Stalemate over extension of emergency measures

Even the Senate is divided over whether to approve President Goodluck Jonathan’s request to extend the measures, for the third time, when they expired on November 21. The three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, which have borne the brunt of the festering insurgency of Boko Haram, in response to which the measures were taken, […]

Even the Senate is divided over whether to approve President Goodluck Jonathan’s request to extend the measures, for the third time, when they expired on November 21. The three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, which have borne the brunt of the festering insurgency of Boko Haram, in response to which the measures were taken, are still nowhere getting the stability that was envisaged for them.  The impasse in the Senate came in spite of several days of deliberation, including a closed-door session with Nigeria’s service chiefs.
President Jonathan first declared a state of emergency in the three states on May 13, 2013, following a request by the military brass who claimed that it would assist soldiers in the field to win the war against Boko Haram. After the expiration of the first six months’ run in November 2013, an extension was obtained from the National Assembly in line with Constitutional provisions. In May 2014, a second extension was also granted the military to complete its mission of defeating the insurgency and restoring normalcy in the affected states.  
 However after 18 months of the emergency measures being in place, rather driving than out the insurgents, the soldiers were losing territory after territory to them. The insurgency has taken a more virulent character and intensity, with the killing of hundreds in their path and displacement of hundreds of thousands more.
The debate has now degenerated into a question of whether the emergency measures had been useful; indeed, there is a growing perception that they may in fact have aided the insurgents. At one point, there were talks, even among the president’s closest advisers and confidants, on whether the rule should not include sacking the elected governors and legislatures of the three states. The suspicions that this engendered has, not surprisingly, swelled the ranks of the opponents of extension of the emergency measures.
The result is that the process has needlessly-and dangerously-been politicised.
The purpose of any emergency measure is to provide a framework for the suspension of certain basic rights in order to enable the military or any designated group to carry out a redemptive mission. It is usually applied during periods of natural or, as in this case, an insurgency that is threatening the foundation of the state.
In executing the measures, among other effects are the restriction of movements at designated periods of the day, as well as confinement of the populace to certain locations. In his explanation of the rationale for the state of emergency, Jonathan stated that its application was to avail the military the liberty to have increased control of the theatre of war for unimpeded operation.
This expectation has not been met; the opponents point out that emergency measures have done more harm than good. According to one of the Senators representing Borno State, Mohamed Ali Ndume, the measures have only worked to the advantage of the insurgents who often strike when the residents of the communities would be confined to their homes. He and other opponents believe that without emergency rule the people would feel freer to ‘properly’ respond to attacks by Boko Haram insurgents, including liaising with the military in this respect.
This unfortunate scenario has raised questions regarding the effec-tiveness of the anti-terrorism strategy of government, since the almost total reliance on emergency measures has so far not yielded the expected outcome. While the ferocity of attacks by the insurgents and their indiscriminate mode of operation have attracted widespread revulsion, the military is yet to upgrade its efforts, traditionally disposed to conventional warfare, to resolve this asymmetrical engagement with a determined enemy.
To win this war would require a shift in the disposition of the military establishment to fighting it. Stripped of whatever advantage the emergency measures would have provided, the military needs to re-strategise, even reviewing its deployment of assets, including motivation of the troops on ground. In any case, the president has other powers in the Constitution he can draw on to deploy troops to war.  
The Nigerian military, which has earned global acclaim for quelling insurgency situations in various parts of the world, cannot afford to perform less at home. The Commander in Chief should live up to his pledge ‘to do everything’ within his power to defeat the insurgency.