Rethinking approach to peace in Afghanistan

The publication of Afghanistan in the Balance by the School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, Canada is a notable contribution to studies on how to achieve a stable Afghanistan in light of its history and many complexities that result in it being viewed as the graveyard of empires. Edited by Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Sven Bernhard Gareis […]

The publication of Afghanistan in the Balance by the School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, Canada is a notable contribution to studies on how to achieve a stable Afghanistan in light of its history and many complexities that result in it being viewed as the graveyard of empires. Edited by Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Sven Bernhard Gareis and Charles Pentland, the book brings together a group of reputable scholars and researchers based largely in Europe, several of whom are leading experts in their field.

The editorial team has done an outstanding job of bringing together this codified collection of papers presented at the international conference held in Hamburg, Germany in 2010 on the challenging task of making Afghanistan work for the better since the collapse of the Taliban’s rule. The work is analytical and provides an honest assessment of the current US/NATO intervention in Afghanistan. This publication should therefore be of use to global policy makers as it aids in the evaluation of actions in both war-torn Afghanistan and other countries on the brink of collapse due to terrorism and insurgency.
Afghanistan in the Balance is divided into three sections: Counter insurgency, Comprehensive Approach, and Political Order and covers a wide range of topics, as well as a lengthy, edifying, introduction that covers the essence of the book. Thus one of the strengths of this work is its approach to the analysis of counter-insurgency [COIN]; the role of the NGOs in peace building in Afghanistan; security sector reform, the impact of Afghanistan’s neighbours; regional power play; among other topical, multi-dimensional issues. Each of the 13 chapters has been well written with smooth transitions from one chapter to the next.
It is not an exaggeration to say that Afghanistan has become a thorn in the eyes of the international community. The country is at the crossroads of war and peace; a ‘distressing assessment’ by every standard (p.1). To understand the place of Afghanistan in politics of war and peace is to first appreciate the ‘complexity of stabilization and peace-building in war-torn countries,’ and it began with the simplification of eliminating the Taliban without recourse to identifying the many tentacles aiding the destabilization of weaker states, such as Afghanistan as in this context (p. 7). The book begins by addressing the interests of neighbouring states. No doubt neighbour countries such as Pakistan, India, and Iran feel they have something at stake should they allow the “wrong” side to take over powers in Afghanistan. They know the “great game” well and will not relent either. These problems are also faced by the US and NATO. With the fall of the Taliban each group was nervous about potential outcomes, especially those who had been involved for quite some time. Consequently, the first law of this war is for NATO to seek cooperation from countries neighbouring Afghanistan and apply the best strategy. For, ‘insurgency needs to be fought using COIN tactics’ (p.13).
The book brings to light the nature of Afghan society after the fall of Kabul when the International Security Assistance Force’s strike began in the wake of 9/11. The first daunting task requires winning the hearts and minds of ordinary Afghans who have, in some remote areas, become sympathetic to the insurgents. To date the election that brought Hamid Karzai to power is seen as fraudulent and this enmeshes his government in ‘a growing legitimacy crisis’ (p.20); which poses the question of whether world powers will ever learn their lessons from this deliberate mistake. It is similar to the situation in Africa where democracy is left in the hands of manipulators so long as they are in the good book of the powers-that-be. In a crisis situation the legitimacy of rulers in the eyes of the locals should be paramount. The adventures of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan should serve as a perfect lesson for intervention in Afghanistan. There are other problems with wanting a mere huge Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) which comes with “insider attacks” from the same personnel meant to usher in culture of law and order, coupled with corruption from within, among other accusations (p.23).
One of the stronger arguments made in Afghanistan in the Balance is that the importance of a proactive police force ‘has been overlooked,’ an oversight that prompted the Canadian forces to mentor and to train them (p.44). Military operations have been criticized for being ‘surprisingly blurred,’ and, as this example shows, they are not sufficient. Furthermore, that effort should take into consideration ‘broad range of needs in a hostile environment’ in order to win the war (p. 70). The book discusses again the need to ‘re-orient the development agenda to the needs of the local people’ (p.80). This is, indeed, important to prevent the insurgents from discrediting aid and the aid workers as legitimate target for attack.      
Afghanistan in the Balance perceptively criticizes the attitude of key players in Afghanistan when it argues that ‘states engaged as donors and troops contributors in Afghanistan go far beyond what most NGOs can tolerate’ (p.85). This is true when the attitude of the donor countries is looked at because they (i.e. the donor countries) refuse to allow the NGOs assiduously working in Afghanistan to be free from their dictate. Why not involve Afghanis in remote areas and other personnel from Muslim-dominated countries so that it appeals to sensibilities of the local Afghans? Hence the book advocates the need to apply ‘traditional mechanism for resolving disputes, such as the community or tribal councils of elders’ (p.91). Afghanistan is a traditional society and any effort to deliberately set aside traditional institutions and values as “archaic” and “not modern” will be disastrous.
The authors’ findings are that Afghanistan cannot be stable without economic prospect and that neighbouring countries are key players in development. If Afghanistan’s proxy war could be contained, all will certainly be well and the desirability of deinstitutionalizing it from being a front-line state in the most recent US’s foreign policy. Central Asian countries close to Afghanistan need to understand that there is no alternative to peace. Even if they have divergent interests, as suggested by one of the publications strongest arguments: ‘these interests should become part of the international action to “win the peace” in Afghanistan’ (p.181). Whether or not Afghanistan will continue to be the graveyard of empires depends on factors such as the need to rethink the counterinsurgency approach. It is a fatal mistake to try to subsume Afghanistan by “force” into the liberal order. What the authors overlook, however, is that it is imperative to leave Afghanistan with its traditional set-up. There is also failure to discuss the appropriate, or exact, time for US/NATO’s withdrawal, which means there is no clear plan for intervention.
The authors of Afghanistan in the Balance’s show genuine concern and the publication should be regarded as a strong example of how to bring the much needed peace and development to Afghanistan.
This review was first published by the Academic Council on the United Nations System,http://acuns.org/review-of-afghanistan-in-the-balance/