The presidency and politics of ministerial nominees
There was a presidential nominee in the days of former President Olusegun Obasanjo who later became the Minister of Aviation. The senators promised trouble. Someone set them up to it. It’s all politics. In a situation where lawmakers promise embarrassment, presidents don’t show up in the ring. President Obasanjo withdrew somewhat strategically. Soldiers will always […]
There was a presidential nominee in the days of former President Olusegun Obasanjo who later became the Minister of Aviation. The senators promised trouble. Someone set them up to it. It’s all politics. In a situation where lawmakers promise embarrassment, presidents don’t show up in the ring. President Obasanjo withdrew somewhat strategically. Soldiers will always be soldiers. Then he walked the rope in the background. When his nominee showed up months later on the Senate floor, everyone chorused “Aye,” and the Senate president’s gavel sounded. The presidency won in the public eyes, the Senator, too, did not lose face. Dialogue was flogged as the reason for that new state of affairs. Lack of it was said to be the cause of the problem the other time; it is a good excuse any day, lack of dialogue. That didn’t happen in Obadiah Ando’s case.
There are examples in US politics of situations where the president knows well ahead who will be approved or thrown out among his nominees for cabinet positions. A couple of nominees were indeed thrown out – countable number on fingers in that country’s more than 200 years of political independence. But over the years, occupants of the White House learned to have their way in most cases where rejection was anticipated. One way they did this was to simply create new federal positions. When George Washington, the first president, took office in 1789, he made 120 nominations for diverse federal positions. When George W. Bush took office in 2001, he made more than 2,000, out of which there were Senate-confirmed appointments and direct appointments that require no senatorial input. Under conditions of a possible confrontation, the presidency sometimes nominates an obedient and uncontroversial candidate for a Senate-confirmed position. Meanwhile, the president may elevate lower-level positions, places his real choice there, and make him wield tremendous authority. For instance, in 2001, President George W. Bush directly appointed James Cason to be assistant deputy secretary of Agriculture. Bush’s father, President George H.W. Bush, had failed to have the Senate confirm Cason agriculture secretary during his tenure. The younger Bush thus circumvented the Senate by appointing Cason to a powerful position that did not require senate confirmation. It was a way out. All’s fair in war. The presidency had its way on that occasion, coming out strong, powerful; a thing it needed to project to the American public.
There is a thing about Senators that wield power of either accepting or rejecting a president’s nominee. It has been argued that the elected senators are the bastion of people’s will, the embodiment of democracy. So they are. But as things are playing in relation to the lawmakers in Abuja, the presidency and even the ruling party appear to come out worse off. The ruling party was shocked when its members in the House of Representatives deviated from party position and selected other candidates for themselves as leaders. That was a plus for the independence of the legislature, but a minus for the party position on a matter that the presidency must have been aware of.
There is this suspicion that the presidency chose to accept the House leadership because it wanted to avert a confrontation. There definitely would have been a confrontation. For political analysts, having lawmakers who get away with what happened in the House of Reps is a minus for power and prestige at the presidency. Public impressions and conclusions over such matters are crucial where the presidency wants a thing, and it fails to get it. And that raises another question: Why did Obadiah Ando debacle happen? Yes, the presidency withdrew his name at first. But it suddenly reappeared. Should the presidency have allowed itself to be persuaded that the nominee ought to get back on the list in order to be given a hearing on the senate floor after the initial withdrawal? And if the nominee would be allowed to return for screening at all, was it not possible to wait until full backroom consultations indicated that enough dialogue had taken place, and the nominee would sail through? Was the presidency’s ears in the National Assembly not sensitive enough to moods, and as such rendered counsel appropriately to avoid the embarrassment of a rejection on the senate floor? Whatever the answers may be, the point remains that the Obadiah Ando debacle was avoidable. It is one other disappointment too many for the presidency.
The implications of all this is the issue, however. And it surely is of concern to political watchers. For a time of defying the presidency across the land may come to be a game some may start to enjoy and regularly engage in. That is not tidy for this system at this time when diverse challenges requiring a strong presidency. And there is a concern that there may continue to be a list of events such as Obadiah Ando’s and as such, firmly plant the impression in the minds of Nigerians that their presidency is weak? There is no doubt that sound counsel, firm execution of positions on issues that will better project the power and the prestige of the presidency is needed at this point.
Ajibade, a Consultant, wrote from Abuja. [email protected]