Managing wheat import

Over the years, Nigeria’s agricultural policy has rested on attaining food sufficiency as against dependence on imports. But sensible as the intent was, there has not been sufficient political will to bring it to fruition, thus creating the embarrassing paradox of a country endowed with vast arable land but unable to harness it properly to […]

Over the years, Nigeria’s agricultural policy has rested on attaining food sufficiency as against dependence on imports. But sensible as the intent was, there has not been sufficient political will to bring it to fruition, thus creating the embarrassing paradox of a country endowed with vast arable land but unable to harness it properly to wean itself from being a net importer of food for its citizens. The cassava development strategy could serve as the take off point for the import substitution policy that seeks to achieve 20% substitution of cassava for wheat in bread production thereby creating employment and income for farmers and others involved.  
 Yet even with the appreciable level of commitment to the policy, actualising it would take much more than declared intent.  For instance, the cassava policy and the cassava bread initiative is not new; it was originally introduced by the Olusegun Obasanjo administration. The fact that the cassava bread is still work in progress shows the difficulty inherent in popularising and making it acceptable.  It is advisable therefore that the plan should be well thought-out before being embarked on, in order to avoid complete failure ant its resultant unpalatable effect on the economy. This is why the government should have done more work in for instance boosting local production of wheat to make up for the shortfall the ban the imported variety would bring about.  Wheat production in the country has not been a success; it has been unable to respond adequately to investment in financial resources and time expended on it. The reason for this partly has to do with the climate which is not too suitable for its growth. Borno State that has recorded improvement in its cultivation has been hampered greatly by ongoing security challenges.  Therefore emphasis on increasing its production would have been well worth the effort.
 This point is lent credence by the concomitant increase in the price of rice following its ban, which may not have happened had there been some coordination between local production and limiting its import.   The same argument goes for cassava of which, according to Dr Akinwumi, Nigeria is the largest producer. The emphasis placed on it through encouragement of farmers to intensify its cultivation, at the expense of other crops, could easily create a glut, a distinct possibility considering the challenge of viability of the cassava bread presently.  A glut could disrupt farmers’ income, which could further worsen their circumstances. These factors, and more besides, demand that the government thinks through this policy critically before embarking on it.
 One such factor is the need for co-ordination and harmonisation of tariff policy with neighbouring countries to achieve the objectives of the policy. Unless this is done, the same commodities banned could find their way into the country through these countries. Furthermore, Nigeria’s customs department would have to be alive to its responsibilities for the policy to succeed. The pursuit of food sufficiency as a policy is a worthwhile course to pursue by every responsible government. The ban on rice and the proposed drawdown by 20% of wheat import are therefore measures towards that end. They should however be properly considered before implementation in order to avoid negative consequences on the Nigerian economy.