To encrypt, or not to encrypt; that is the question

By encryption, I mean the conversion of the messages (texts, videos, graphics, pictures, etc.) you send out to others, for example, from your phone; into a form that cannot be understood by other people who might have intercepted the messages. In its most basic form, encrypting or the conversion of your messages into gibberish, involves […]

To encrypt, or not to encrypt; that is the question

By encryption, I mean the conversion of the messages (texts, videos, graphics, pictures, etc.) you send out to others, for example, from your phone; into a form that cannot be understood by other people who might have intercepted the messages. In its most basic form, encrypting or the conversion of your messages into gibberish, involves the (mathematical) multiplication of arrays containing your messages, with arrays of usually prime numbers. At the receiving end of the communication, the inverse operation is carried out to recover the original message. Even though the encryption process is conceptually very simple, it does require you to know the manner in which the original message is packed into an array and the specific arrays of prime numbers that have been used. Without being told what these arrays are, it’s practically impossible to decrypt encrypted messages. Imagine being asked to locate a hair-sized object placed somewhere in a big city the size of Lagos, without being given any other information. It’s going to be hard.

Many of the messaging programs, such as WhatsApp or Telegram, encrypt messages sent with them. The way the programs are written, the companies who wrote the applications don’t know the encryption codes, even if they want to decrypt your message! It’s that secure – and this is the part that really frustrates law enforcement all over the globe – especially in Europe. What the government wants is to be able to intercept and read messages sent into anyone’s phones.

To the naïve, the issue of whether or not to encrypt messages is a straight-forward matter; with only binary options: encrypt to protect the privacy of citizens, or don’t encrypt so the government can intercept peoples’ messages and save lives. Unfortunately, the issue is a bit more complicated. 

The case for end-to-end encryption is quite convincing. If all messages were the kinds that you send to friends and family members, may be it wouldn’t matter much if the messages were intercepted. On the other hand, it gets pretty hurtful when banking information sent across the networks gets intercepted and used for malicious purposes – for example, to hack your bank account and steal money. Also, hacking of messages dealing with national security can be damaging to a country. 

The case for not encrypting is also quite convincing; particularly on matters of national security. A case in point is the recent terrorist attack in London by Khalid Masood. Masood was a 52-year old Briton who drove a car into pedestrians, killing three of them and fatally stabbing a police officer. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack. Well, Masood had used WhatsApp to communicate with other people during the hours leading up to the terrorist attack. Allowing a backdoor to the encrypted messages sent or received by Masood, British intelligence might have been able to prevent the terrorist attack and therefore save lives by hacking Masood’s phone messages, particularly if he had been on government’s radar.

Another way, in which a backdoor would have helped, other than the preventive measure described above, is post-mortem, whereby security officers could obtain information about Masood’s communications, in case he had not been followed before the attack. This capability could enable investigators to find out who Masood had been talking with, which would be of tremendous value to law enforcement and the families of the victims alike.

The reaction of Amber Rudd, British Home Secretary, to the terror attack, vis-à-vis WhatsApp’s encryption, is predictable. She had a lot to say about Silicon Valley companies developing all these apps. “We do want them to recognize that they have a responsibility to engage with government, to engage with law enforcement agencies when there is a terrorist situation,” Ms. Rudd was quoted as telling the BBC penultimate Sunday, referring to tech companies. She is also credited with the statement:  “We need to make sure that organizations like WhatsApp, and there are plenty of others like that, don’t provide a secret place for terrorists to communicate with each other.” Ms. Rudd also reminisced on the pre-encryption days, when, with a search warrant in hand, investigators used to be able to “steam open envelopes or just listen in on phones when they wanted to find out what people are doing.” Unfortunately, a backdoor lets everyone in, not just the government; which is a situation that makes the government’s demand complicated.

Ms. Rudd’s demands are reminiscent of the United States government’s demand in February/March of 2016. In that case, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) asked Apple to unlock the iPhone used by one of the attackers who killed 14 people in San Bernardino, California in December 2015. Apple refused, but the FBI was able to find a way to unlock the phone without the help of Apple! 

The general disposition of the tech companies is to resist governments’ demand to compromise the privacy of citizens. However, to help fight crimes, it seems that tech companies might have to do more.