Oil wells dispute: Why C/River–A/Ibom tensions demand urgent federal intervention

A renewed dispute over oil wells between Cross River and Akwa Ibom states is fast evolving into a complex political, legal and economic contest, one that analysts warn could deepen tensions in Nigeria’s oil-producing region if not urgently addressed at the highest level of government. At the centre of the controversy is Cross River’s intensifying […]

A renewed dispute over oil wells between Cross River and Akwa Ibom states is fast evolving into a complex political, legal and economic contest, one that analysts warn could deepen tensions in Nigeria’s oil-producing region if not urgently addressed at the highest level of government.

At the centre of the controversy is Cross River’s intensifying push to be recognised as an oil-producing state, anchored on claims of abandoned, capped and potentially viable oil and gas wells within its territory. The state government argues that historical exploration activities, coupled with legal and geographical realities, justify its demand for derivation status, an issue that carries significant fiscal implications under Nigeria’s revenue-sharing formula.

 

The basis of Cross River’s claims

Cross River officials point to multiple oil fields said to exist across the state, including in Bakassi, Akpabuyo, Calabar South, Biase, Akamkpa and Odukpani. Many of these wells, they say, were drilled in the 1950s and 1960s by multinational firms such as Shell Petroleum Development Company but were later abandoned due to low commercial viability at the time.

The state highlights specific assets: the Odukpani Oil Field, estimated to hold about 33 million barrels of crude; the Akpet Central Field, reportedly discovered in 1986 with reserves of 27 million barrels of oil and 21 billion cubic feet of gas; and the Ogoja Gas Field, believed to contain up to 70 billion cubic feet of gas.

Officials argue that advancements in technology and changing market conditions could make these fields commercially viable today. More importantly, they insist that the existence of such reserves underscores Cross River’s status as a legitimate oil-bearing state.

Beyond geology, Cross River’s case rests heavily on legal interpretations of the landmark International Court of Justice Bakassi ruling, which ceded parts of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.

According to the state government and legal experts, the ruling did not transfer the entirety of the Bakassi territory. They argue that significant portions of the Ikang mangrove, western Bakassi islands and segments of the Calabar estuary remain within Nigerian sovereignty and specifically within Cross River.

A legal review by former state assembly speaker, John Gaul Lebo maintains that Cross River retains a functional maritime corridor to the Atlantic Ocean through the Akwayefe River and adjoining estuaries. This, the argument goes, preserves its status as a littoral state under international maritime law, including provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

From this standpoint, Cross River contends that its exclusion from the list of oil-producing states is both legally and geographically flawed.

 

The 76 oil wells controversy

The dispute is not entirely new. It echoes the long-standing disagreement over 76 offshore oil wells, which were the subject of litigation between Cross River and Akwa Ibom. In a decisive judgment, the Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled in favour of Akwa Ibom, effectively transferring control and the associated derivation revenue of those wells to the state.

However, Cross River now argues that the ruling addressed only those specific offshore wells and did not extinguish its claims over other onshore and nearshore resources. Officials say fresh findings indicate the presence of at least 67 oil wells within its territory, separate from the previously adjudicated 76 wells.

“Our 67 oil wells derivation is sacrosanct,” a senior government official said, signalling a renewed determination to pursue recognition through legal and political channels.

Complicating the dispute is a broader geopolitical concern involving Nigeria’s maritime boundaries with Cameroon. Reports of alleged encroachment by Cameroonian interests into mangrove islands in Mbo Local Government Area of Akwa Ibom have heightened tensions.

The area, rich in oil and gas deposits, is said to host thousands of wells. Nigerian authorities, including the Senate, have initiated investigations into the situation, underscoring fears that unresolved internal disputes could weaken Nigeria’s territorial claims externally.

For stakeholders, this intersection of domestic rivalry and international boundary sensitivity makes the Cross River–Akwa Ibom dispute more than a routine resource disagreement.

But the question the above has raised is what makes it a policy issue. At its core, the conflict raises fundamental questions about Nigeria’s resource governance framework. The derivation principle, which allocates a percentage of oil revenue to producing states, has long been a source of contention. Determining what constitutes an “oil-producing state” is therefore not merely administrative; it is deeply political and economically consequential.

Moreover, the dispute exposes gaps in Nigeria’s approach to managing abandoned oil assets. Many wells drilled decades ago were left idle due to technological or economic limitations. With modern extraction techniques, these assets may now be viable, raising questions about ownership, licensing and revenue sharing.

Without a clear, forward-looking policy, such issues are likely to recur, potentially fuelling inter-state rivalries.

Given the stakes, stakeholders are calling on President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to step in before the situation escalates.

Analysts argue that federal intervention is necessary for several reasons. First, only the federal government has the authority to harmonise legal interpretations, regulatory frameworks and fiscal policies across states. Second, the dispute touches on national security, particularly in the context of maritime boundaries and relations with Cameroon.

Third, the Niger Delta’s history of unrest, often driven by perceptions of marginalisation and resource control, serves as a cautionary tale. Allowing a similar grievance to fester between two neighbouring states could have broader implications for stability in the oil region.

A coordinated response, experts suggest, should include an independent technical audit of oil and gas assets in the disputed areas, a legal review of existing judgments, treaties and delineations, and a policy framework for integrating previously abandoned wells into the national production system.

If left unresolved, the Cross River–Akwa Ibom oil wells dispute risks becoming what observers describe as an “albatross” for the federal government. It could lead to an enduring and politically costly problem that could undermine cohesion in a strategically vital region.

For Cross River, the issue is about economic survival and recognition. For Akwa Ibom, it is about protecting established revenue streams. For Nigeria, it is about maintaining stability, ensuring equitable resource distribution and safeguarding territorial integrity.

The challenge for policymakers is to balance these competing interests without inflaming tensions. That will require not just legal clarity, but political will and strategic foresight.

As the debate intensifies, one thing is clear: resolving the dispute is no longer optional.