in his reply to the preliminary objection raised by the respondent? If the answer is in the negative whether such denial or consideration of those issues amounted to the breach of rules of hearing as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution?
2. Whether the lower court has correctly interpreted and applied the provisions of order 24 Rules (2) and (3) and order 25 Rule 6 (1) and (35) of the Kano State High Court (Civil procedure) Rules 1988
3. Whether the Statute of Limitation can be applicable in the circumstance of this matter.
It is on record that the grounds upon which the application that was brought (pursuant to Section 2(9) of the Public Officers (protection) Law Cap.121 Laws of Kano State for the dismissal of the suit) are as follows:-
“4(b) That following proof of allegation of gross misconduct of hiding of files the plaintiff/respondent was dismissed.
 (c) That the letter of dismissal was served on the defendant/respondent on 30th January, 1996.
 (d) That the plaintiff/respondent filed this action on 25th June, 1996 verily six months after he was served with the letter of dismissal.
(e) That it will be in the interest of justice to dismiss the action.
 (f) That the dismissal of this action will not prejudice the plaintiff/respondent.”
The finding of the lower court on the ruling of the trial court was also attacked by learned counsel, submitting that it cannot be supported having regards to what is contained in the record of proceedings of the trial court. According to him the breach of the failure of the trial judge not giving a detailed ruling deprived the appellant of knowing the position of the court on the issue raised and argued, and by this failure the right of fair hearing of the appellant has been infringed.
There is no gain saying that the application and objection that is the subject of controversy now was on point of law, being one on jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine the case. That being the case, all the learned trial judge needed to do was to consider the provision of the law under which it was brought and the affidavit evidence in support.
The learned judge considered the deposition in the supporting affidavit for dismissal of the suit, stating that date of dismissal of the appellant, and the relevant exhibit which I have already reproduced supra, and then even reproduced the relevant law which reads:-
 “2. Where any action, prosecution or other proceedings commenced against any person for any, act done in pursuance of execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority of any such law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect:-
 (a)     The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not be or be instituted unless it is  commenced within three month next after the act neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance or damage or injury, within three months after the ceasing thereof:-“ See Public Officers (Protection) Law Cap. 121 Laws of Kano State.
In this circumstance that the appellant’s supporting evidence was bereft of anything substantial to deserve any detailed analysis, what was the learned trial Judge supposed to do, stray into a blank discourse because he wanted to satisfy the appellant that he considered his own side of the story? Definitely not. Now, what are the issues the learned trial judge was alleged not to have analysed in detail? They are that the Statute of Limitation must have been pleaded specifically, the date when the injury complained of occurred, and the fact that negotiation to settle the suit were on. I think that the fact that the learned trial Judge did not go into a detailed consideration of these complaints in his judgment is inconsequential as long as he has considered the most vital aspects of the application, briefly as it may have been.
In all these wise, the issues of lack of fair hearing raised, by learned counsel for the appellant is of no moment.  There was therefore no infringement of the right of fair hearing.
In the final analysis, on this issue the objection raised being that of jurisdiction was properly raised, notwithstanding, the stage at which the ruling, and the order made. The most important thing is that the substance of the objection was dealt with and the correct decision was arrived at. An elementary principle of the law and which has been dealt with in a plethora of authorities is that an objection to the jurisdiction of a court can be raised at the beginning or the end of a proceeding even just before judgment stage. It is fundamental that it can be raised even in an appellant court. See Ezomo v. Oyakhire 1985 1 NWLR part 2 page 195 .
For the foregoing reasoning I resolve this issue in favour of the respondents and dismiss ground of appeal No. (1) to which it is married.
Issue (2) above is a spill over of issue (1), as the argument entails demurer which has already been touched in issue (1), most especially on the purport of Order 24 of the Kano State Civil Procedure Rules. The learned Counsel for the appellant in his brief of argument reproduced the following provision thus:-
“Order 24 Rule 1 states- No demurer shall be allowed.”
 (2) Any party shall be entitled to raise by his pleading any points of law, and any points so raised shall be disposed of by the judge who tries the case at or after the trial. Provided that by consent the parties or by order of the court or a judge on the application of either party, the same may be set down for hearing and disposed of at any time before the trial.
 (3) If in the opinion of the court or a judge the decision of such point of law substantially disposes of the whole action, or any distinct cause of action, ground of defence, set-off, counter-claim, or reply therein, the court or judge may thereupon dismiss the action or make such other therein as may be just.”
The purpose of pleadings and raising any point therein, as is required in Rule (2) supra is to avoid springing surprises on parties, and this is an elementary law of practice and procedure which does not require the interpretation of the said Rule (2) supra to understand.
If the function of pleadings is to put the other party on notice of what to expect at the trial, then a motion on notice, (as was in the instant case) to dismiss a case on point of law precludes elements of surprises. The appellant cannot feign ignorance of the point of law raised before the motion was moved. The appellant was very much aware of what the respondents were seeking from the court, and had the opportunity to meet it headlong. The appellant cannot say that he was prejudiced, for I believe even if that point of law on Statute of Limitation was raised in the statement of defence, he could not have proffered more argument than he did in the course of the proceedings in respect of the motion. As I have stated earlier in the judgment in the treatment of issue (1), the Statute of Limitation is matter of jurisdiction which can be raised at any stage of litigation, and I will add here, even in the Supreme Court.
I resolve the issue in favour of the respondents and dismiss grounds (2) and (3) of appeal to which it is married as it lacks merits.
Having agreed and held that the action was caught by the Statute of Limitation, I am of the view that the need to consider the arguments covering issue (3) supra is obviated. Once the action was statute barred there was nothing to build on it. To proceed with the treatment of issue (3) is like chasing a wild goose, as the most important aspect of the appeal has already been dealt with above and disposed of. Issue (3) is therefore resolved in favour of the respondent, and the related ground of appeal No. (4) is dismissed. This is an appeal against concurrent finding of two lower courts which should not ordinarily be disturbed unless the findings have been found to be perverse and have caused miscarriage of justice.  The end result is that this appeal fails in its entirety. I will however make no order as to costs.