Now that the Americans are here… (II)

a celebration of real improvements in the country’s macroeconomic environment as demonstrated in consistent GDP growth over the past decade, the inclusion of the country in the MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey) emerging economies and a re-basing of the country’s GDP, making her the largest economy in Africa and the 26th largest in the world. […]

a celebration of real improvements in the country’s macroeconomic environment as demonstrated in consistent GDP growth over the past decade, the inclusion of the country in the MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey) emerging economies and a re-basing of the country’s GDP, making her the largest economy in Africa and the 26th largest in the world. Rather than celebrate the president, several world media ran editorials and commentaries very uncomplimentary of him and his handling of the abduction of the girls.
Additionally, the Chibok affair coupled with the President’s inappropriate response to the Nyanya bombing appears to have sown disillusionment among his ‘protest supporters’. There are indeed thousands of Nigerians who ‘support’ the president – not necessarily because they believe in his ability but because they either feel there are no better alternatives  out there or  are enraged  by a feeling that he is being unfairly hounded, especially after the rather opportunistic and temperamental open letter to him from former President Olusegun Obasanjo.
But let me return to the Americans.
Though a number of countries – China, Britain, the Netherlands, France and others-pledged various forms of military assistance in locating the abducted girls, Nigerians seem rather enamoured by the involvement of the USA in the rescue effort despite the fact that the country sent only seven marine soldiers to join about 60 others already in the country as part of America’s counter-terrorism effort. What should we expect from this international rescue effort? Can they deliver?  How will their involvement impact on our local politics and the politics of 2015? And what will be the way out of the Boko Haram challenge?
On the U.S.-led foreign assistance in locating the abducted Chibok girls, my personal opinion is that if the U.S. soldiers are able to quickly locate the whereabouts of the abducted girls and free them without many of them losing their life in the process or without a heavy civilian casualty during any commando-style rescue operation (a commando-style move will be ill-advised in my opinion), it will boost the U.S.’s standing in the eyes of the Nigerian public. If however the bombings continue despite the hype about foreign military assistance in fighting Boko Haram and if the girls are not quickly located or released, US’s standing in the eyes of Nigerians will be diminished while Boko Haram could become even more emboldened. Similarly if the foreign soldiers are perceived to be the ‘face’ of the campaign against Boko Haram, especially if such open involvement leads to civilian casualties, it could remind Nigerians of the aftermath of US’s involvement in several conflict countries – Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya – galvanizing in the process anti-American and anti-Western sentiments and serving as a basis of recruitment for Boko Haram. Already it remains a matter of conjecture whether the declaration of both Boko Haram and Ansaru as foreign terrorist organisations by the U.S. in November 2013 – a move that was supposed to choke off the sources of funding to the sects-helped in fact in glamourizing the sects within the international terrorism franchise and thus paradoxically helped in attracting more logistic support to the groups. In essence while foreign technical know-how could help the country in its fight against terrorism, there are potential flipsides to this that Nigerian security forces should be mindful of.
I have severally argued that Boko Haram is one of the symptoms of the crisis in the country’s nation-building processes. The long term solution to the Boko Haram challenge in my opinion is therefore restarting the stalled nation-building processes to create more ‘true Nigerians’ – that is, Nigerians who privilege their Nigerian identity over the other identities they bear. The crisis in the country’s nation-building processes interfaces with the crisis of underdevelopment to create an existential crisis for many Nigerians.  For many young people, a way of resolving this crisis and its embedded sense of alienation is to retreat from the ‘Nigeria project’ and construct meanings in chosen primordial identities—often with the Nigerian state as the enemy.  I have elsewhere called this phenomenon   a “de-Nigerianisation” process. In Nigeria, there is a heavy burden of institutionalised memories of hurt, injustice, distrust and even a disguised longing for vengeance by various individuals, ethnic groups, regions and religious groups.   In this sense, actions that ordinary Nigerians rightly see as heinous are seen by some as normal, even heroic.  In Nigeria, no individual or political authority enjoys universal legitimacy across the main fault lines. Nigeria is therefore a country in desperate need of creating more ‘true Nigerians’. Terrorism by Nigerians against their own country will end or be drastically reduced when Nigerians come to see themselves as one people and develop that sense of what the University of Cornell emeritus professor Benedict Anderson called “imagined communities”  
Re-starting the stalled nation-building process in the country is not going to happen overnight. The following measures, however, hold a good promise:
(a) Though I remain sceptical that the on-going National Conference convened by the federal government to recommend solutions to the many challenges facing the country will succeed because of deeply ingrained distrust among Nigerians, the conference, if well managed, could be a credible platform for all stakeholders to vent their grievances and frustrations with the Nigeria project. The catharsis will be useful as the country strives for long-term solutions to its nation-building problems. In the same vein, some recommendations from the conference, if implemented, could help in mollifying some aggrieved groups.
(b) Perhaps one of the long-term solutions to the Boko Haram challenge could come by default. The increasing wave of “Naija optimism” – a wave of new optimisms about the economic prospects of the country typified in the recent inclusion of Nigeria in the MINT emerging economies and the rebasing of her GDP which made her economy the largest in Africa and the 26th largest in the world, could help to blunt the pull of the centrifugal forces.  Because people instinctively want to identify with success, economic growth and development could pacify irredentist pressures, as separatist forces may have to contend with the fear of leaving at a time the country is being tipped as among the likely future economic super powers of the world.   
(c) As Nigeria’s economy develops, the various parts of the country could develop organic economic linkages that will help further the cause of the nation-building process. For instance, if the groundnuts produced in the north are used in the manufacture of peanut butter in the southeast and the cocoa produced in the west are used for manufacturing chocolate drinks in the north, such economic linkages will help to blunt inter-regional animosities and thus further the cause of national unity.

What can Nigeria do in the meantime?
In the short- to medium- term the government should adopt a combination of koboko (Hausa word for whip) and “pieces of the National cake” (“patronage” or “co-optation into the system”). In Western speak carrot and stick strategies. Some of the measures the government could take include:
(i.) Empowering the state governments in the north to lead the charge and be the faces of the fight against Boko Haram. This could, if anything, address the conspiracy theory in the north that President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration is funding Boko Haram either to make Islam look bad or to depopulate the north ahead of the 2015 elections. It is important to underline that the conspiracy theories have made it more difficult to mobilize collective anger against Boko Haram.
 (iii.) Very quick trials, under Islamic laws, of those found to be Boko Haram activists or funders. Having suspects stand for trial for months or even years creates a backlash, and often has a way of mobilizing sympathy for them. It may also be strategic to try the suspects under Islamic laws since the sect members have openly rejected Western civilization, including its jurisprudence. This means that whatever punishment is meted to them under Islamic jurisprudence will not be seen as part of Western conspiracy against Islam.
(iv.) Creating a special ministry for Northern Affairs and instituting a sort of Marshall Plan for the north-east aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the local populace. The proposed Marshall plan will also help to rebuild the damages done to these areas and their economies by the Boko Haram insurgency and equally provide assistance to those who have lost their businesses and means of livelihood to the conflict.
(v.) Exploring the option of offering amnesty to the more moderate members of the sects while side-lining the hardliners and finding means to effectively neutralize them.
Obviously there is no quick-fix to fighting terrorism anywhere in the world – as experiences in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia and other countries have shown. However with the above recommended short-to-medium term strategies pursued concurrently with the longer term strategy of resolving the crisis in Nigeria’s nation-building processes, Boko Haram’s terrorism can be contained while resolving the crisis in the country’s nation-building processes will ensure that the sect and other insurgency groups in the country will be effectively neutralised.