Presidential race prediction: A math model

The 35 million votes, he contended, could be clinched by APC and Gen. Buhari in 2015 on account of the votes being domiciled in APC controlled states.  Kano and Lagos states, for example, have a combined voting population of 11.1 million. In 2011, we had 73.5 million voters nationwide, thus Lagos and Kano controlled 15% […]

The 35 million votes, he contended, could be clinched by APC and Gen. Buhari in 2015 on account of the votes being domiciled in APC controlled states.
 Kano and Lagos states, for example, have a combined voting population of 11.1 million. In 2011, we had 73.5 million voters nationwide, thus Lagos and Kano controlled 15% of the nation’s votes. Surprisingly in Kano State, out of its five million voters, 2.4 million of them didn’t vote – that is, almost half the voters didn’t show. The case of Lagos was even more instructive.  Of its six million voters, only about two million of them came out to vote, leaving 4.1 million voters who elected to sit on their couches to watch TV.   After the cleaning of the register by INEC, we now have 68,833,476 voters in Nigeria.
The thesis, dear reader, and the point Dele Momodu labored to make last year, is that undecided voters are a big factor in 2015. Today’s column therefore extends the argument by devising a simple math model to force the wild numbers (which were all over the place) to behave; and to facilitate ease of understanding and analysis.
Seeing that Dele Momodu wrote his insightful column of last October in “search of mathematicians,” a disclosure of sorts is in order.  I’m not a mathematician.  Neither can I gather sufficient arrogance to assert myself a student of mathematics.  What I do know, however, is how to create a math model – even though a simple one.  
Do not mind its simplicity however.  “In principle, it matters not whether the math methods employed to carry out math proof are simple,” wrote William J. Adams, author of ‘Slippery Math in Public Affairs’, “or the ultimate in technical sophistication.”
In doing this, I do not guarantee reality, only validity.  That is, a promise of (a perfect) accuracy of the prediction of voter behaviour is neither explicitly nor tacitly claimed.  Based on my postulates (a crystallization of my assumptions) however, my theorems (conclusions) are valid.  Another person could bring forth a different set of postulates (the hypothesis) and reach conclusions that are different from mine – keeping in mind the RIRO (if realistic input, realistic output) and the NINO (nonsense in, nonsense out).
Now that I’ve turned in my excuse early, let’s move on to the model.  First we’ll start with the postulates; in logic, rhetoric or argument, these would be called premises.  The theorems or conclusions followed the postulates. The theorems are drawn based on the postulates.
The Postulates
Postulate 1: Factors which influenced election victory have not changed since 2011 except in the Southwest.  Such factors are: PDP’s ability to rig (I refer you to Captain Sagir’s exposé on Ekiti election), voting based on ethnicity and religion and PDP’s control of security agents.
Postulate 2: Buhari will win the states he won in 2011 and PDP will win the states it won in 2011 except in the Southwest and Kwara State.
Postulate 3: Undecided voters (defined as those who didn’t vote in 2011) will vote in 2015.
Postulate 4: The undecided voters will vote according to the states the PDP and the opposition parties won in 2011, except in the Southwest.
Postulate 5: All eligible voters will collect their permanent voter’s card (PVC) before the deadline and will vote.
Postulate 6: Jonathan will not get 25% of votes from Northwest and from Niger State.
Postulate P: Other factors that may play a role in the result of the election are not being considered.
 Theorems
Theorem 1: Jonathan will win all the states in the Southeast (7,665,859) and South-south (11,133,620) and Northcentral (6,610,827) except Niger State (2,014,317) and Kwara State (1,142,267), giving him a total of 25,410,306.
Theorem 2: Gen. Buhari will win all the states of the Northwest (17,620,436), all the states of the Southwest (13,731,090), Niger (2,014,317) and Kwara (1,142,267) states from Northcentral and all the states of the Northeast (6,208,197) except Taraba (1,340,652) and Adamawa (1,559,012) where he’ll share the votes with Jonathan; giving Buhari a total of  40, 716,307 votes.
Theorem 3: Gen Buhari will win the election with popular votes from 19 states or the equivalent of 40 million votes in percentage which is 59% of the votes.
Explanations
This looks neat enough and makes mathematical sense.  If you grant my postulates P1 through P6 and PP, you must also grant my theorems T1 through T3 as valid consequences of them. T1 follows from P1, P3, P4 and P5.  T2 follows from P2, P3, P4, P5 and P6. T3 follows from T1 and T2.
Postulate P states that other factors are not being considered.  But what other factors?  For a critical consumption of this model, let’s plainly state the factors.
F 1:  Boko Haram is not going to have as much sway on the voting patterns of the Northeastern states with a sizeable population of Christians.  That is, except you’re one of the parents of the Chibok girls, people who voted for Jonathan in 2011 from Northeast are likely to do so again – regardless of the Boko Haram phenomenon.  Thus, Boko Haram is not being considered for some of the Northeastern states.  Let me give one example.  Just before INEC postponed elections, an employee of one the firms I consult for told me that he was going to his village in Adamawa State.  Why?  To convince his people (who were set on voting Jonathan again) to reconsider.  “Why do they want to vote Jonathan?” I asked.  “They said Buhari is a Muslim fanatic, so it’s better to vote Jonathan who is a Christian.”
This man’s family, the people he was going to convince, has lost six individual members to the Boko Haram crisis.  Jonathan is not blamed for starting Boko Haram, but it is unanimous that he’s handled it in the worst way possible.  Yet, people who were subjected to many traumatic days due to the crisis enacted by Jonathan’s government and Boko Haram still want to vote for him.  They were sent away from their homes, they slept in the bush and they lost family members.  
Indeed, this man’s family actually believed they needed to be convinced to vote otherwise.  When he told them why he was coming, they said: “we’re waiting.”  I know one case study is not  enough to generalize or discard BH as a factor, but those who think the religious tool PDP used in 2011 can no longer sway should think again.
F 2: In this model, the merger of opposition parties to form APC is not a factor.  The merger affords APC the wherewithal to contest elections more effectively, but it matters little in making up people’s mind.  For example, in the Southwest, people are going to vote out Jonathan not because APC now controls their states but on account of the awful way Jonathan treated them – it’s like he’s telling them you matter little more than a dead rat.
Other factors abound – but they’re also not being considered.  If you disagree with this model – I know many will – at least use it as a template and write your own.