Not history repeating itself, corruption fuelling Nigeria’s insecurity crisis

Can you recall where you were in July 2009? That was the month clashes erupted between Boko Haram militants and Nigerian security forces in Bauchi and two other northern states. Since then, Nigeria has been wrestling with an expanding security crisis: Boko Haram in the northeast, separatist tensions in the southeast, and banditry across the […]

Can you recall where you were in July 2009? That was the month clashes erupted between Boko Haram militants and Nigerian security forces in Bauchi and two other northern states. Since then, Nigeria has been wrestling with an expanding security crisis: Boko Haram in the northeast, separatist tensions in the southeast, and banditry across the northwest and north-central regions. In the last few weeks especially, the situation has worsened dramatically — mass kidnappings of schoolchildren, abductions of church congregants, and even the kidnapping of a state assembly deputy speaker. Some analysts suggest that this is a replay of Nigeria’s past, pointing to early-19th-century insecurity in the Sokoto Caliphate, when kidnapping, raiding, and social upheaval were rife. But to frame today’s violence as “history repeating itself” is misleading. What we are witnessing now is not merely cyclical insecurity but a more corrosive and modern disease: systemic corruption, elite impunity, and governance failure — undergirded by a government that has struggled to deliver inclusive leadership and basic security, especially under President Bola Tinubu.

Let me start with a snapshot of terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria today. Recent weeks have painted a grim picture of Nigeria’s security situation. According to reports, on November 21, 2025, gunmen stormed St. Mary’s Catholic School in Papiri, Niger State, abducting at least 215 pupils and 12 teachers. Earlier in the week, 25 schoolgirls from Government Girls Comprehensive Secondary School in Kebbi State were kidnapped at night; tragically, the school’s vice principal was killed. In Eruku, Kwara State, gunmen attacked Christ Apostolic Church during worship, killing at least two people and abducting dozens. Reports say 38 or more worshippers were taken, with ransom demands reportedly as high as N100 million per person. In August 2025, bandits killed dozens during an attack on a mosque in Unguwan Mantau, Katsina State, and abducted many. On July 1, 2025, militants believed to be affiliated with Islamic State – Sahel Province attacked Kwallajiya village in Sokoto State, killing 15–17 people. Earlier years saw large-scale massacres, such as the Tarmuwa massacre (2024) in Yobe State, where over 130 villagers were killed by IS-aligned insurgents. As a student of history, in my estimation, these are the most traumatic and symbolically significant attacks on the populace in a single short period in what is today northern Nigeria, since the 1847 attack against Gwamatse and Salame by Gobir Chief Mayaki. In Gwamatse 30 descendants of Shehu Danfodio were killed. In Salame, libraries of scholars were scattered and women were kidnapped. This led Sokoto Military leaders to give an ultimatum to Caliph Aliyu Babba bin Bello (1804–1859) to take actions.

Some commentators invoke those tumultuous years of the caliphate to explain today’s insecurity. This oversimplifies the problem. The caliphate, though not without its challenges — including raids, kidnapping, and frontier banditry — maintained strong local structures, moral legitimacy, and relatively accountable governance. Today’s Nigeria, by contrast, is being torn apart not only by violence but by institutional decay. Insecurity today did not spring from a vacuum or manifest from our DNA. Unlike in the Caliphate, corruption undermines the very institutions meant to check violence and hold actors accountable. The role of corruption in fueling insecurity is well-established. Let me cite some of them. (i) It is well-known that corruption in Nigeria has grown deeply entrenched, eroding governance trust and weakening rule-of-law institutions. Corrupt politicians and officials divert resources that should go to security, social services, and development. (ii) Persistent corruption also amplifies poverty and unemployment. A study argues that corrupt practices by political elites embolden criminal actors and alienate marginalised communities. When young people are left with no opportunity, they are more susceptible to recruitment by bandits or extremist groups. (iii) Today, the security sector has collapsed. Corruption weakens the security architecture: funds for arms, personnel, training, and intelligence are mismanaged or siphoned. Security agencies operate with limited capacity or are manipulated by political patronage.

The worst factor worsening insecurity in Nigeria is the so-called Ransom Economy. The profitability of kidnapping itself thrives due to poor governance. Criminals know that the state is often slow, under-resourced, or compromised; they rely on ransom demands, knowing they can extract large sums. In addition, government indecisiveness leads to an erosion of public trust. When citizens do not trust institutions — the police, judiciary, or local government, they become less likely to cooperate or support state-led security efforts.

Last Saturday, at the 25th Anniversary (Silver Jubilee) of the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) in Kaduna, the President — represented by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Abbas Tajudeen — delivered an address titled ‘A Generation Summoned by a Crisis’. The President expressed government’s concerns about the current insecurity in the north and promises further actions. While no administration can fully eliminate insecurity overnight, Tinubu’s government has come under justified criticism. The government’s sudden underinvestment in social safety nets was ill-advised. Removing fuel subsidies, floating the naira, and withdrawing other cost-of-living supports without fully cushioning the poorest has exacerbated vulnerability. Security sector reform has been weak. The administration has yet to deliver meaningful reform in policing, intelligence, or community-based security. Reactive deployments like airstrikes happen, but preventive and structural reforms lag behind. Perceived exclusion in political appointments and resource allocation deepens grievances among marginalised regions, fueling insecurity. Despite rhetoric, many high-level corruption cases remain unresolved or poorly prosecuted — even when corruption directly undermines security policy. These pose important question for President Tinubu. What is President Tinubu’s North Star on insecurity — his clear direction for addressing terrorism, banditry, and criminal separatist activity? What is Tinubu’s message to a breastfeeding widow whose husband was killed at a church service or a schoolgirl whose close friend has been kidnapped? What is his message of hope to the 70 per cent of the population in part of the north – those 30-year-old and younger — who know nothing except killings, bombings, school closures, and missed opportunities?

Let me remind President Tinubu of the basic principles taught in security studies. To improve the insecurity there must be actions – both kinetic and non-kinetic. Specific action leads to a specific result. Allowing small, controllable pockets of insecurity to fester eventually lead to major, uncontrollable events and potential system collapse. There are many examples of violating these simple basic teachings that led to undesirable outcomes. Let me cite two. In Afghanistan, corruption within government institutions — from the police to provincial governors — helped fuel the Taliban’s resurgence. Funds meant for security were diverted; local populations distrusted the state, pushing them to tacitly support insurgents. There were no serious actions by the government. This allowed the Taliban and Al-Qaida to emerge, eventually drawing in U.S. intervention. Somalia’s long-running instability has been deeply connected to state capture and kleptocracy. Warlords, corrupt officials, and militants have long benefited from weak institutions, leading to a vicious cycle of violence. Today, that beautiful country has been fragmented and left in perpetual instability. These cases show a recurring pattern: when institutions are weak and corrupt, and there are no decisive government actions, violent actors exploit the vacuum. The result is a structural breakdown.

Nigeria’s security crisis is not a replay of the 19th century. It is a manifestation of a modern, systemic failure — a failure rooted in corruption, broken institutions, and governance that excludes the vulnerable. To restore peace, stability, and trust, President Tinubu’s government must take specific actions. It must launch a genuine anti-corruption revival, especially targeting how security funds are used. It must reform its security architecture — from intelligence to policing, procurement to border control. It must build inclusive governance structures that give marginalized communities a voice. It must invest in youth empowerment, education, and economic opportunity — removing the appeal of crime. And it must promote accountability and justice for victims of violence, including kidnappings and mass abductions. History does teach many lessons — but invoking it as fate wastes the real one: without curbing corruption and rebuilding trust, instability will persist. The crisis is not destiny; it is a choice — one that political leaders must confront, beginning today.

 

El-Yakubu is a professor of Chemical Engineering, Ahmadu Bello University [email protected]