Opportunistic and unrealistic

Justice Mohammed’s ruling, in a suit instituted by Olisa Agbakoba (SAN) that challenged the practice, was meant to reaffirm the Judiciary as a separate and independent government arm. Mr Agbakoba’s obvious good intention in instituting the case was to make the judiciary more responsive to its duties. As the third arm of government, the judiciary […]

Justice Mohammed’s ruling, in a suit instituted by Olisa Agbakoba (SAN) that challenged the practice, was meant to reaffirm the Judiciary as a separate and independent government arm. Mr Agbakoba’s obvious good intention in instituting the case was to make the judiciary more responsive to its duties. As the third arm of government, the judiciary has come under blistering and damning public censure over allegations of corrupt practices and diminishing quality in the administration of justice. These have done much harm to the image of the Judiciary.
To be seen going cap in hand every so often to the executive arm for funds to run its affairs evokes uncomfortable notion of the judiciary being a weak partner that must bend to certain compromising demands in order to get what is due to it. The more independent of the executive arm the judiciary is, the better it would be for the polity.
However, while the principle of the separation of powers is ideal for performing particular functions and duties, it would be difficult to uphold and sustain it in budgetary matters on several grounds.  First, even though funds accruable to the judiciary are consolidated, funds to all government units and departments are released according to the available funds in the treasury at particular times. This point is important given the regular long delays in the budgetary process requiring funds to be appropriated from other sources to keep government affairs running in the meantime. Thus, it would be impractical to sustain and abide by Justice Mohammed’s ruling to make available to the judiciary all the funds due to it at a go without denying other government departments funds for their operations.
Even the judiciary would not wish such a scenario to occur because of its possible disruptive effects on government business generally. The claim that the current process by which the judiciary submits its budget estimates to the executive first before it is taken to the National Assembly negates the principle of separation of powers is not tenable. The judiciary’s duty is to adjudicate disputes fairly, and no arm of government has the right to impede the exercise of this function. It cannot possibly seek to have its own revenue collectors, accountant general, auditor general, etc, in order to be comfortable with its idea of independence. But submitting its financial proposal to the executive for scrutiny and approval before sending it as part of the total budget process of government, in a particular year, to the legislature, is a requirement of the financial regulations on which probity, transparency and good government rest. It is the executive’s function to determine how much is in its coffers, and how much would be safe to spend at a particular time without causing harm to the economy. Left on their own, all government agencies would want to get all the funds they request, oblivious of whether the economy could meet such demands. But that’s impractical of course.  It is the government’s business to control such demands and track disbursements.  
The issue of the judiciary going cap in hand to the executive before collecting its allocations can be addressed if its entitlements, indeed the entitlements of every other agency, are paid in accordance with schedules, without deferments and unnecessary delays.