Why Nigeria’s Arms Deals Keep Failing And What Needs to Change
By Yusuf Maikanti In 2021, Nigeria’s military quietly acquired Chinese Wing Loong II drones to combat Boko Haram. By 2023, many were grounded, victims of faulty tech and zero after-sales support. The same happened with our T-72 tanks, bought from Belarus and left to rust without spare parts. This isn’t a rare case; it’s the […]
By Yusuf Maikanti
In 2021, Nigeria’s military quietly acquired Chinese Wing Loong II drones to combat Boko Haram. By 2023, many were grounded, victims of faulty tech and zero after-sales support. The same happened with our T-72 tanks, bought from Belarus and left to rust without spare parts. This isn’t a rare case; it’s the predictable result of a broken procurement system. For over a decade, Nigeria has scrambled to arm itself against insurgency, swinging between Western suppliers with political strings and Easten partners offering cheap but unreliable hardware. The result? A military stuck with incompatible, poorly maintained weapons, while insurgents grow stronger. It’s time to admit our current approach isn’t working, and to prioritise local production and smarter procurement.
The appeal of Eastem suppliers like China and Russia is obvious: no human rights lectures, lower prices, and faster deals. Nigeria bought Russian Mi-35 helicopters and Chinese VT-4 tanks, only to face spare parts shortages and technical failures. The Wing Loong drones, hailed as game-changers, now gather dust because Beijing provided no maintenance support. These aren’t isolated cases. The Stockholm Intemational Peace Research Institute notes that China supplied over a third of Nigeria’s arms between 2017-2021, but many underperformed in the field. Even our Alpha Jets, bought decades ago, are now useless due to neglect, proof that no weapon lasts without upkeep. Meanwhile, the 2014 U.S. blockade on Cobra helicopters, over human rights concerns, forced Nigeria into rushed deals with fewer safeguards. The lesson? Reliance on any single foreign supplier is risky, whether due to political whims or equipment that doesn’t work well.
The deeper issue is Nigeria’s failure to invest in its own defence industry. The Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), established in 1964, should be the backbone of self-reliance. Instead, it’s held back by underfunding and bureaucracy. Its OBJ-006 rifle, meant to symbolise self-sufficiency, still relies on imported parts. Contrast this with South Africa’s Paramount Group, which produces armoured vehicles for global markets, or Turkey’s booming drone industry. Nigeria has the capacity; what’s missing is political will. Local firms like Proforce already manufacture mine-resistant vehicles, yet the military still imports overpriced, refurbished equipment from questionable middlemen. The $500 million contract for outdated Puma helicopters in 2014, a deal stained by corruption, shows how broken the system is.
Fixing this requires three steps. First, Nigeria must prioritise local arms production. DICON needs funding and partnerships with tech-savvy nations like Turkey or Israel to bridge gaps in expertise. Cheap Chinese training ($50,000 per soldier) sounds good, until troops face drones they can’t repair. Second, procurement must be streamlined and transparent. An independent oversight body could end the graft that ruins military deals, ensuring funds buy functional gear, not political favours. Third, every foreign purchase must include after-sales agreements. Nigeria can’t afford more abandoned helicopters or drones rotting in hangars.
The insurgency won’t wait. Boko Haram and ISWAP adapt faster than Nigeria’s slow, inefficient buying system. Buying foreign might offer short-term fixes, but true security comes from self-reliance. Imagine if the $2.1 billion lost to Dasuki’s arms fraud had funded local factories or maintenance hubs. Nigeria’s military would be stronger, and its economy richer. The choice is clear. keep patching holes with foreign quick fixes, or build a system that works. The time to choose is now.