The Kala/Balge pushback against insurgents
In a sustained battle lasting many hours, the poorly armed but obviously determined villagers succeeded in beating back the attack. According to various accounts of that encounter, the villagers had got wind of an impending attack by the insurgents, and prepared for them. The insurgents suffered heavy losses, with reports putting the death toll at […]
In a sustained battle lasting many hours, the poorly armed but obviously determined villagers succeeded in beating back the attack. According to various accounts of that encounter, the villagers had got wind of an impending attack by the insurgents, and prepared for them. The insurgents suffered heavy losses, with reports putting the death toll at over 200. It was the second such reported occasion that the Rann residents, wielding rustic weapons like Dane guns, bows and arrows, catapults and sticks, and every other object they could lay their hands on, would confront the insurgents and come out of it triumphant.
By standing up to the insurgents, the people of Rann have displayed exceptional heroism thereby demonstrating that rather than cower helplessly in the face of a brutal enemy, communities willing to make the supreme sacrifice in order to keep their communities safe can confront and defeat the insurgents. Ironically a few days earlier, elements of Boko Haram had attacked Gamboru, a neighbouring town close to the Lake Chad like Rann, where they had indiscriminately burnt houses, killed 400 people and destroyed some 300 vehicles and 650 motorcycles with little or no resistance. It may well be therefore that, having seen the devastation wreaked by Boko Haram in Gamboru, the Rann people resolved to give the insurgents a piece of their medicine through organising and resisting the incursions in order to protect and safeguard their own abodes rather than submit to the insurgents’ mad mission. So far, they have been able to stave off further onslaughts.
The Rann example is a tempting template to recommend to other towns and villages across the North East region that had hitherto allowed the Boko Haram free rein, despite the presence of soldiers deployed there under emergency measures that have entered its second year. But these villagers would need organisation and backup by regular forces on the ground, much like the Civilian JTF that sprang up in Maiduguri sometime ago to confront Boko Haram. The Rann episode was actually a re-enactment of a defensive practice that has always been prevalent in towns and villages across the country, activated when an enemy threatens the entire community. It is a re-enactment that readily commends itself to other places, whether or not they have suffered from the insurgents’ furious attacks.
The fact that communities should replicate the Rann effort at self-defence is even more apposite at this time when allegations are rife, hotly disputed by Army Headquarters but persistent in eyewitness accounts, that normal security personnel deployed there often ignore prior warnings of the impending attacks by insurgents, causing the people to be left to their own devices and sitting ducks, defenceless. Without doubt, such effort at community-level self-defence would raise awareness at the grassroots that the continuous peace and safety of the community is the responsibility of everyone in the community, which in turn would heighten the awareness-and civic duty- of fishing out antisocial elements in the community and bringing them to the notice of the relevant authorities for appropriate action. Surely, all of which in the end would expedite the process of finding a lasting solution to the nightmare of the insurgency that prevails among citizens now.
The nature and modality of community attempt at keeping insurgency at bay should be worked out so as to complement, not replace, the efforts of the regular security organs whose function it is to restore the peace that has been shattered by Boko Haram and maintain law and order. This should be so in order for it to be seen not as an encroachment on duties of the security arms of government, but rather as a necessity in the difficult and dangerous battle to wipe out the menace of the insurgency.