Possible trajectories of the Boko Haram conflict

Quite often scenario mapping – just like futures studies – is based on a very important caveat – all things being equal (ceteris paribus), which is another way of saying, “if current trends continue”. In real life however we all know that things are rarely equal and current trends rarely continue as they are.The other […]

Quite often scenario mapping – just like futures studies – is based on a very important caveat – all things being equal (ceteris paribus), which is another way of saying, “if current trends continue”. In real life however we all know that things are rarely equal and current trends rarely continue as they are.
The other important point to bear in mind is that virtually everything about Boko Haram is contested – from the meaning of its name (i.e. whether  the translation of ‘Boko Haram’ should mean  “Western education is forbidden or a sin” [a mere transliteration in my opinion] or  “Western civilization is forbidden  or a sin” – which I believe should be the correct interpretation – to when the sect was founded, the reasons for its radicalization, whether its assumed leader Shekau is dead or alive, and whether many of the attacks assumed to be carried out by the sect were actually carried out by them.
We will build a number of scenarios under which the Boko Haram conflict will abate or decelerate and permutations under which the conflict could accelerate or widen.
Scenario 1: Attacks by Boko Haram decline
Aftermath of the kidnap of the Chibok girls
There were high expectations that the global outrage caused by the kidnap of over 200 Chibok girls and the involvement of foreign countries (USA, UK, France, China etc.), in the efforts to locate and release them could  lead to a deceleration of the conflict.  
• If the U.S-led foreign military and technical assistance had been quick in locating the whereabouts of the abducted girls and freed them without many of the kidnapped girls losing their lives in the process or a heavy civilian casualty    during any rescue operation, it would have bolstered the standing of the US-led foreign countries in the eyes of the Nigerian public and probably demoralized the insurgents, leading to a deceleration of the conflict.
• However if the foreign military advisers are unable, within a short  frame of time,  to locate and release the girls, it could embolden Boko Haram, and  further raise the sect’s profile within the international terrorism franchise. In this sense, one of the unintended effects of the foreign ‘intervention’ in the wake of the kidnap of the Chibok girls could actually be an acceleration of the Boko Haram conflict. For instance there is a feeling that the declaration of the sect as an FTO (Foreign Terrorist Organisation) by the U.S. in November 2013 had the unintended effect of glamorizing the sect within the international terrorism franchise, leading to more support to them and increasing the audacity of their actions.

Jonathan stepping aside as president
There are many people, especially from the north, who seem to believe, for various reasons, that Jonathan is the ‘trouble with Nigeria’ and that once he steps aside, renounces interest in 2015 or is removed from office, the problems of Boko Haram will be solved.
• Since Boko Haram taps into some local grievances in parts of the north, especially feelings of being cheated resulting from the acrimonious PDP’s zoning and power rotation arrangements (or that the north needs the political lever to balance the south’s alleged domination of the economy and bureaucracy), Jonathan stepping aside to be succeeded by a northern Muslim, could address some of these grievances and choke off any latent local sympathy for the sect in the north-east, leading to a deceleration in the conflict.
• The problem with this option however is that Jonathan may not agree to any deal in this direction unless such will enhance his political stature. This is another way of saying that such a deal will have to involve very complex negotiations involving strategic stakeholders from   the north, south-south, the south, Muslim and Christian communities – and possibly also major world leaders. This is because Jonathan’s candidacy has grown much larger than him and anyone who fails to appreciate this will be completely missing the point.
• There is always a danger that concessions to the north in this regard could militarize other insurgency groups in the country who may come to believe that Boko Haram-type of violence may be needed to win concessions for their parts of the country. For instance  there are those who believe that NADECO’s heroic (in my opinion) but militarized campaign for the revalidation of  the June 12, 1993, election won by Abiola but annulled by Babangida led to the presidency being conceded to the Yorubas in 1999 and that the militants in the Niger Delta were pacified not only with a generous amnesty programme that turned many of the militants  into billionaires overnight but also paved the way for the emergence of someone from the Niger Delta (Jonathan) first as Vice President and subsequently as President. In other words, any negotiation for Jonathan to step aside and for power to ‘return to north’ must be mindful to address the possible ‘me-tooist’ imitations by other insurgent groups in the country.  
• If President Jonathan is hounded out of office or prevented from running (such as the Supreme Court disqualifying him as ineligible to contest), it could lead to a renewed militancy in the restive Niger Delta and also deepen the north-south (or north- south-south) divide.
• If Jonathan runs and loses, there will be the usual cries of being rigged out, which will most likely renew militancy in the Niger Delta – even if the electoral tribunals and the Supreme Court affirm the loss.
• If APC loses the election, there will also be the usual cries of being rigged out, leading to post-election violence in the north, perhaps on a scale larger than what we witnessed in 2011.
• If APC unravels and many of the influential northern politicians are persuaded to return to PDP, this is unlikely to have any major impact on the trajectory of the conflict.

If Northern state governors and political leadership are empowered to be the faces of the fight against Boko Haram and arrested Boko Haram suspects tried under Sharia law
• This could immediately address the conspiracy theory prevalent in the north that Jonathan is sponsoring the sect either to make Islam look bad or to depopulate the north ahead of 2015 or that he is not doing enough to fight the insurgents because it is not ‘his people’ that are being killed. In essence the Northern political leadership being made the face of the campaign against Boko Haram will give them full ownership and responsibility for the fight against terrorism in the region. Also trying arrested suspected Boko Haram insurgents under Sharia law could convince them that their trial is not a Western conspiracy against them and Islam since the insurgents have openly rejected Western civilization, including its jurisprudence.

• Though this option appears to hold a good promise of leading to the abatement of the conflict in the short term, there are flipsides to it: Will the rest of the country accept it if (a) the insurgents are tried under Sharia and not found guilty? (b) If the northern political leadership recommends a generous amnesty programme for the insurgents along the lines of what the Niger Delta militants received? © If the northern political leadership tries its best but is unable to capture leading members of the sect or stem the tide of the conflict?

Scenario 2: Boko Haram accelerates and widens the conflict
It is possible for the Boko Haram conflict to grow far worse than it is now. This trend could happen under at least four possible scenarios.

(a) If Boko Haram unleashes attacks in any of the southern states and it leads to massive retaliatory responses
• This scenario could throw ethnicity and regional clashes into the boiling pot, widening the conflict and possibly turning Boko Haram and other insurgency groups in the country into de facto regional and ethnic armies.
• (b) If Boko Haram chooses to outsource its terrorism to Fulani herdsmen or infiltrates them.

This could lead to their operations spreading to other parts of the country beyond the northeast up to the south.  The good news here however is that even if this happens, Boko Haram will lack the critical local infrastructure to sustain its terrorism in the south – as it has done in the north-east.
• (c) If the United States and Europe become the faces of the fight against the insurgents. Anti-Western sentiments could galvanize, turning into support for the terrorists if Western countries are made the faces of the fight against terrorism in the country, especially if their involvement results in massive deaths of the insurgents and non-combatants.
• (d)If President Jonathan wins the 2015 election, especially if there is a feeling that he rigged himself to power. This option could harden the political discontents in the north, further feeding the Boko Haram terrorists the oxygen to continue and possibly widen their insurgency. It is important to underline that the notion of ‘free and fair election in Nigeria is largely subjective. Election is deemed ‘free and fair’ only if one’s preferred candidate is declared the winner.
(Adapted from a presentation to the executives of Chevron, Lekki, Lagos, 7 June 2014)