State police in Nigeria: Is it for North’s strategic interest?
When I was growing up, my father used to narrate to me the ignoble stories of the Native Authority police brutal attacks against the NEPU activists in 1950s and 1960s. The regional police forces were weaponised against political opponents. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the dominant party in the region, often used the Native Authority […]
When I was growing up, my father used to narrate to me the ignoble stories of the Native Authority police brutal attacks against the NEPU activists in 1950s and 1960s. The regional police forces were weaponised against political opponents. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC), the dominant party in the region, often used the Native Authority police to suppress the activities of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), the opposition party rooted in Kano.
The stories had many episodes: rallies were broken up violently, prominent activists like Abba Maikwaru, Bello Ijumu, and Lawan Dambazau, were imprisoned or intimidated, and party meetings were regularly infiltrated or banned. The Native Authority police acted not as neutral law enforcement agents but as enforcers of the ruling party’s dominance.
Similarly, in the Western Region, the local police played a notorious role in escalating the political crisis of the 1960s by aiding one faction of the Action Group against the other. The fear of such manipulation was part of what led to the eventual centralised police control.
In addition, based on recent experiences, we must be cautiously optimistic about the State Police Force. Let me share four concerns. The current power tussle about the installation of the emir of Kano brings to fore the danger of wrong control or manipulation of police force. There are many examples whereby instruction from the state governor were either ignored or countered by order from Abuja. We have similar experiences in Rivers State – where the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) was used against the interest of the state governor.
Another important consideration is the possibility of infiltration or control of the state police by successionists or terrorists elements. There is also the important matter of adequate funding of a professional State Police Force. For example, based on the recent GDP estimates; Yobe, Gombe and Zamfara States are the poorest of the poor in Nigeria. Even poor neighbours are disdainfully calling them poor. How could such financially challenged states fund their police force?
The major cost of running the police force is the salaries/benefits for personnel. There are also expenses for equipment, healthcare, retirement, and other benefits. This must be carefully considered. If a state doesn’t pay teachers, they simply engage in private extra lessons. If it doesn’t pay its police forces, will they engage in private “extra-policing” and serve as coercion forces for the highest bidders?
These are part of the reasons why the recent move to legislate the establishment of state police in Nigeria has stirred both optimism and apprehension in my mind. I am not alone. I could guess that many across the federation have similar emotions. On the surface, the decentralisation of the police force appears to be a welcome reform—one that promises enhanced security, faster response times, and a policing structure more attuned to local realities. Yet beneath this seemingly progressive step lies the shadow of Nigeria’s political history, marked by the abuse of regional police for partisan and ethnic domination.
In a nation still grappling with weak democratic institutions, patronage politics, and ethnic tensions, granting state governments the authority to establish and control police units must be approached with utmost caution. Without rigorous safeguards, Nigeria risks repeating a dark chapter of its political history.
Federal systems around the world offer instructive lessons on both the benefits and dangers of decentralised policing. In the United States, for instance, the existence of state and local police forces allows for more community-focused law enforcement. Yet, the system is not without its flaws. The selective enforcement of laws and political interference continue to challenge American policing.
Similarly, in India—another vast, diverse federation—state police forces are frequently accused of being instruments in the hands of state leaders. In some cases, chief ministers have reportedly used police to intimidate critics or suppress protests. However, India also provides an important model: the presence of independent investigative bodies like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the judiciary’s oversight role, and media vigilance have, at times, curbed the excesses of state power. South Africa offers a hybrid model where provincial premiers have limited oversight roles over the police, but the actual control lies with national structures. This aims to balance local relevance with centralised accountability. If Nigeria must embrace state police, we must do so with our eyes wide open.
Based on our bad experiences and good practices in other countries, how do we ensure that the state police force doesn’t become a weapon of tyranny and serves the strategic interest of the North? A short answer is that the legislation should include iron-clad constitutional clauses and oversight mechanisms that prevent abuse.
For a longer answer, let me propose six areas to strengthen the legislation: (1) Independent Oversight Bodies: Each state police force must be overseen by an independent police service commission that includes members of civil society, the judiciary, and federal representation. (2) Uniform Standards and Training: National minimum standards for training, ethics, and conduct should be established and enforced by a reformed federal police oversight agency. (3) Inter-State Accountability Mechanisms: A framework allowing federal authorities and other states to intervene when state police are found to be violating rights or undermining national security. (4) Judicial Recourse and Federal Review: Citizens must have access to courts and federal human rights institutions in cases of police misconduct, especially politically motivated arrests or harassment. (5) Political Non-Interference Clauses: State governors should not have unilateral powers over police appointments or operations. Appointments must be ratified by state legislature and subject to public scrutiny. (6) Periodic Audits: Annual audits of the operations, personnel conduct, and financial records of state police forces should be mandatory, with reports submitted to both state and federal legislative bodies.
The case for state police is not without merit—especially in a country as large and diverse as Nigeria. Insecurity continues to undermine development, and a locally empowered police system may indeed enhance responsiveness and trust. But, as we have experienced recently in the country, particularly in Kano and Rivers States, Nigeria Police’s interventions left the situations more chaotic.
Chaos, when divided into smaller units of chaos, becomes more chaotic. Therefore, any move toward decentralization must be matched with vigilance, transparency, and the political will to protect democracy. State police could become a milestone in Nigeria’s democratic development—or a slippery slope toward regional tyranny. The difference will be made not by the law alone, but by the safeguards we demand and the institutions we build to uphold them.
El-Yakubu is a Professor of Chemical Engineering at Ahmadu Bello University [email protected]