Politics of extending emergency rule

I disagree very strongly with those who contend that emergency rule should have been extended ‘automatically’ for the fourth time as a matter of course because the need for it is apparently  obvious (at least to them)  and that those holding contrarian positions do not wish the country or the Jonathan administration well.  My personal […]

I disagree very strongly with those who contend that emergency rule should have been extended ‘automatically’ for the fourth time as a matter of course because the need for it is apparently  obvious (at least to them)  and that those holding contrarian positions do not wish the country or the Jonathan administration well.  My personal opinion is that after running any project for as long as eighteen months, an impact assessment will be needed to determine if the project is fulfilling the objectives for which it was set up. If such projects must be continued after such impact assessments, it is expected that lessons learnt from their operations will be built into their modus operandi for better results. This, in my opinion, is what we should be doing with the current debate on the extension of the emergency rule in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.
Carrying out impact assessment for a ‘project’ like the emergency rule, obviously presents some methodological challenges. How will one assess the impact of the emergency rule? The most obvious method will be to use the ‘before’ (that is before the emergency rule was instituted) and ‘after’ (that is after the emergency rule was instituted) and then compare the two situations. If we adopt this method, it will be clear that the emergency rule has not worked. In fact under emergency rule, Boko Haram mutated from a rag tag insurgency group to a highly sophisticated group that seizes territories and defeats our military in symmetric battles. The problem with the ‘before’ and ‘after’ approach however is that it will be unable to tell us what would have happened without the declaration of the state of emergency in those states.  It will also be unhelpful to use states where emergencies were not declared as control states to give us insight of what would have happened if emergencies were not declared because the three affected states were already the worst affected by Boko Haram terrorism. Can one actually argue that the state of emergency declared in the three states led to the escalation of insurgency in those states?  
The politics of extending emergency rule in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states is embedded in the array of conspiracy theories about Boko Haram which have helped to make the mobilization of collective anger against the terrorists difficult.  For instance for many of President Jonathan’s opponents in the north, the emergency rule was a deliberate ploy  either to depopulate the north ahead of the 2015 elections or it is meant to ensure that elections do not hold in many areas of the populous north-east, believed to be a stronghold of the opposition APC. According to John Odigie-Oyegun, National Chairman of the APC, “President Goodluck Jonathan is so desperate to win re-election that it will now appear that there is a secret understanding that our security forces should turn a blind eye to the Boko Haram insurgency so that the insurgents can occupy as much territory as possible and make elections impossible in these areas, knowing full well these are APC strongholds,” (National Mirror, 20 November 2014). Opponents of President Jonathan also argue that the emergency rule has been a source of primitive accumulation for several people close to power at Aso Rock.
In the same way, proponents of the continuation of the emergency rule often see in the opposition to the renewal of emergency rule a ploy to enable Boko Haram gain more territory and humiliate President Jonathan. Such people often argue that  the regime was deceived into a bogus ceasefire agreement with Boko Haram at a time that the military had gained advantage over the sect, and that the military’s unilateral ceasefire only enabled the insurgents to regroup, re-strategize and then capture Mubi, embarrassing both the army and the government. For proponents of the continuation of emergency rule therefore, those who are opposed to it have secret agenda of either aiding Boko Haram or to see President Jonathan humiliated.
Beyond the disagreements on the desirability or otherwise of continuing the emergency rule and the conspiracy theories that drive the various perspectives, we can establish at least three areas of consensus:
One, Boko Haram conflict has been intensifying despite – and some will argue – because of emergency rule. The humiliation of the army in conventional battles poses a threat to our democracy. The humiliation of the Malian army by the Tuareg rebels was in fact one of the reasons for the military coup in that country in 2012
Two, State of emergency is a big inconvenience to residents, including on their basic freedoms. Residents of the affected states suffer from a double whammy – an escalating insurgency on the one hand and an increasing militarization of daily life on the other which has led to an abridgement in their fundamental rights and adversely affected businesses and other means of survival.
Three, initially emergency rule worked, silencing momentarily critics. But the emergency rule was one of several instances where Boko Haram would suffer setbacks  only to quickly re-group and change strategy. In essence Boko Haram has shown an incredible ability to re-invent itself, meaning that any strategy for confronting the insurgents must be extremely dynamic and at least two steps ahead of them given their ability to adapt and re-strategize.  Boko Haram has already adapted to the state of emergency declared in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and renewing the emergency rule without drastically changing the template is unlikely to succeed. As W.L. Bateman would put it, “If you keep on doing what you’ve always done, you’ll keep on getting what you’ve always got.” To be able to defeat the insurgents we need new thinking, we need to think out of the box.
One proposal that is often brandied is for the introduction of ‘full’ emergency rule, meaning for the elected governors of the affected states to be replaced by military administrators and for the democratic structures in those states to be suspended. Apart from the possible unconstitutionality of this proposal, it is not exactly clear how turning these states into military dictatorships will solve the Boko Haram menace. Did dictatorship in Pakistan and Afghanistan solve the issue of fundamentalism and terrorism in those countries? Has the near militarization of Adamawa, Yobe and Borno states stemmed the tide of terrorism there? There is in fact a danger that if you have full blown military rule in the three states, there will be a big temptation by some military adventurists to supplant the entire democracy architecture in the country. My personal opinion therefore is that this sort of diarchy will not work.
Another issue that is often overlooked in the debate on emergency rule is that it often leads to the military routinely performing police functions. This often erodes their professionalism, including possibly attitude to war and paying the supreme price for the country. It may be an interesting piece of research to find out whether there is any correlation between the increasing use of the army in police duties and  stories of our soldiers dropping their guns at the sight of Boko Haram and taking to their heels.
As a way out I am much more persuaded by the position of the governor of Yobe State, Ibrahim Gaidam, on the issue.  A spokesman for the governor was quoted by the Premium Times of 19 November 2014 as saying:
“His Excellency Governor Gaidam believes that the presence of military troops on the ground is absolutely necessary but not sufficient to take the war to the insurgents and to defeat them. There are other vital ingredients which must feature now if the current extension is to enjoy any success at all.”
If we agree that the presence of troops on the ground is absolutely necessary, we can then discuss what could be added to the presence of troops. I do not mind if it is called state of Emergency or given another name.  What is clear is that we need well motivated military on the ground in the affected states but they must also do things differently as they did before – given that Boko Haram has already adapted to their strategy.