Why France can’t be Nigeria’s strategic partner (II)

All states are pragmatic in foreign policy Pragmatism doesn’t really tell us what a state’s foreign or strategic policy is, because all states are pragmatic. The first thing one learns in the study of global politics or strategic studies is that ideology, which is the opposite of pragmatism, plays little or no role in the […]

All states are pragmatic in foreign policy Pragmatism doesn’t really tell us what a state’s foreign or strategic policy is, because all states are pragmatic. The first thing one learns in the study of global politics or strategic studies is that ideology, which is the opposite of pragmatism, plays little or no role in the foreign policy calculations of states.

The world system is largely anarchical. In other words, it has no central government, even though it has created a global institution, the UN, that tries to play that role, and there are norms, treaties and laws that seek to regulate the behaviour of states in the international system.

The values or ideologies that inform domestic state practices may be useless in an environment where states are trying to survive, and defend or advance their interests globally. States may profess or uphold certain values, norms or ideologies, but they rarely act as the prism through which they interpret, or behave in, the world, especially if they are seen as an obstacle to the realisation of their core objectives.

Let’s take the examples of the US and the Soviet Union, arch-rivals with diametrically opposed values, systems of government and ideologies. During the Cold War, both countries worked with and supported regimes that didn’t share their ideological beliefs in their struggle for dominance in the world. The US and its Western allies projected an ideology of liberal internationalism (the spread of democracy, human rights and markets on a world scale) at the end of the Cold War when the US became dominant in what came to be called a unipolar world. It did this because it didn’t face any credible opposition and could do as it pleased in the world. That period of hegemony has now ended.

However, even in the heydays of that policy, there are copious studies that have shown that the West’s support for global democracy was selective. And in the current period, the West can’t even uphold a central feature of its ideology on markets and capitalism— the free global movement of goods and capital—as the U.S. slams tariffs on China’s, Mexico’s, and Canada’s exports, and imposes restrictions on the sale of advanced semiconductor chips to China. The strategic policy that informs the protectionist behaviour vis-a-vis China is containment—to prevent China from dominating the world. This is unvarnished great power politics.

The same can be said for the Soviet Union and China, which had ideologically-driven communist systems of government. Let’s take the Soviet Union. Apart from its expansionist activities in Eastern Europe where it played an active role in building communism in those countries, Soviet foreign policy in the wider world was not revolutionary. Indeed, even Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe could be seen as a strategic move to provide a buffer between itself and the more powerful West European and US alliance, NATO, which was steadfast in trying to contain or destroy its communist system.

The Soviets were largely interested in defending the communism they had built in their own country by cultivating friends overseas, irrespective of their ideological inclinations. Their foreign policy was largely pragmatic within the context of protecting Soviet communism and challenging Western global hegemony. There were no Soviet revolutionaries or ideologues running around the world spreading socialism or communism. The Soviets supported left-leaning states that were opposed to Western hegemony as well as conservative or neutral states that were open to doing business with them. Soviet embassies were not filled with revolutionaries, but had spies like the U.S. and other major powers, who helped to provide intelligence and enhance the power of the Soviet Union globally.

Let me give two examples that I witnessed when I taught in Nigeria in the 1980s. Under the leadership of Bolaji Akinyemi, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) held a Roundtable discussion on Soviet-Nigeria relations, and Akinyemi invited me to prepare a lead paper on the Soviet Union’s economic relations with Africa. I gave it my all. I thought I was fair to the Soviet economic system and its trade relations, even though

I raised some critical issues. However, the Soviet representatives at the meeting were unhappy with the paper. During the evening cocktail before the Roundtable, two members of the Soviet embassy pulled me aside and took me to the back of the room. They strongly protested about what I had written, asked me what I wanted, and told me to withdraw the paper. I responded that what they demanded wouldn’t be done and that if they had any issues with the paper they should raise them at the Roundtable.

The following day, my paper was the first to be tabled for discussion. The Soviet ambassador and a large contingent of Soviet officials were in the meeting. I recall that my presentation was methodical and forceful because I had prepared well after my encounter with the Soviet officials the previous evening. When the chair asked for comments, the Soviet ambassador only remarked that the paper was full of factual errors but couldn’t highlight any, and asked the NIIA to schedule another roundtable in which he would invite their own scholars from the Soviet Union to challenge what I had written. I was left with the impression that the Soviet embassy had spies that were masquerading as policy professionals.

My next encounter with Soviet officials in Nigeria was during the Marx and Africa conference at the Ahmadu Bello University in 1983. I was a member of the steering committee of that conference. On the eve of the conference, we were approached by two officials from the Soviet embassy in Lagos who asked us to give them the list of participants for the conference. We politely told them that it wasn’t the policy of our group to provide lists of participants to individuals who were not members of our group. We thought we would see them at the conference the following day, but they left the campus after we rejected their request. They were not interested in the ideas that were going to be discussed at the conference. They only wanted the list of participants for their political work.

What all of this suggests is that, by necessity, all states behave pragmatically in the world system in their struggle to survive or be influential and powerful. Big states, or those with great power ambitions, seek hegemony in their own regions and try to prevent other powerful states with great power ambitions from becoming hegemonic at the global level.

Small states with no great power ambitions tread cautiously by not offending any of the great powers, or seek protection from one of the great powers by becoming vassal states. Power and interests—not pragmatism, which every state practices—provide a powerful prism for understanding the foreign and strategic policies of states. To be continued

 

Bangura wrote from Nyon, Switzerland [email protected]