The Kano Standard

People of the ancient and thriving civilization of Kano, who  are not famous for their modesty, have a trademark self-adulation that reminds everyone that  Kano  is better at everything. History of Hausaland and much of the Sahel will vindicate this boast, right up to the last four decades. Kano had  been the engine room of […]

The Kano Standard
The Kano Standard

People of the ancient and thriving civilization of Kano, who  are not famous for their modesty, have a trademark self-adulation that reminds everyone that  Kano  is better at everything. History of Hausaland and much of the Sahel will vindicate this boast, right up to the last four decades. Kano had  been the engine room of growth and development in the North and Nigeria. It had kept the basic and the splendid elements  of Hausa culture and Islamic traditions insulated from the assaults of western and other influences, and was strong enough to assimilate every other stranger element that made it its home. In truth, however, Kano’s problems and challenges, like its assets and qualities, have always outgrown everyone else’s.

In the last four decades, Kano had been the epicenter  of the dramatic de-industrialization on the North and the decline of the Northern economy. Its social problems have  grown in inverse proportion to the decline in its economic assets. Its massive, growing  population is more of a liability than an asset. The legendary enterprise and ingenuity of the Kanawa is fast becoming history. Its deep roots in popular politics have been kidnapped by the insidious, crippling tendencies of the nation’s current partisan politics. Kano never does anything in small doses, and it is currently in the midst of crises that would measure up to the usual  Kano standard.

It is not entirely new, this current clash between change and resistance to it, but it is being waged in a context that is poorly structured to resolve it and return Kano to its most distinguishing  characteristic: changing to remain the same. Some popular narratives  cling to the half-truth that Kano has preserved a 1,000 year history of traditional authority manifested today in the rule  of Sarki Muhammadu Sanusi II. This is a myth that can be empirically challenged by many developments that  have all contributed in giving Kano Emirate its contemporary hue: the pre-Jihad contests for power, the epochal nature of the Jihad itself, endemic threats and instability at the levels of ruling elite and the varying powers of the peasantry, the redefining influence of colonization, and its fortunes and shape in the hands of the post-colonial political elite. What is historically correct is that there has been a Sarkin Kano for 1,000 years, but his territory and its power and administrative structures have undergone continuous changes and transformations, such that it is correct to say that the only constant in the history of Kano is the unbroken existence of the Sarkin Kano throughout its history. Those who equate changes with destroying an institution offend history.

There is another half-truth. This one champions the idea that political authority which has shifted away from the Emir to  the colonizing power, and then increasingly to its successor, the Nigerian political elite, has reduced the Emir and his authority to an institution that has only a marginal cultural relevance, a political nuisance and pawn  that can be used, tolerated or abused as the need arises. The legal subordination of the Emirate system under political authority has certainly denied it significant powers  to govern, but is not without substance and meaning in the lives of the non-elite in particular. In Kano, royalty symbolizes a survival of history, and generates the type of respect and veneration which the politician would love to have. Long after Ganduje is done, there will be Sarkin Kano, even if it is not Sanusi11 and an Emirate in one form or the other.

We are dealing with a problem designed  to create conflicts. The Emir and the governor occupy the same political space, and their relationship is pre-eminently political. On paper, the  Emir has a number of choices. He could, as most do, submit totally to political authority. This option gives him relative safety from  harassment and bullying by politicians with small ego, as well as the comfort that he could out-live  the temporary nature of the presence of a particular, overbearing  political level. He could also negotiate a little more space by becoming more involved  as an appendage of the partisan political level, although this carries with it the risk  of a backlash from unstable political dynamics and even loyal quarters that have firm views on appropriate behaviour from royalty. Or he  could choose to encroach into the  space available to the political level by being overtly political, patently partisan or re-writing the rulebook on appropriate behaviour by royalty. This option is guaranteed to institutionalize permanent tension and hostility between the political level which has legal power to hurt traditional authority, and a traditional authority that thinks it can walk on both sides of the street.

Kano represents  a worst-case scenario today: an Emir with his own manual on appropriate conduct, and a Governor who feels insecure  and because he does not appear to have the complete space he desires to be comfortable. The matter is made worse because that space is  determined by partisan political competition, an issue that assumes the traditional Kano dimension: bitterly competitive, all-consuming and dangerously destructive. Earlier skirmishes had exposed the vulnerabilities and advantages of the two powerful people playing out an old game for  which Sarki Sanusi’s grandfather lost the throne and was exiled, and a former governor of the state, late Abubakar Rimi burnt his fingers and a lot more in an attempt to humiliate late Sarkin Kano Ado Bayero, and had his decisions instantly reversed by the man who defeated him.

Governor Ganduje is embarking on political engineering that has  the potential to weaken the extensive influence of Sarkin Kano over his Emirate. He has appointed new Emirs, some in places with  historical antecedents, others reflecting perverse intentions to overturn all known parameters of received wisdom. He is deepening enmity within the same ruling family, buying loyalty and cultivating support by pitching brothers against each other. He is behaving like the monkey who just found out how to light matches, removing geriatrics who have hallowed roles in the traditions of king-making and leadership; inverting hierarchy at spectacular levels and scale which can only shock and humiliate; making IDPs out of respected title-holders, and is behaving as if the end game is the ultimate removal of the Sarkin Kano. He stands on thin ground because he shows no evidence that his actions are founded on wide, popular support. In two years’ time, he will be negotiating life outside the Governor’s office.

On the face of it, he has powers to mutilate the Kano emirate system to his heart’s satisfaction. His rationale will be that he has the law on his side and the political imperative  to keep a visible, interested and unusual Emir out of the power equation permanently. There is a long queue in the courts challenging his understanding of his powers, but the judicial process will most likely not resolve a matter that is at the heart of the hybrid systems we run in this country. Few are willing to admit it, but the 2019 and 2023  elections are at the heart of this crisis. Unlike electoral contests, this will be  one where no winner can take all.

No one in Kano is indifferent to this quarrel, so there is a scramble to invent support to show that the Governor’s high stakes antics are popular,  and a major realignment of forces to resist what is seen as a reckless abuse of office by Ganduje is in the making. Kano politics will wear a new coat of paint, no matter what happens. It is very unlikely that the  Emirship of Kano will ever be free from the stain or stamp of political partisanship, and this will influence much of the flurry of mediation efforts rushing the stop further damage. No outcome will satisfy any of the parties entirely, and this looks like a battle that will be fought many times in the future.

Consistent with the scale of this crisis, solutions, at least for now, will need to be bold and imaginative. They may have to involve tinkering with some decisions of the governor  to restructure the Kano Emirate, and revisiting other decisions that  serve the only purpose of feeding the perception that he is  fighting an enemy to settle narrow, personal scores. It will involve a strong influence on Sarki Sanusi to be loyal to the throne he sits on, by learning the virtues of dignified discretion and avoiding reactions from politicians that merely desecrate the dignity of his inheritance and a great asset of the people. Partisan politics has eaten too deeply into every facet in the lives of Kano people. Somehow, they will have to find a way of limiting its tendency to corrupt everything it touches. The search for good leaders who will appreciate their history and current mission is a major priority for the entire North and Nigeria. In Kano, the search for the key to a secure and dignified future starts now.