The Military Should Not Allow This

This is in spite of the commitment of huge resources, in men and materials, and the declaration of a state of emergency in the area by the Federal Government. That is why reports of apparent mutiny by soldiers deployed there to defeat the insurgency by the Boko Haram sect are disturbing, to put it mildly. […]

This is in spite of the commitment of huge resources, in men and materials, and the declaration of a state of emergency in the area by the Federal Government. That is why reports of apparent mutiny by soldiers deployed there to defeat the insurgency by the Boko Haram sect are disturbing, to put it mildly. Many accounts from the area suggest that two units of soldiers at Maimalari Barracks in Maiduguri who were deployed to separate  operational locations in Danboa and Gwoza  Local Governments  Areas of Borno State, defied orders from their superior officers to engage the insurgents. They had mobilized out of the barracks, but stopped at the outskirts of the state capital Maiduguri, allegedly refusing to proceed further, unless they were provided adequate and better equipment to engage the Boko Haram insurgents.
The army understandably is reticent at characterising the soldiers’ conduct as mutiny, but recent warnings by the military’s top brass, including threats of firing squads, indicate that there is sufficient ground to worry.
 Some of the aggrieved soldiers claimed that their action was based on field experience that the Boko Haram insurgents had superior fighting equipment, some captured from the military. Besides, whenever they reported their handicaps, including lack of (or frustrating delay in the) payment of allowances, to superior officers, they would be threatened with charges of mutiny, they said.
This development came barely days after some related incidents that took place earlier, indicating a growing wave of malcontent among the troops prosecuting the counterinsurgency campaign in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. First, there was the case of soldiers shooting at Major General Abubakar Mohammed, then General Officer Commanding (GOC), venting their anger at the killing of four of their comrades, who they said were part of a poorly-equipped unit sent to deter Boko Haram. There was the embarrassing spectacle of the wives of soldiers demonstrating against what they said was the unjustified deployment of their ill-equipped husbands to certain death in the name of military service.
Expectedly, the military high command has reacted with anger, offering a cocktail of responses ranging from outright denial of the mutiny report, to threat of court martial for erring soldiers.  While the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Lt. General Kenneth Minimah warned of the extant statutory provision of execution for mutinous soldiers if found guilty, the spokesman of the Defence Headquarters, Major General Chris Olukolade spiritedly debunked the mutiny story, prompting a crackdown on the press for its reporting on the unfolding problem.
In recent times, the performance of the military with respect to the anti-terror campaign has come under intense scrutiny, not just locally, but in the international arena as well.  Some of the military’s tactics, not least the disposition of its high command towards reports of disaffection among the rank and file, have attracted widespread concern from critical sections of the society.  At least two former military officers, namely General Ibrahim Babangida, a former military head of state and General Theophilus Danjuma, former army chief and Minister of Defence, have publicly lamented the prolongation of the government’s declared war on terror. If nothing else, the massive toll on the affected communities in terms of loss of comfort, limbs, life and property to the insurgency, dictates that an early end to it be facilitated by all means.
Vile as mutiny is, it is indefensible that any soldier would allow himself to be misguided into acting as if engaging in mutinous conduct for any reason is answer to any grievance he might have. Mutiny in the military tradition is a serious act of betrayal bordering on sabotage and which in whatever form compromises the integrity as well as effectiveness of troops in action. Military service is a demanding call to duty with attendant high personal risk, which requires the unflinching commitment to discipline by its officers and troops for success.
 Hence mutiny by officers and troops appropriately attracts the grave penalty of summary execution, through a process of court-marshal. In handing down the warning over mutiny, General Minimah rightly advised chicken-hearted soldiers, whose perception of military service may be inappropriate, to quietly leave the service in their own interest.
Yet, beyond the misconduct of the erring troops lies the more profound issue of performance of Nigerian troops in the anti-insurgency campaign, with regard to their welfare and motivation. It is a trite consideration in military culture that a soldier fights on his stomach, training and weaponry, just as the protection of servicemen in action is equally cardinal.
The complement of incidents in what is effectively a theatre of war of which the mutiny is the latest, points to a conclusion that troops deployed there are dissenting for avoidable reasons. And the development is attracting terrible consequences.
 At last count, the Boko Haram insurgents occupied at least three local government headquarters in the region, imperiously hoisting their flag, to all intents and purposes, and claiming territory. The implications of such a development are not farfetched, which is the unacceptable scenario that two sovereign authorities now control parts of the nation’s territory. This is an intolerable affront to the nation and a serious challenge, not just to the armed forces and the government, but to all Nigerians too.
This is because the development, more than any other consideration, accentuates the public perception of the inability of the military to contain the insurgency. Again, it highlights a failure of strategy for doing the job. For the army, it illustrates an irony in which the performance of its personnel in international peacekeeping and related security operations is given superlative reviews but is condemned in actual combat at home. The situation therefore demands fresh thinking and a review of the win-the-war effort, giving intelligence primacy. The new thinking should also address the grounds for the unmistakably growing malcontent among the foot soldiers at that front.
Given the princely allocation of the national budget to security, and by implication the defence establishment, the issue of inadequate equipment for service personnel should not have been an issue.  Focus should be devoted 100 percent to removing the tumour that this insurgency cancer has grown into; internal squabbles among the armed forces should be smothered in order to achieve the ultimate objective quicker than the nation has so far witnessed.