The vindication of Victor Malu
By mid-term in 2001 the then deputy chairman of Senate Committee on Defence, Saidu Dansadau (ANPP, Zamfara) raised fundamental questions on Nigeria’s combat readiness because as he put it, “Obasanjo was unnecessarily underfunding the military”. Senator Dansadau further asserted that “duly appropriated sums are not released to unit, divisional and sector commanders” and gave the […]
By mid-term in 2001 the then deputy chairman of Senate Committee on Defence, Saidu Dansadau (ANPP, Zamfara) raised fundamental questions on Nigeria’s combat readiness because as he put it, “Obasanjo was unnecessarily underfunding the military”. Senator Dansadau further asserted that “duly appropriated sums are not released to unit, divisional and sector commanders” and gave the major instance of the 1999 supplementary budget, of the sum of N6.7b that was appropriated for Defence capital projects only N3b was eventually disbursed and how in the 2000 fiscal year the National Assembly allocate 9b naira capital projects with only N6b in the long run expended. The Ikeja cantonment blasts also around the period under review were no doubt a direct consequence of such financial malevolence.
It was under these parlous circumstances President Obasanjo fell out with his pioneer Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Gen. Victor Malu. The main bone of contention was not interestingly over duly appropriated sums but on the level and extent of Pentagon’s reform program for the Nigerian military establishment. Reportedly the American resource persons insisted on perusing the Nigerian Army’s “contingency plans” and required unfettered access to our strategic military locations. On both demands General Malu publicly declared in March 2001 that the said plans were “exclusive to Nigerians only” and “that a friend today can be an enemy tomorrow”. All Malu was canvassing for was a truly national army with a deep sense of purpose and that only from within can any army properly reform.
Since the main thrust Pentagon’s training program was on “peace-keeping operations” with such handouts as “introduction to soldiering”. Malu’s then immediate boss and Chief of Defence Staff, Vice Admiral Ibrahim Ogohi told a visiting US Air War College delegation to his office that “what Nigeria needs is logistic support and not training”. Ogohi was retired the same day as Malu month later in April 2001.
Beyond the monstrous clash of egos between Obasanjo and Malu the Nigerian military is a victim of its own self-inflicted segregation. The systematic discrimination prevalent in its officer corps between “regular combatants”, “short service” and “non-combatant regular officers” has over the decades taken its toll on camaraderie, established competing fiefdoms and created “constituencies” that has undermined esprit de corps and consequently instituted a skewed reward system.
Nigeria’s generals in and out of office have amassed gargantuan power bases and have even deeply penetrated into the terrain of its rival political class. Today there is a burgeoning narcissist military class in Nigeria. It is not uncommon to find the serving officer son of a retired Major-General marrying into the family of a serving Rear Admiral or Air Marshall and so on. Nigeria’s exclusive clubs of generals many of them “barracks boys” by background have therefore been passing their accumulated wealth and connections to their children. A one-time chairman of the behemoth 2nd Republic NPN (1979-1983) Chief Adisa Akinloye even stated that there were 3 parties in Nigeria- ‘The NPN, the army and other political parties” and according to Col Abubakar Dangiwa Umar (rtd) “not less than 20% of our security manpower is deployed for duties as guards and servants (batmen) to non-serving and retired officers and their spouses”.
While in office Malu had his army buddies as active policy makers and even serving senators. The then president, his Defence minister, Chief of Staff, NSA and SSS chief spook were also all retired generals but nevertheless newly initiated politicians of the same political hue. By taking into consideration Field Marshall Erwin Rommel’s dictum “military education is easier than re-education” this impressive array of obviously patriotic generals no doubt committed class suicide by the lack of being politically adroit in oversight. Or so it seems.
What exactly are the benchmark achievements of Pentagon’s peace-keeping re-training program? Perhaps only former president Obasanjo can answer that since reportedly the “ officials of the Ministry of Defence were not involved in the initial negotiations between Nigeria and the US for the executive military agreement and the service chiefs had no input into the syllabus and doctrinal content of the otherwise well intentioned training program”. What of the current spike in court martial proceedings for mutiny, cowardice, desertion and gross dereliction of duty? Perhaps only President Goodluck Jonathan can also answer that, since it’s now his call, having recently cancelled yet another training programme to be offered by the Pentagon.
Does a truly national army with a deep sense of purpose need an abundance of supplies or even technologically enhanced hardware? During the Vietnam War General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietcong military commander “had no trucks to carry supplies and his communication was 19th century. Another General would have tried to catch up, and Giap had the opportunity-he had the offer of trucks, radios, weapons, and training from China-but he saw them as a trap, to turn the North Vietnamese into a weaker version of their enemy. Instead he chose to make the most he had, turning his army’s weaknesses into virtues. Right up to the end of the war, the Americans were still trying to figure out how North Vietnam supplied its armies in the field. To fight, move troops, and ferry supplies, the Americans used helicopters, which gave them tremendous mobility. But the war had to be ultimately to be fought on the ground, and Giap was endlessly inventive in using the jungle to neutralize American air power, disorient American foot soldiers, and camouflage his own troops. He could not hope to win a pitched battle against superior US weaponry, so he put his effort into spectacular, symbolic and demoralizing attacks. Armies that seem to have an edge in money, resources and firepower tend to be predictable. Relying on their equipment instead of knowledge and strategy, they grow mentally lazy. In Operation Desert Storm in 1991 American military strategists made full use of their superior technology. They had learned the lesson of their debacle 20 years earlier in Vietnam. The combination of advanced technology and creative flair proved devastating”.
Without a truly national army with a deep sense of purpose the breakup of Nigeria will be inevitable chiefly because in the erstwhile British Empire all its then colonies with the highest prevalence of “the clash of the civilizations” there has been historical continuity of sorts in balkanization and eventual fragmentation at national independence or much later. First India decimated into Pakistan and Bangladesh, Malaya followed suit becoming Malaysia and Singapore with recently South Sudan seceding from Sudan. Is Nigeria next?
Yahaya-Joe wrote from Rock Road, Wusasa, Zaria, Kaduna State <[email protected]>;
General Malu met his Mea Culpa in Odi, Bayelsa state however his commitment towards building a truly national army was unwavering when he declared “If you fire at me, I will fire to take your head. If you call in the army to take over from the police, the rules of engagement will be different. You should equip the police to enable them carry out their duties”. In a twist of what can today be best described as poetic justice he concluded “the army should be allowed to concentrate on training to protect the territorial integrity of the country”. Malu mercifully met his Waterloo during retirement at his hometown of Zaki-Biam, Benue state where a horde of mutinous soldiers invaded and razed his country home.
In conclusion, his eventual vindication came much recently when a detachment of mutinous soldiers conversely abandoned position at the country home of the serving Chief of Defence Staff. Who will now save the Nigerian military from itself? Since the military is still Nigeria’s most national institution, saving the military is saving Nigeria.
Yahaya-Joe wrote from Rock Road, Wusasa, Zaria, Kaduna State <[email protected]>;