Understanding soft approach to counter-terrorism

The roll out of Nigeria’s Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism, NACTEST provided much needed evidence that the Jonathan Administration had not been besieged by an unwinnable unconventional war waged by faceless insurgents. Rather, while the deadly hostilities between national security forces and the insurgents raged on, the Office of the National Security Adviser had gone […]

Understanding soft approach to counter-terrorism
Understanding soft approach to counter-terrorism

The roll out of Nigeria’s Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism, NACTEST provided much needed evidence that the Jonathan Administration had not been besieged by an unwinnable unconventional war waged by faceless insurgents. Rather, while the deadly hostilities between national security forces and the insurgents raged on, the Office of the National Security Adviser had gone back to the drawing board to develop a counter-insurgency strategy that also targeted the unconventional characteristics of the insurgency from which it derived its “unwinnable” posture.
The sheer vastness of largely uncharted areas of operation and the disproportionate disposition of security forces combine with the drone-like precision attacks on identified vulnerable locations by insurgents in hit-and-run strikes, to complicate and amplify the barely concealed limitations of conventional forces.
Related to this public pessimism is the undeniably static record of operational strategies deployed so far by security forces to counter insurgencies. Nigeria is certainly no stranger to insurgencies therefore it should not be seen to be a novice in combating them. From as far back as 1980, when the Maitatsine sect unleashed the first major outbreak of highly organized armed insurrections under the banner of “religious” creed, the northern region has intermittently been the theatre of several widespread outbreaks of bloody encounters with terrorist insurgencies. What was regarded as a job for the police mobile force soon proved to be no walk over even for combined military security forces, leading to repeated recourse to army as the first line of offensive against insurgents.
 Enhancement of the military’s training schedules to incorporate current counter-terrorism techniques with the collaboration of US, UK and other European agencies as well as the numerous international peace-keeping engagements of Nigerian armed forces initially raised hopes of greater successes against local insurgents. However at this point in the long-drawn and terribly bloody war against terrorism in Nigeria, it is glaring that the expected success has not been forthcoming despite huge allocations of funds and acquisition of latest in weaponry appropriate for conventional operations.
It is instructive that the Office of the National Security Adviser has been assuming higher visibility in the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies of government in the last decade and a half since the scourge began unfolding menacingly as a formidable security challenge. By definition and public expectation, this office should be pre-occupied with the development and articulation of dynamic framework of effective strategies and implementation modes in response to major security challenges for containment and eventual neutralization of the threats in a timely and intelligent manner. Its function is therefore distinct as a veritable trans-service think tank and coordinating centre for the respective corresponding intelligence and security enforcement units of the armed forces, providing overall direction and guidance in addition to routine monitoring.
The significance of Nigeria’s Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism, NACTEST comes into focus against the backdrop of past fixation with an operational strategy that has been tried, tested and testified to be tactically defective in effectively checking the upsurge in security challenges and the desired elimination of militant insurgencies. The urgency of breaking this spell and restoring the vibrancy, resourcefulness and credibility of the Office of the National Security Adviser, was a compelling concern of NSA Sambo Dasuki. He had responded to a call to national duty in the eye of a swirling storm of bloody insurgencies and related terrorist attacks in more than half of the northern flank of the country, flaring wildly over emergency restrictions. He was able to broaden the scope of areas of intervention beyond the battle-fronts to actively involve the wider community of stakeholders, strategic partners and institutions of government at all levels in a radical refocussing of the nation’s counter-terrorism master-plan.
Existing structures within and outside government will be used to deliver targeted programmes and activities that further the overall objective of stemming the tide of radicalism and complement government approach to counter-terrorism with enhanced societal involvement. It also features an economic revitalization programme targeted at states that are most impacted by terrorism. There is every hope that this approach will greatly facilitate active involvement of the general public and all stakeholders in implementing the soft approach strategy which is packaged to complement the on-going military operations, especially in addressing the unconventional factors that defy military options. Nigerians should rally round this new initiative and identify with the national effort to move forward in pursuit of effective and lasting solution to insurgencies in Nigeria. 
Bartholomew is a public affairs analyst in Jalingo.